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Prepared for: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 
Contract No. GA-924 

October 1974 


301 Maple Avenue, West 

Vienna, Virginia 2218f 

(703) 281-4503 



1.1 Report Use 1-1 

1.2 General Findings 1-5 

1.3 Recommendations 1-8 

1.4 Study Overview 1-15 

1.5 System History, Brief Description and Review 1-20 

1.6 Vendor History and Review 1-26 


2.1 Overview 2-2 

2.2 Equipment Characteristics/Operational Requirements 2-4 

2.3 Equipment Storage 2-17 

2.4 Equipment Maintenance 2-28 

2.5 Machine Set-Up and Testing 2-39 

2.6 Equipment Security . 2-52 

2.7 Ballot 2-65 

2.8 Staffing 2-80 

2.9 Training 2-88 

2.10 Voter Education 2-98 

2.11 Voter Process 2-106 

2.12 Vote Tallying 2-113 

2.13 Computer Support 2-126 

2.14 Vendor Supplies/Services and Equipment Cost 2-132 


3.1 Overview 3-2 

3.2 Selection Guide Data Development 3-3 

3.3 Selection Guide Summary 3-12 


4.1 Overview 4-2 

4.2 International Election Systems Televote 4-3 

4.3 CES (Computer Election System) Precinct Ballot 

Counter 4-4 

4.4 Gyrex Corporation 4-5 

4.5 Hewlett-Packard Vote Tally System 4-7 

4.6 Accuvote - Accuvote International, Inc. 4-10 

4.7 Frank Thornber Co. - Video Voter 4-12 

4.8 Electronic Voting Machine Corporation (EVE) 4-14 




5.1 Methods of Procurement 

5.2 Bid Solicitations 

5.3 Bid Invitation 

5.4 Contracting 

5.5 Bid Evaluation 



8.1 Findings 

8.2 Conclusions 

Appen dlx 




1 Jurisdictions Visited 

2 Machine Vendor Listing 

3 Machine Specifications 

4 Machine Storage Information 

5 Machine Maintenance Requirements 

6 Machine Set-Up and Testing Specifications 

7 Machine Security Characteristics 

8 Voting Machines Capacities and Procedures 

9 Voting Systems Staffing Requirements 

10 Voter System Training Requirements 

11 Voter Education for Voting Systems 

12 Voting Systems Processes 

13 Tally Operations Summary 

14 Tally Procedures Summary 

15 State Organization Responsible for Administration of 
Voting Machine Legislation 

16 Duties of the Administrative Organization 

17 Procedures Required to Have Machines Approved 

18 Specifications for Voting Machines 

19 State Fraud Prevention Requirements for Machines or 

20 Identification of Specific Types of 
Legislation) That are Allowed by the 




This report contains the results of a study of voting systems conducted 
by Analytic Systems, incorporated of Vienna, Virginia, under a contract 
with the Office of Federa! Elections, to Describe, Anal^e and Compare 
the Current^ Available Methods of Vote Counting Shipment ~ n l^r~ 
past, each Jurisdiction considering a change in the vote counting 
equipment it was using was required to individually locate and research 
each of te e x istin g system The purpose of the study was to collect 
etai e information concerning each systems operation and to presen 

hl s in option in a format that would permit easy comparison ase 
oca, need and serve as a reference guwe fM ^ _ 

ning changes in systems. F 

Data was collected from all the manufacturers presently (Januarv 197M 


systems. s ctons using manual 

follows: n 3n USe f -> -ctlon of the report 


overview of how systems 



2.0 System Comparisons. This section is structured to permit 

jurisdictions to examine local elections system requirements 
according to thirteen operational requirements of the voting 
process. These include such requirements as storage, tally- 
ing, etc. Each section contains a summary and a detailed 
description of each system. Persons approaching this as a 
report will find that the summaries contain sufficient detail, 
Subsequent system descriptions are provided to assist local 
elections officials in system selection. 

3.0 System Selection Guide. This section contains a System 

Selection Guide which is designed to permit jurisdictions to 
analyze their requirements within each area of their voting 
system operation and subsequently base their system selec- 
tion on the results of this comparison. Completion of the 
selection guide requires use of local data in conjunction 
with information contained in Section 2.0. 

4.0 Current Research and Development. In describing the status 
of current voting system research this section identifies 
jurisdictions where tests have occured and specifies manu- 
facturers of current R&D systems. This information will 
prove useful when further contact is desired. 

5.0 Procurement. This section summarizes the user site study 

findings concerning procurement. Additionally, it provides 
procurement recommendations, considerations, and related 
computer programming requirements. This section is written 
for jurisdictions planning new systems and entering new 
areas of system, supply and service procurement. 


Legislation. This section pro 

. s section pro- 

vito a suBmary of the voting machine legislation for each 
<* the tifty states. Additionally, it identifies the states 

Porfo voting machine certification and the lndivldual 

' organization responsible for this function. 

This section contains a su mary of 
used in other major natlons of ^ 

Thls sectlon cont 

jurisdictions Bho had reported T " 

if the votlno fc< ' "^ Charges of wu 

cne voting machines or the =,,= ^ 

a part of the fraud. y Deration 

:>: two appendices provided with the re Dort H ^ 

a> * sue visits ribe the 




Subsequent sections of the report contain study findings relative to 
each of the particular elements of voting systems under consideration 
within that section. This section addresses conclusions that may be 
generalized from the specific findings. 

1.2.1 No "Ultimate" System 

A major finding of the study is that there is presently no system 
which is superior in all instances. Although users surveyed identified 
minor problems with existing systems none expressed dissatisfaction 
with their system, and all felt their system operated smoothly. Each 
system has its strong and weak points, arid the requirements of each 
jurisdiction are unique. Therefore, system selection should be made 
by considering how the strong and weak points of particular voting 
systems match the requirements of a particular jurisdiction. This 
report has been structured to facilitate such an approach by prospective 

1.2.2 Voting Processes May be Categorized 

Voting processes may be characterized as being of two basic types. 

These are: 

. Machine systems which tally the vote as it is cast 
(no ballot) . The tallying consists of tabulating 
machine totals either manually or electronically. 

. Ballot systems in which individual ballots are 
stored in ballot boxes. The tallying consists 
of either manually, mechanically or electronically 
tabulating the individual ballots. 


are in the first category. They have the advan- 
i-iius machine totals as soon as the polls close and of 
^ individual ballot tabulation problems. They have th, 
"_ l ; ul S difficult to transport and store and of not pro- 

u.viuua.L ballot audit trail. 

i "allot systems include the manual 

, punch card and optical 

unique features, the flow and 

Same ' ^ese system have the 
- POH operations, lndlvlduaa baUofc ^^ ^^ 

where poor ven 


in the 

or more 

1 Paso> 

e actlvtl 


1.2.4 Fraud 

Fraud is a problem related to people, not to systems. Fraud is not a 
problem where there are effective management controls and two party 
participation occurs throughout the voting process. When these control 
do not exist, however, fraud is a problem and can occur no matter what 
system is being used. 


The computer is not a part of any one system although some systems rely 
on the computer more than others 3 and the computer is frequently used 
to provide quick tallying for all systems. The computer is often singl 
out as a potential instrument for fraud since, as a black box, its 
processing cannot be observed. Effective management controls and valid 
tion procedures will eliminate any possibility of fraud from this sourc 
Observations made from this study indicate that the problem of getting 
data to the computer is consistently greater than problems generated 
through the operation of the computer. 



= or" the range of interviews with mac hine manufacture mul 
s-Bgcst, the following reco^endations be Jmpleo.ented ,,v 
ot Federal Elections. 


that a ""al observation of 
insight to the advanta 

be emphasl 





to be evaluated 


r d Chambers 


2. Study of State Certification Procedures 

A number of states have given a board or state official the responsi- 
bility to certify each voting system before it can be marketed and used 
within the state. This is an important and, we feel, proper function 
for each state to perform in protection of its local election officials 
from an excess of salesmen marketing products or services that have 
not demonstrated the capability of providing dependable, accurate vote 

AS1 recommends that a survey of those states who now provide this certi- 
fication be conducted so that those states with no certifications can 
consider the advisability of such a program and the actual results of 
existing programs be evaluated. The proposed survey would obtain: 

. Legal basis for certification. 

. Make up of the board or committee. 

. Aspects of each system to be evaluated. 

. Procedures to accomplish evaluation. 

From this survey general guidelines will be developed to be presented 
as models for state certification law and procedure. Special emphasis 
will be placed on simplifying computer oriented aspects of these systems 

3. State Standards for Computer Use in Vote Counting 

The National Bureau of Standards Is conducting a study of the fraud 
potential associated with various voting system computer programs pre- 
sently in use within several jurisdictions across the country. This 
study will provide considerable information concerning those programs 
studied, but it will not address the experience of various states in 
dealing with computer programs used for vote counting. In many 


jurisdictions the modifications associated with state and local efforts 
have had significant impact on the conduct of elections. It would 
appear that a timely and valuable product could be produced that would 
compare the results of the NBS study against the background of efforts of 
states to utilize the computer in vote counting. The study could pro- 
vide guidelines for model state election codes for proper control of 
computer associated vote counting. Many states simply do not have the 
expertise within their data processing staffs to prepare such guidelines 
or design legislation that would not hamper the use of computers in 
attempting to prevent serious election difficulties. ASI recommends 
that such a study be undertaken. Emphasis should also be placed on 
proper preparation for election day processing, including establishment 
of back-up equipment to meet election day emergencies. As pointed out 
in the basic report the management element rather than the equipment 
element has the most impact on the success or failure of a vote counting 
system. A study that will highlight these management as well as equip- 
ment aspects of election administration should contribute to fewer 
election day disasters where computers are used. 

4. Vote Fraud Considerations 

In the report developed from the survey of election boards it was 
noted that few jurisdictions reported fraud charges and that of those 
that did report such charges an even smaller number reported vote fraud 
as opposed to registration fraud. Nevertheless, it is imperative that 
the public and legislators be provided with detailed information regard- 
ing types of vote fraud that may have occurred. Initial identification 
of alleged vote fraud occurrences should be accomplished through follow- 
up of these jurisdictions reporting charges of vote fraud in the above 
referenced study. Jurisdictions should then be examined in terms of 
type of voting system used and the type of fraud charged to determine if 
there Is a relationship between the occurrence or type of fraud and 


the use of a particular voting system. Other characteristics of the 
jurisdiction should also be noted to determine if other patterns can 
be identified and a comprehensive report developed from the information. 

The report will also categorize the identified cases and include general 
observations regarding the size of the vote fraud problem as well as 
guidelines for legislators to use in writing fraud prevention portions of 
legislation and election officials to use in writing election procedures 
that will minimize the chance of fraud in their jurisdiction. 

5. Effect of Systems on Voting Participation and Voting Patterns 

This study of voting machines has, with some related studies, developed 
considerable information related to the important issue of how local 
jurisdictions should select appropriate voting systems. Little attention 
has been paid. to the question of how differing types of systems effect 
the participation of voters in casting ballots. Some studies by machine 
manufacturers suggest that this equipment is indeed a significant factor. 
Several questions arise concerning the impact of voting machines on 
the voter. Does the fact that some machine systems encourage polling 
places to serve larger numbers of voters have any effect on the partici- 
pation of those voters while in the booth? Does the voting process 
of each system have any effect on the propensity of voters to cast votes 
for the entire ballot? Does the amount of voter information provided 
regarding the voting process on a given machine system have any effect 
on their participation? 

ASI recommends that a study of these factors be conducted. Site selec- 
tion for such a study can be accomplished effectively through use of the 
data base created from the Survey of Election Boards conducted by ASI 
for the Office of Federal Elections. Sites should be selected with both 
Tnanual and machine systems and analysis of a recent election conducted 
to measure fall off in voting participation from the top of the ballot 


.' ballot. A report should be prepared to 

tion officials regarding the effect of voting 
;ieneiits of voter participation. 

-- ^ infection to be developed about tlla .on,, 

, P-rticipatlcn/pattems and voting systema anothor 

: T UCa1 C deVel Plng '-' **" into vo tur 

can be s 

"tilled a technique o, 

tha polls to ^^ ^ _ 

" ithvoters 


"3 interview would be 

* Partlcuiar 

"'^m.ation he harf 

-v 0ter , sreact ion 



^ ldaut . Uy 




a concern 




7. Regional Seminars 

Upgrading the knowledge of state and local election officials with 
respect to elements of successful election administration is a most 
Important technical area that must be considered as a basic area of 

sponsorship by the Office of Federal Elections. The Survey of Election 

Boards indicates that election officials themselves identify various 

types of training as the most significant deficiency within the election 
process. The importance of such training is underscored by observa- 
tions made within this study which show that voting fraud is a function 
of election management rather than of the voting system used. An 
organization of an association of election officials recently formed 
provides a possible vehicle for sponsoring regional seminars for train- 
ing election officials and for developing techniques which would permit 
local officials to train more effectively within their jurisdictions. 
Such seminars should be supported from the Federal level by the prepara- 
tion of training materials using case study approaches from identified 
successful election offices. AS! recommends that an effort be initiated 
to identify jurisdictions currently successful in each of the major 
areas of election administration such as utilization of voting machines 
of each type, public education programs, training of election officials 
and planning logistics for an election. OFE should then take the steps 
necessary to convert this experience into a training package(s) which 
could be used in a series of seminars to transmit effective techniques 
to appropriate election officials. 

Analytic Systems Incorporated, Survey of Election Boards, 
May 1974, ' 


In order to mitigate redundant testing of voting machines, national 
standards should be developed for election system equipment and equipment: 
should be subjected to appropriate engineering tests by the federal 
^oyeni-Kmt. The results of these tests should be communicated to the 
.-it.UL's so that the same test does not have to be repeated fifty times 
tor each piece of equipment. In order to determine what standards 
should be set for such national testing, state certification processes 
should be examined in detail to relate state "law" to the actual pro- 
cfcduros currently employed within the states. 



Data used to prepare this report was collected from 11 manufacturers nc 
marketing systems, from _4_ companies currently developing systems and fi 
28 systems users including all types of voting systems. Current manuf; 
turers are identified on Page 1-27, those involved in research efforts 
are identified in Section 4.0, while the chart on Pages 1-16 thru 1-18 
lists the 28 users studied, the type of system they used and selected 
characteristics describing users and their systems. 

Site visits were conducted at a minimum of two user locations for each 
system with the exception of the Accuvote and Control Data systems, 
which had only one user at the time the study was conducted. Users 
were selected based on population, large and small, to determine if 
jurisdiction size had an effect on the system operation. System per- 
formance, as reported in the Survey of Election Boards , was also 
used as a selection criteria. Site visits were made to a location 
where performance was rated as good and, when possible, at one locatic 
that identified problems. 

Study guides were developed to assure that consistent and compatible 
data were collected from each site and from each system operation. 
Separate vendor and user question sets were developed. Both sets were 
structured similarly except that vendors were not asked to provide dat 
describing experience in the use of the system. Areas covered by the 
guide were: 

User (Vendor) Characteristics 
. Equipment Characteristics 
. Equipment Storage 

C1) Analytic Systems, Incorporated, Survey of Election Boards, 
Washington, D.C., May 1974. 





















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. Equipment Maintenance 

. Pre-election Procedures 

. Post Election Procedures 

. Ballot 

. Equipment/System Security/Integrity 

. Staffing 

. Training 

. Voter Education 

. Voter Process 

. Vote Tallying 

Peripheral System/ Equipment Requirements 

. Supplies/Services 

. Procurement 

. Cost Items (Equipment and Supplies) 

Guides were tested at one vendor and one user location. Appropriate 
modifications were made to the guides based on the test results. All 
.endor and user interviews were subsequently conducted during Eebruar> 
March and April 1974. 

Concurrent with the data collection efforts an analysis of the state 
laW s effecting voting machines and system was perfor^d and forexgn 
e^aesies in Washington were contacted to e^ine foreign votxng 
systems and use. 


Electoral systems had f-h < K 

ia their beginnings in ancient- 

st rt ' v ting "- *. y a show of ha n 

^ " Sil * *". , black balls Qf h ; 

and unmarked shen M , , ""^ r by Usln 8 

4.1 stl ells. Much later -j n I^Q A 

the concept of paper bal , ^ ' 1H58 ' Au stralia introduced 

^ r oallot secrecy and "secrpf" K n 

since become known aa H, A , fc s y ste ms have 

as the Australian ballot. 

Manual voting systems 

y eni s uamg paper ballots are sMn 

cent of the jurisdiction ^- , USed Within 5 3 per- 

J ^^-cions withxn the United S^^^ Qe - c ^ 

jurisdictions (some Use h , h , S ' 52 percent o f the 

^e both manual and marMn^ 
for casting the " secret ,, ... f ^ ^^ Use raa ^ine systems 

ola sslfled as leve r maChille SyStems ^ arbitrarily 


of these systems 

1*5.1 Lever^J^stems 

Jacob Myers developed 
election. it was a 
York, Six years 
was established in New 

^vel opment of 

be used in . UiS . 

o manuactur 
This corporation cont inilft , 

<-xnues to manufacture 
unde the name of AVM r 


*" ^ 

1898, the Automan \* 

^tomat lc Voting Machine Company 

to manufacture nnH i 

market fchose ^chines. 

m i 

ket lever ^chines 

Around 1910 Samuel Shoun A < * * 

p designed and develonprf ., ^ 

The Shoup Voting Machine r , u " maChlne 

bX Sa mu el Shoup has g ne 7^' ^ "' " Ot or controlled 
these systems are now ^^ " ac qu isitio ns and c h a n ges and 
Section S ys te ms (IES) "" uf ' CtU d a " d -rketed by International 


Seismograph Service Corporation developed a lever machine in the late 
1930s and marketed this system until 1967. At that time, Seismograph 
discontinued the manufacturing of lever machines and began to manufactui 
and distribute punch card systems. 

Ransom F. Shoup, who served as President of the Shoup Voting Machine 
Company for a short time in 1970, and his son recently developed a 
lever machine. They have formed the R.F. Shoup Corporation and have 
orders pending although no machines have been installed at this time. 

Lever voting machines served almost exclusively as the machine voting 
process through the early 1960s, and the machines used were either AVM 
or Shoup. Generally the lever machine consists of self contained voting 
booth, voting machine and a tallying mechanism. The ballot is a fixed 
part of the machine and the candidate is selected by moving a lever 
either over or beside the name on the ballot. Write-in slots are pro- 
vided under individual doors and the candidate 1 s name written in. The 
lever machines are programmed each election to permit the selection of 
no more than the proper number of candidates for each office including 
write-ins. There is no overvoting possible if the machine is correctly 

After all candidates and issues have been selected the vote is recorded 
by moving a master lever which advances the counters for each lever set 
in the voting position. The master handle also returns levers to origin 
(no vote) position and opens the booth curtains. Any selections can be 
changed prior to pulling the master lever. After the polls close, the 
vote count is recorded from each of the counters on each machine. Votes 
are added together manually for all machines in one poll location. The 
results from each poll location are tabulated centrally, either manually 

or by a mechanical/automated process. 



Joseph P. Harris, Professor of Political SM 

of California at Berkelev H e i ^"^ 3t the adversity 

yd pe he v c 




an marketed the syst em untll 1969 . 
discontinued this marketing and si R ned 11,, 
Sanies. Ihese companles 8 ^ 
P-ent of Cities to IBM . The 

' CES - Computer Election Systems 


VIP - Voting Instrument Products 

' EMI " ElCtr Mechanlca!, Incorporated 

Seiacor - Seismograph Corporation 

of these corporations has marketed the " 


. :; :::;;:?; - - - 


., h . a Mmlt . d eh " - .. 

wij-ginai license agreement 

only two companies retaining the riehf- 


The Votomatic system uses a prescored punch card ballot, with each of 
the prescored voting positions (228) being numbered. The ballot is ii 
serted in the top of the voting device and positioned under the ballol 
pages. The ballot pages contain the candidates and issues and are 
affixed in the voting device so that the number beside each candidate 
name corresponds to the exposed number on the ballot card. The voter 
his or her selection by punching out the prescored block opposite the 
candidate's name with the same number. The voter continues from the 
front to back through the ballot pages making selections. The voter 
proofs the ballot by reviewing to be sure that all numbers correspond, 
If a mistake has "been made the voter returns the ballot to the poll ji 
and receives a new ballot. The completed ballot is placed in a balloi 
envelope which is placed In. the ballot box. The ballot envelope pro- 
vides space for write-ins, 

The Graphic Arts Division of Diamond International Corporation and 
Carlisle-Graphics, a division of Litton Industries, developed similar 
punch card systems in 1970. These systems, Datavote and Accuvote, 
differ from the Votomatic system in that the ballot is printed on the 
punch card and is not prescored. Any number of printed ballot puna 

cards can be used to make up a total ballot. The voting device con- 
sists primarily of a flat tray for holding the ballot cards and a pun 
unit which slides back and forth on a bar. The voter places a ballot 
card on the tray, moves the punch unit to position it over the X on t 
ballot for the candidate desired and depresses the punch unit which 
punches a hole in the card. Since a separate punch action is require 
for each selection, each ballot card is placed individually in the 
voting device and selections are made until total ballot is completed 
The ballot is proofed by checking to be sure a hole is punched beside 
the desired candidate's name. If an error is made, a new ballot may 
obtained from the poll judge. Write-in space is provided for each of 
and is accomplished by punching the X beside the blank position and 
writing in the candidate's name. 


The ballot is inserted into the voting device and the punch device is 
positioned over the ballot block desired by sliding it to the desired 
position. The punch device is then depressed to punch a hole in the 
desired position. A separate punch action is required for each vote 
cast, for each separate office or issue. 

Punch card systems use a central tallying point for processing after 
voting is completed. The tallying process requires, at a minimum, a 
card tabulating device (marketed by the vendors) which will process 
all ballots from one poll location and print out the totals. When 
this tallying system is used a lead card is used to program the machine 
for each ballot style and poll loc ation totals must be tabulated indi- 
vidually. to l arger systems card readers are used ^ produce ^^^^ 

tapes which are subsequently processed by computers, to provide totals. 
1 -5.3 Optical Scan Systems 

In the late 1950s, Los Angeles County appropriated approximately 
$1,000,000 to support the development of equipment to expedite paper 
ballot counting. The Norden Division of United Aircraft developed an 
optical scanning system as part of this support effort. The system 
was purchased by Coleman Systems and marketed by then, until 1971. Since 
that time Gyrex Corporation, which has been a subcontractor for system 
parts, has taken over the manufacturing and distribution of this system. 

In the early 1960s, a second optical scan system was developed and 
Votronics, Incorporated was formed. The Votronic Corporation was 
acquired by Cubic Corporation in 1964, and they have been manufacturing 
and distributing this optical scan system since that time. 

in the late 1960s, Control Data Corporation began testing the use of its 
21 Optical Character Scanner as a vote tallying device. The District 
f Columbia has tested the system in two elections. To date, there 
as been no active marketing of this system. 


The optical scan process marketed by the three companies, although 
different systems, operate using the same principle. The vote is cast 
on a paper ballot, similar to a manual ballot, by marking the selection 
with a flourescent inking stamp for Cubic or Gyrex or a pencil for 
CDC. If errors in voting are detected by the voter, he or she may ob- 
tain a new ballot from the poll judge and the erroneous ballot is voidec 
All ballots are sent to a central tallying point where they are processe 
by optical readers. The optical readers, depending on the system, will 
produce either precinct totals which can be tallied manually or magneti< 
tape which can be processed by computer to provide election results. 



The size and resources of the vendor are not extremely important in 
noting system selection, if the firm Is sufficiently reputable to fulfill 
the contract terms. Vendor support services, a most important considera- 
tion, do not appear as an item on the balance sheet. Generally, it can 
,)e assumed that the older, more established companies, can provide such 
services; however, certain basic guarantees should be included as part 
Df any contract, prior to the purchase of a voting system. These are 
Hscussed in detail within Section 2.11, Procurement Considerations. 

lhart 2 on Page 27 lists the eleven vendors currently marketing 
/oting systems and provides limited information about business and 
:orporate affiliations. 

Ihether operating as divisions of larger corporations or independent 
-.orporations, only four manufacturers list voting systems, allied 
Cervices and supplies as 100 percent of their business. Of these four, 
l.F. Shoup is marketing but has no active installations and no Gyrex 
ivstem has been sold in several years. The third, International Elec- 
tion Systems, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Macrodyne, Incorporated 
iccounting for only a small protion of Macrodyne* a total business. As 
L result CES is the only major active corporation currently writing 100 
ercent of its business within the voting system area. AVM is the 
ily voting machine company to date that has acquired other businesses 
s part of its corporate structure. As a result of these acquisitions 
-oting systems now make up only 28 percent of AVM's total business. 

hree of the current punch card vendors are printing and supply companies 
ho have added voting systems to their business as a means of providing 
ore complete service to customers. Their direct marketing efforts are 
imited to existing geographic areas they are servicing, however. 


M 4J 

c S 

o w 

u nj 

-u a. 

- 1 


The following pages provide a brief summary of the vendor's history and 
discuss problems or potential problems the corporations have experienced 
which are related to the production and sale of voting systems equipment, 
Histories are sequenced alphabetically by type of system, lever, punch 
card and optical scan. 

1,6.1 Lever ; Systems AVM Corporation 

The first mechanical voting machine, which served in an 
official election in Lockport, New York in 1892, was 
developed by a safemaker who was determined to use his 
specialized knowledge to stop election fraud. He founded 
the manufacturing company in Jamestown, New York in 1898, 
which was to become the Automatic Voting Machine Corpora- 
tion, now the largest manufacturer of election equipment 
in the United States. 

In 1964, management formed the AVM Corporation, taking 
the abbreviated nickname by which the company came to be 
known among government officials. At that time, in addi- 
tion to manufacturing and marketing election systems 
through its Automatic Voting Machine Division, AVM Corpora- 
tion began to diversify its product line by acquiring 
companies which produced checking lockers and locks, auto- 
motive control valves ,, and office furniture, Other 
companies which were subsequently acquired, among them 
manufacturers of marine and hospital furniture and 
industrial and kitchen cabinetry, were sold in 1973 - 74, 
due to their incompatibility with AVM's marketing struc- 
ture or because of marginal profitability. 


In 1974, Automatic Voting Machine Division changed its 
name to Election System Division which more accurately 
describes its functions and services, since these encom- 
pass total election systems, not just voting machines. 
It Is the largest division of AVM, including number of 
employees, size of facilities, and sales percentages. 

During 1973 the corporate management was changed, in- 
stalling a new Chairman of the Board, President, Execu- 
tive Vice President, Vice President for Finance and 
Secretary/Treasurer . 


Certain Legal Proceedings 

"In 1974, the company settled three indictments involv- 
ing prior management under arrangements with the U.S. 
Justice department. Pursuant to these arrangements the 
company, on February 7, 1974, entered, and the Court 
accepted, a change of its earlier plea of not guilty to 
a plea of nolo contendere with respect to an indictment 
which charged the company's then president with violations 
of the proxy solicitation and reporting requirements of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and of certain pro- 
visions of the United States Criminal Code. The indict- 
ment also charged the company and its former president 
with failure to file a schedule with its 1970 Annual 
Report on Form 10-K showing certain indebtedness by him 
to the company. As a consequence thereof the company 
was sentenced on April 8, 1974 to pay a fine of $5,000. 

On March 26, 1974 the Federal Court in Buffalo, N.Y. 
accepted the company's change of its pleas of not guilty 
to pleas of nolo contendere with respect to the other 
two indictments which charged the company and several of its 
former officers with violation of the federal criminal laws 
through the use of the mails to facilitate bribery and 
with conspiracy to bribe public officials in connection 
with the sale of voting machines. The company was fined 
on April 8, 1974, $13,500 and $35,000 respectively, in 
connection with its pleas in these two indictments". 


Source - AVM Corporation Management 

1-31 Tv^Prnational Election Systems (Shoup_) 
Research indicates that the Shoup Voting Machine Corpora- 
tion began around 1910 and operated on a limited scale 
until the early 1930s. Other information indicates that 
Samuel R. Shoup developed the system in the 1920s in 
Philadelphia and a corporation was formed at that time 
with Shoup being a minor stock holder. In either case, 
the development and sale of the model 2.5 in the mid 
1930s turned the corporation into a successful and pro- 
fitable operation. 

In 1961, General Battery and Ceramic Corporation of New 
York incorporated Consolidated General Battery Corpora- 
tion (Pennsylvania) Filters, Inc., and Shoup Voting Machine 
Corporation. The company made batteries and spark plugs. 
Subsidiaries manufacture ceramic products, subminiature 
and microminiature hermetically sealed relays, glass-to- 
metal seals, relays and related products. They also 
assemble, manufacture and service voting machines, toll 
collection devices and related equipment. 

In 1965, General Battery and Ceramic Corporation sold 
the voting machine operations to a newly formed group. 
The new company was incorporated as S 


Macrodyne-Chatillon Corporation which was in the aerospace 
business was looking to diversify their production. They 
acquired Shoup Voting Machines in 1969 for an estimated 
$6,000,000, primarily in stock. Macrodyne then brought the 
manufacturing portion of the business into their subsidiary 
United Aero Products. 

In July 1971 a Federal Grand Jury indicted Shoup Voting 
Machine Company and nine individuals including its president 
on charges of bribery, mail fraud and conspiracy. One 
indictment charged that officials of the Shoup Corporation 
conspired to sell 200 machines to Hills borough County, 
Florida for $530,700 through bribery of local persons. 

The President and other individuals involved left the com- 
pany at that point and formed their own marketing company 
and marketed the Shoup machines until early 1972. In 
early 1972, the individuals were convicted and their market- 
ing agreement was terminated. 

"Effective March 31, 1972, Macrodyne-Chatillon wrote off 
its investment in, and deconsolidated, The Shoup Voting 
Machine Corporation (Shoup), a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
Liquidation of Shoup was approved by the Board of Direc- 
tors. This was done because of alleged acts of former 
management which resulted in adverse publicity, and be- 
cause of a $2.3 million federal income tax lien which 
resulted in the Internal Revenue Service seizing certain 
assets. A new corporation, International Election Systems 
Corporation, was formed to continue the voting machine 
operations ." (3) 


Standard and Poor's Directory, 1972. 


International Election Systems had no marketing staff and 
in March of 1972 signed an agreement with CES (Computer 
Election Systems) to market their equipment. By October 
1972, however, International Election Systems decided to 
market the system on their own and terminated the CES mar- 
keting rights by mutual agreement. 

International Election System has now developed its own 
marketing staff and is performing that function in-house. 

1,6.1.3 R.F. Shoup Corporation 

Ransom F. Shoup and Ransom F. Shoup II left Shoup Interna- 
tional Election Systems and formed the R.F. Shoup Corpora- 
tion, incorporated in 1972. They have developed a new 
lever voting machine and have orders for machines in 
Louisiana, Virginia, Alabama and Tennessee. No machines 
have been installed at this point. 

A complaint (4) filed on March 30, 1973, a $9 million suit, 
by International Election Systems Corporation of Burlington, 
New Jersey, in the United States District Court, Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, against Ransom F. Shoup, Ransom 
P. Shoup II, Ransom F. Shoup and Company, Incorporated and 
Election Services and Supplies, Incorporated, alleges in- 
fringement of patents; taking and using proprietary tech- 
nical information, deceiving customers, users, purchasers, 
service clients, and prospective customers, by using the 
na.e, designation, and trademark "Shoup", conversion of 

Election News, April 1973 


materials and parts for their own use; and fraudulent 
entering into an agreement with Computer Election Systems, 
Incorporated of Berkeley, California, in derogation of 
the rights of International Election Systems Corporation. 

Damages are claimed as in excess of $1 million for im- 
properly taking trade secrets and over $2 million for un- 
fair competition and fraud, use and conversion of property, 
Treble damages are requested due to the alleged willful 
and fraudulent basis of the defendants' actions. 

1.6.2 Punch Card Systems Carlisle Graphics (Accuvote) Litton Industries 

The Accuvote system is a punch card system developed by 
Carlisle Graphics which is a division of Litton Industries, 
Carlisle Graphics is a printing company working in the 
following areas of activity: 


County and Municipal 4% 

Labels for Cans and Bottles 28% 

Checks 17% 

Collateral (Annual Reports, Brochures, etc) 35% 

Point of Purchase Advertising Poster Displays 6% 

Election services are sold to political jurisdictions 
within Northern California. These services provide all 
printed materials required by the election system used 
including ballot printing, ballot samples and precinct 
supply sets. Precinct supply sets contain all supplies 
necessary to conduct elections at the precinct level. 


In 1971, the Accuvote system was developed by James 
Curtis, the Vice President of Carlisle Graphics, to per- 
mit the expansion of the election services provided to 
political jurisdictions. The Accuvote process is a 
direct punch into a printed punch card ballot. The pre- 
sent system permits 38 positions for a one punch card 
ballot. Future systems will permit 52 positions per card, 

Carlisle Graphics markets a ballot tabulator for county 
votes and are presently developing a mini 8K computer to 
tabulate punch card ballots. Present plans are only to 
market the system in Northern California. They will 
license other companies to market the minicomputer in 
other geographic areas. 

1,6.2,2 CES (Computer Election Systems) 
Joseph P. Harris, assisted by William Rouveral, began 
designing the Votomatic vote recorder process in 1962. 
Kenneth Hazlett, future co-founder of CES, assisted in 
the development of the Votomatic ballot tally system. 
The system was used in Georgia and in California in 1964. 
International Business Machines acquired the system in 
1965 and marketed the system through 1968. In 19* 
IBM decided to divest itself of many ne? 
including the Votomatic system. 


Hy 1971, 32 states had passed legislation permitting the 
use of the Votoraatic system. The systems were in use in 
twenty states and 180 jurisdictions. The system has also 
bijen used in Canada in a municipal election in Burnaby, 


In nay 1972, CES was named as the exclusive marketing agent 
for Shoup voting machines by Macrodyne-Chatillon Corporation, 
This agreement was terminated in October of 1972. 

CES has its own nationwide marketing staff with offices in 
fifteen cities. In addition to the Votomafcic devices, they 
narket a ballot tabulator for tallying punch card ballots 
in small jurisdictions and a BMX ballot multiplex unit. 
The ballot multiplex unit is a four part card reading device 
which reads ballots and compiles data on magnetic tape for 
computer input. 

CES markets complete election services for its customers 
This includes updating the computer program for tabulating 
votes. Additionally, CES has a facility in Nashville, 
Tennessee to recondition lever machines they receive as 
trade-in,. They ^ricet these to l ever machlne usrs> 

' they seu eiecti n ~ 


1-6.2.3 Datavote (Diamond International Corporation) 

The parent company, Diamond International Corporation, was 
incorporated as Diamond Match Company in 1930 as a successor 
to an Illinois company of the same name incorporated in 1881. 
The parent company had net sales of over $600 million in 
1972 and produces a wide variety of wood products and 
specialized machinery. 

The Datavote system was invented in 1966 by Curtis Fielder 
who is now the Manager of Datavote systems for Diamond Inter- 
national. In 1966, Mr. Fielder marketed his invention which 
then used die cut punch cards under the corporate name of 
Mathematical Systems Corporation. This company was purchased 
in November 1967 by Diamond International. 

In 1970, the Datavote punch using non die cut punch cards 
was introduced. Two major modifications have been made in 
that product. In 1972, a 76 position punch was introduced 
and the punch stand was modified to hold the ballot on an 
angle for better visability and has a locked on back to 
prevent tampering with the punch mechanism, 

They did not need a license from IBM since their system was 
considerably different. Originally, the Datavote punch 
card had round holes and the system also printed the ballot 
on only one side of the card. The ballot is now printed on 
both sides and the input process was developed to read both 
sides in one pass through the punch card reader. 

1-38 Fidlar and Chambers 

A. P. Luse and Company was a one man printing company begun 
in 1854. By 1877 it was Egbert, Fidlar and Chambers and 
has been Fidlar and Chambers since 1898. They market 
printing, office supplies and office furniture in Iowa and 
Illinois. Additionally, they sell some special items 
through direct mail all over the country. 

In 1969 they became a distributor for VIP in 
Illinois. VIP was one of the licensees for the IBM Voto- 
matic system. When VIP ended its production and marketing, 
Fidlar and Chambers leased the tooling for manufacturing 
from VIP. However, since VIP was in default of its license 
to market these systems Fidlar and Chambers could not 
market the Votomatic system through this lease agreement. 

In 1973 Fidlar and Chambers purchased Electronic Marketing, 
Incorporated (EMI). EMI, from Dupage County, Wheaton, 
Illinois was one of the original licensees for the IBM 
Votomatic system. They never developed or marketed the 
system and as a result did not default on its license. 
Fidlar and Chambers is now manufacturing and marketing 
under this agreement. They expect this to be a major por- 
tion of their business in the future, although no nation- 
wide marketing plans have been established. 

lt6 ' 2 ' 5 ^Scg^iSeismograph 8^1*^3^.^^ 

Seiscor is a division of Seismograph Service Corporation 
"hxch is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Raytheon ( 

Seismograph Service Corporation, which conducts seismic 
surveys for oil and gas structures, was founded in 
1931. m 1966, they became a subsidiary of Raytheon. 


In the 1950 's, Seismograph Service Corporation was look- 
ing for product lines to level the peaks and valleys of 
its production operation. They developed an electro 
mechanical voting machine in the late 1950's and began 
marketing in the early 1960's. 

In the mid 1960 's they became interested in the Harris 
Votomatic System. They felt that this was the system of 
the future because of its portability, cost and tallying 
advantages. In 1967 , they received a license from IBM 
to produce and market these systems. In 1968, they dis- 
continued the manufacture of the electro mechanical 
voting machines. 

Although Seiscor believes their product is considerably 
different than Votomatic they have continued to pay IBM 
royalties and have an active license to manufacture and 
distribute the Votomatic system. 

1.6.3 Optical Scan System Cgntna 1 Da t a Co r p or at ion 

One division (formerly the Rabinow Corporation) of Control 
Data Corporation has been designing optical character 
recognition systems since the late 1950s. They have de- 
signed a number of specialized OCR machines as well as 
general purpose machines. 

Control Data Corporation has been interested in the vote 
tallying market for several years and considered punch card 
applications. They approached the District of Columbia 
with the idea of field testing a system using their 921 
optical character scanner. This was a non profit venture 
t:o iUJKifcl: In s *',<; i;efii dos.i^n as veil .-is to determine its 


marketability. The system was used in the 1972 presidential 
election and the 1972 school board election. 

The system is still in the prototype stage and not currently 
being marketed. CDC now has a new 929 OCR which they feel 
will be very effective for the voting application. 

1 6 . 3 . 2 Cubic Corporation (Votronic) 

The Votronic system was developed by J. Holzer, N. Walker 
and H. Wilcock. They formed Votronic, Incorporated in 
the early 1960s. In April 1964, Cubic Corporation acquired 
Vo tronics , Incorporated . 

Cubic Corporation was Incorporated in California in 1949 
as P&M Electronics and adopted its present name in 1950. 
Votronics was its second of approximately twelve acquisi- 
tions . 

Cubic products include electronic devices and systems. 
Subsidiaries provide computer services and distribute 
medical supplies and equipment, industrial gases, welding 
equipment, safety and fire equipment, amateur two-way 
radio equipment; complete elevator systems, computer 
voice response systems and electronic surveying and mapping 
equipment , 

The 1972 and 1971 sales were distributed approximately as 
follows : 

1972 1971 

Electronic Systems 13% 29% 

Antenna System's 6 9 

Elevator Mfg & Installation 47 , 34 

Computer Peripheral Equipment 6 4 

Other 23 24 

1-41 Gyrex 

The vote counting system developed by the Norden Division 
of United Aircraft Corporation of Hawthorne, California, 
together with several other product lines, was sold to 
Coleman Systems in 1962. 

Coleman Engineering Company was founded in 1953 and 
became Coleman Systems in 1969. The company manufactured 
automatic machine tools, numerical control systems, cameras, 
automatic measuring and read out devices, abrasive wheels 
and discs and job honing and boring and precision machine 
tools. Because of financial problems within Coleman 
Industries a decision was made in 1966 not to market the 
vote tally system again until 1971. 

"In May 1971, company agreed to transfer all of its pro- 
duct rights and interests in its vote tally system to Varo, 
Inc., subject to the successful performance by Varo of a 
contract with the County of Hamilton, Ohio. In fiscal 
1972, the system was accepted by the County and, accord- 
ingly, company received an initial fee of $50,000. Under 
the agreement, Company will also receive royalties equal 
to 5% of the sales price of these systems sold or leased 
by Varo through May 1976. "W 





This section of the report deals with the thirteen operational areas 
that make up vote counting systems and it relates machine characteris- 
tics to each of these areas. Jurisdictions are considering adopting 
a new voting system each have unique characteristics which tend to 
make one element of a voting system more important than another. With- 
in this report we have, therefore, dealt with each area separately, 
and in detail. Each operational area is divided into three subsections; 

. Purpose - a brief description of the operational 
area of concern. 

. Summary - relates general types of systems to 
operational considerations and points out where 
particularly critical positive or negative rela- 
tionships exist. 

. System Discussion - provides detail on how each 
system functions within the particular operational 
area of concern. 

Part 2.0 contains systems discussions for each type of equipment, pro- 
vided in sufficient detail to serve as a reference guide. System 
discussions for each type of equipment are preceded by a Summary section 
which discusses general implications of the operational area to voting 

The operational areas of concern 


- Equipment characteristics /opera- 
tional requirements 

- Equipment storage 


Equipment maintenance 

Machine set-up and testing 

Equipment security 



Voter education 

Voting process 


Vote tallying 

Computer support 

Vendor cost data 



2.2.1 Purpose 

This section provides detail on equipment characteristics such as size 
and weight as well as special considerations such as replacement time, 

warranty and special poll requirements. 

2.2.2 Summary 

Pages 2-15 and 2-16 contain charts for comparing major equipment 
characteristics and operational requirements. Descriptive data pro- 
vided within the following includes machine size, replacement time, 
warranty, operational requirements and ratio of machines to registered 
voters. Machine Size 

Dimensions and weight of machines are practical selection 
factors when considering selection of poll locations, stor- 
age, transportation and tallying space requirements. 

. Lever Machines - Lever machines occupy from 8.6 
square feet to 22.6 square feet of floor space 
and weigh between 250 and 940 pounds. The 
R.F. Shoup machine weighs less than 300 pounds, 
the AVM and IES machines range between 590 
pounds and 940 pounds. Lever machines require 
no special storage space or peripheral tally- 
ing equipment . 

. Punch Card - The punch card machines for voting 
occupy from 1/2 square foot to 3.4 square feet 
and weigh between 5 and 16 pounds. Transpor- 
tation storage and set-up space requirements 


for punch card machines are, therefore, minimal. 
There are, however, tallying requirements which 
must be considered. In smaller jurisdictions 
card tabulators may be used which occupy 12 square 
feet and weigh 150 pounds. Space required will 
depend, to a great extent, on the number of card 
tabulators required. Larger installations will 
use their own or available computers. When exist- 
ing system card readers are not able to handle 
the peak election load, card readers will have to 
be either leased for each election or purchased. 
Additional card readers imply extra space require- 
ments for processing and storage problems when 
purchase is made (larger jurisdictions consider- 
ing moving toward punch cards should consider 
contacting Los Angeles County to develop a per- 
spective of the storage/processing problem). 

. Optical Scan Systems - The optical scan systems 
occupy from 7 square feet to 685 square feet 
and weigh between 525 and 7,000 pounds. Space 
allocation for optical scan systems becomes crit- 
ical at the tallying point. The volume of votes 
to be counted determines the number of machines 
required and thus the space requirement for tally- 

2t2 ' 3 - 1 AY^Corporati^ 

four models manufactured by AVM 

T~l V\ 4- -. 

co lurans are added n each 

length lncreases 10 e 

13 therefo " 82 1/2 lnches lons a . 

*uip ment r ep lacement tlme s n n S an "** ^0 pounds. 

manufacturer slnce , h ^^ aCCOrdi ng to the 

parts and ve year 

required for AVM. 


in transit H nea are 

transit, the warranty would nnt- 

a not c ver repair 

The number of AVM devices reouirprf 

varies. The manuf, . PM ra lBte "* voter 

manufacturer recommends that for .. 
Section 600 people can KP "Average 

^vice, 500 b y . the 4 co ^^^"^ ^ *. 30 col umn 
y i-ne ^u column devirp Ann t. 

^vlce, and 300 by the 60 cnl " 

y cne b column device 
the manufacturers guidelines and ma ' 
- P-dected mach i ne load Q " ^ o. v ary 
Cisco and Pit tsbursh J, b th ^ Fran ~ 

but he '^ C Unty) ^ 5 C0l 
^ use a ratio of 1:250whllethel 

use a ratio of 1:500. The manufacturer recommends 1:400. International Election Systems (Shoup) 

These lever machines are, like the AVM lever machines, 
completely self-contained voting booths which produce 
machine tallies for each candidate and voting issue at 
the conclusion of the day. The machines are 6 feet high 
and 4 feet wide and weigh either 670 or 900 pounds. 
Their replacement time is not known and does not appear 
to be an important factor. There are no special re- 
quirements for operating the system and no peripheral 
equipment is required for IES. 

The warranty offered by IES includes coverage of all de- 
fects in parts and workmanship under normal use for five 
years. During that time period IES will repair or replace 
any machine that is defective unless it has been damaged 
by careless handling on the part of the local jurisdiction. 
The ratio of machines to registered voters recommended 
by the manufacturer is from 1:300 to 1;500. R.F. Shoup 

The three lever voting devices manufactured by R.F. Shoup 
are similar to those previously described except in weight. 
The weight for the R.F. Shoup Model 8-25 is 250 pounds 
and 325 pounds for Model 10-35. These machines require 
about the. same operating space as the AVM and IES machines, 
four feet by six feet. The machines are completely self- 
contained. There are no special requirements at the polls 
and no peripheral equipment is required. The warranty 
offered with the. purchase of these machines covers parts 
and workmanship for five The machine voter ratio 
should be similar to that of other lever machines. 


^.2.3.4 Carlisle Graphics - Accuvote 

The Accuvote punch card device is about the size of a 
telephone. It is lightweight and is not affixed to a 
voting booth. The Accuvote device weighs 12 pounds and 
its life-span cannot be verified at this time. Accuvote 
requires no special conditions at the polls for operation, 
!.ut it does require a card reader and line printer in a 
central tallying location. The ratio of machines to 
registered voters suggested by the manufacturers is one ' 
device for every 150 voters. The Accuvote warranty 
covers workmanship and parts for 10 major elections or 
approximately five years. Repairs that are made by the 
manufacturer are not made on site but the device is small 
enough to permit mailing to the manufacturer for repairs. 
The system requires a tallying device and the Accuvote 
Ballot Tab serves that purpose. It measures 24X36X24 
and weighs 78 pounds. CES 

. c turer produces 


: ; : 

,,,r , 

.,, ; " 1 ' " 

voting and one 
feet of table space 

to the Model I. It q 


" - 


, , 

' ;;:r- 

* Uldt require. a longer 


warranty period CES will extend the warranty to up to 15' 
years. The vendor recommends a ratio of from one machine 
to 100 registered voters to one machine for every 150 

The CES Ballot Tab and Multiplex unit are both used in 

the tallying process to record vote totals. The Ballot 

Tab measures 2 by 2 feet and weighs 140 pounds. The Multiplex 

consists of four units of varying dimensions. Datavote 

The Datavote punch card device is similar in size to a 
telephone and weighs 5 pounds. It is not affixed to a 
voting booth. It requires no special conditions at the 
polls, and its life span is not known at this time. 
Datavote has a five year parts and labor warranty. As 
in all punch card systems, a computer or card tabulator 
capable of tallying the cards and printing the total is 
required for effective system operation. 

Such a device is manufactured by Datavote. It is their 
Ballot Processor which is 4 feet by 3 feet and weighs 
150 pounds. Fidlar and Chambers 

This company markets a punch card device measuring 12 
inches by 12 inches and weighing 6 pounds. It is not 
affixed to a voting booth, and its life expectancy is 
not known at this time. No special poll requirements are 
necessary for the operation of the Fidlar and Chambers 
device. It has a 10 year parts and labor warranty. A 
card reader or computer, which is capable of counting 


and printing vote totals, is required for tallying the 
votes recorded on the cards. The manufacturer recommends 
a ratio of one device for every 125 registered voters. 

2.2,3.8 Seiscor 

Seiscor produces four punch card devices all of which 
are similar. The basic device is a punch card unit 
similar to that produced by CES with a stylus to punch 
the holes. It weighs 4 1/2 pounds and measures 18 inchoK 
by 15 inches. The Standard device is like the Basic with 
a light that can be turned on for voting. The Deluxe model 
is similar to the Standard, but, it has sides so Chat 
when it is placed on a table it becomes a voting booth.. 
The voting station weighs 12.3 pounds and folds into a 
case from a free standing voting booth. All the SelBeor 
punch card devices have an unknown replacement time Mince 
none have worn out yet. The manufacturer recommends that 
there be one device for every one hundred registered votaro. 
There are no special conditions required at poll locutions 
but there is a need for a computer or card reader to record 
and print the votes at a central tallying location. 

The warranty offered by Seiscor Is a one year agreement 
against defects in workmanship and materials. The, warranty 
for a jurisdiction in California that uses Seller machine* 
further states that the equipment has been approved for 
by the Calif ornla State Commission on Voting Machine,. 


The optical scan device Model 921 Mnufactured , ,,, 

about four feet by two feet and weighs 600 , 

Wei 8ha 600 pounds. Although 


its life expectancy is not known, it is suggested by the 
manufacturer that it be refurbished every five years as 
system technology improves. It requires that atmospheric 
controls be exercised through regulation of humidity and 
temperature ranges. The CDC Optical Scanner requires 
peripheral equipment including a teletype unit for pro- 
gramming and a tape drive unit. Ballots must be printed on 
24 pound moisture resistant paper and printing must hold 
color to color registration to less than .015 of an inch. 
The paper cut must observe the same tolerance. The warranty 
is a 90 day parts only arrangement. Cubic 

The central tally device Model 562 marketed by Cubic is 
8 feet by 3 feet and weighs 500 pounds. This optical 
scanning device also has a replacement time that is unknown 
to date. No peripheral equipment is required and only 
sufficient electricity is required to operate this counter. 

The warranty offered with this system is usually a 2 year 
parts and labor agreement to keep the machinery in good 
working condition. In one instance in a California county 
the county had a five year parts and' labor warranty during 
its five year lease period. Gyrex 

The central tally system marketed by Gyrex occupies 6,000 
square feet and weighing 525 pounds. Its expected replace- 
ment time is 40 years although none have reached replacement 
time as yet. There are no special conditions required for 
operation of the Gyrex and, in fact, in Multnomah County, 
Oregon, one Gyrex tally system was located in a parking 


Mr.-'.ye for a number of years. Only appropriate electrl- 
.*L outlets are required for operation of the system. 
IU-r* are certain pieces of peripheral equipment which 
".- ivquu-titf. These include a Reader/Control unit, an 
J*r.uors Console, a Power Supply System, and a Univac 
'000 sugary punch. The system described above is 
--ole of siding alone and producing preclnct totfllg 
i! pouched cards. 

-.-nrrnnty that is standard 

- P ifld of four years or four actions, wlll che ver 
s nrst. This agreement covers all de f ecta in 

r manship with Gy 
labor to repair 


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2.3.1 Purpose 

In this section the actual size of the voting or tallying equipment is 
examined to permit an estimation of the amount of storage area that 
will be needed for each equipment type. Other storage considerations 
are also discussed. 

2.3.2 Summary 

Concern for equipment storage space varies from jurisdiction to juris- 
diction. Some jurisdictions have considerable low cost space available 
while within others space is at a premium. The table on Pages 2-26,27 
provide the storage dimensions, weight and other storage considerations 
for all systems. The three areas of storage discussed on the following 
pages include: space, special containers, and special conditions. 

2.3,2.1 Space 

In planning space requirements for storage, apace re- 
quired for extra equipment for tallying and for voting 
booths must be included. A summary of general considerations 
for each type of system follows. 


Punch Card . Votlng devlces for ^ 

"- fro. 1/3 to ! cubic foot Qf 

Since they can be stacked in 

able numb er can be stored ln 
space. Where votlng bootha 
storage slze must be added a 

for tallying e q uip raen t. Where card readers and 
data processing equlpment ls ^ ^ ^ 

, tallylng storage oncer 

Where card tabulating e q ui pme nt or extra card 
readers are r equlred) consideration must be 
given to ^ number and ^ spgce ^ 

implied by the added equipment. 

Scan - S yst ems each requlre 

storage consideration. I he Gyrex 
Model 3021 which occuples 3jOQO cuMc ^ 

-xghs 7,000 pounds is ordinarily stored in lts 
per Perati ^ location. Space consdera . 

complete vote tallying operation near the Gyrex 
location, orange County> Callfornla ^ & 


OUSetyPe ' r0 -^ ^election off ice 
building ln whlch two model 3Q2i Gre 

are located with related e qulpment . 

The Cubic mod el 5-62 re qu i res 72 cublc feet 

-chines wlth relatively slow hand fed 

of 1,000- 2> 500 cards per hour, the number of 


machines required and the storage problems 
increase as the size of the jurisdiction 
increases. Contra Costa County in California 
has fifty machines for 311 ,,000 registered 
voters. Space is not a problem in Contra 
Costa, and the machines are stored in the 
tally operation room. Imperial County, 
California has five machines for 28,000 
registered voters and stores their machines 
in a storeroom with election materials. 

The CDC machine occupies 29.6 cubic feet 
and weighs 600 pounds. This machine must 
be stored under controlled atmospheric 
conditions. These machines would probably 
be stored where they are used, Special Containers 

Most voting and tallying devices are sold with or in con- 
tainers suitable for storage. Lever machines are built 
with steel doors and when the doors are closed there is 
no need for a special container for the machines. Cloth 
or plastic covers are used in addition to further protect 
the outside of the machines in some instances. This type- 
of cover is also used for the large stationary optical 
scan equipment. Most of the punch card devices are sold 
and packed in cardboard boxes. Most jurisdictions save 
these boxes and use them for storage containers. Some 
models are built into a small suitcase while one manu- 
facturer builds ballot boxes that can also be used secondly 
as storage containers. 


Most vote 

Mention, howeverj 
** e nvlronmental 
ns that most 
"rage conditions. Ihe 
"arm enough so that 
-to area, 

a ; 

"evlces are 

Ula special 
"" to be stored 
. some con . 

ln ^s of 

noriIla Uy kept 



, nany 


2-3.3.1 AVM 

four models p 

S0 .i cublc " 

a fter being 
when being stored . 

52 V2 inches, the width 
o ccuples 31 . 9 

- - ighs 590 
-e fflachlne weighs 

s 62 

occupies 38 cubic feet 

"e ighs 715 
Pounds. The 50 

steel, and 650 pounds 
by 21 lnches 5 

of a The 


31. 9 cublc 
occu Pies less space 

3 ! -chine is 
is 50 


5 incf -es 

model Belghs 

825 P-d- 
m ea Sures 72 1/2 

> "naming 44 cubic feet 



and weighs 940 pounds. In aluminum this machine weighs 
759 pounds. None of these machines need any special 
atmospheric conditions maintained in the storage area. 
It is not possible to stack the machines unless special 
shelves are built. San Francisco, which owns over 1,600 
of these voting machines, stores all of them in a large 
warehouse. Each machine is assigned a specific spot so 
that the custodians can easily go to a specific machine 
to canvass and perform service maintenance. The layout 
of the warehouses has been designed so that there are 
work areas scattered throughout the long rows of machines. 
There the backs and fronts of the devices can be opened 
and workers can check the set-up and counters on the 
machines. International Election Systems 

The two lever machines marketed by IES are completely self- 
enclosed. The IES Model 2.5 occupies 55.6 cubic feet with 
dimensions of 48 by 26 by 77 inches. It weighs 900 pounds, 
The IES Model 3.2 weighs 670 pounds and measures 48 by 26 
by 75 inches while occupying 54.1 cubic feet of storage 
space. Neither machine requires special storage nor do 
they require any covers or containers. R.F. Shoup 

This company has attempted to address the storage and 
transportation problems of lever machines by significantly 
reducing the weight of the machines. In size the R.F. 
Shoup machine is comparable to the other lever machines , 
but in weight, their largest machine is almost half the 
weight of the smaller of the other lever machines. The 


Shoup Model 8-25 measures 

cubic feet> ^ mlghs 375 . -l 

The Aceuvote punch card device measures 11 3/4 by 9 by 5 

inches and weighs about 12 pounds T> 

of a cubic foot " occupies about 1/3 CES 

The CES Model 



i , . 

4 lnches * a complete voting booth 

22 by 19 bv 




CES manufactures a card reader called Ballot Tab. Ballot 
Tab weighs 140 pounds, measures 24 by 14 by 20 inches and 
occupies 6.7 cubic feet. These machines cannot be stacked 
and require no special storage conditions. Datavote 

This punch card device measures 12 by 9 by 5 inches and 
occupies 1/3 of a cubic foot in storage space. These 
devices are usually stored in the cardboard boxes in which 
they are placed by the manufacturer. They weigh five 
pounds and can be conveniently stacked. In Ventura County, 
California, over 3,000 of these devices are stored in a 
small, tightly secured area in the Election Department's 
building. The boxes are stacked well over six feet high. 

A Ballot Processor is also sold by Datavote. The Processor 
is approximately 4 by 3 by 2 1/2 feet. This device Is used 
to tally the voted ballots which are the output of the punch 
card devices. It is not stackable, requires no special 
container for storage nor does the storage area demand 
special environmental treatment. 

2-24 Seiscor 

Seiscor markets four punch card devices. The Basic, Stand- 
ard, and Deluxe models are all similar in size when ready 
for storage, each occupying about 1/2 a cubic foot. The 
Basic device measures 18 by 15 1/4 by 3 1/4 inches while 
the Standard device 18 1/8 by 15 7/8 by 3 3/8 inches. The 
Deluxe devices when ready for storage measures 18 1/2 by 
15 5/8 by 4 1/2 inches. These three devices weigh 4 1/2, 
6 1/4 and 9 1/4 pounds respectively. The Voting Station 
Model folds into two pieces. The voting device itself can 
be stored with the legs or separated for easier storage. 
The Voting Station weighs 12.3 pounds and would occupy 
about 1 1/2 cubic feet including the legs. All of these 
devices can be conveniently stacked and there are no special 
conditions that must be maintained while in storage. 

2-3.3.9 Control Data Corporation 

This system requires no storage of any voting equipment 
other than pencils. Tallying is accomplished by the ballot 
reader gathering totals from pencil marks made by the voters 
on the ballot. Therefore, only the tallying device and Its 
associated equipment must be stored. The CDC 921 ballot 
reader will occupy 29.6 cubic feet as it measures 41 by 25 
by 50 Inches. It weighs 600 pounds and is stationary 
since it must operate and be stored in an environmentally 
controlled computer room (temperature 60-90; humidity 
302-80%). Additional peripheral equipment including a 
teletypewriter, a teleprogrammer, and a tape drive would 
also need to be included in the computer room. 

2-25 Clubic 

As with the other optical scan systems there is little in 
the way of voting equipment that must be stored. With Cubic 
only the pencil sized ballot marking devices and tallying 
equipment must be stored. The Cubic ballot reader 
measures 96 by 36 by 30 inches and weighs 500 pounds. The 
device is protected with a form fitting cloth cover when 
not in use. In Sharon, Massachusetts, these devices are 
stored in a closet between elections and rolled out into 
the middle of the room to tally the votes election night. 
Contra Costa County, California has sufficient space that 
it can leave its fifty machines in operating position at 
all times. 

2,3.3.11 Gyres: 

The Gyrex tally system reads ballots that the voter has 
marked with a special marking device that must be stored 
between elections. The markers are quite small and pre- 
sent no storage problems. The tallying equipment is 
completely stationary weighing 6,000 pounds and occupying 
over 3,000 cubic feet. There are no special conditions 
under which this machinery must be stored, since a simple 

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2.4.1 Purpose 

This section discusses ongoing maintenance requirements for the various 
systems, the maintenance staff training requirements and election day 
maintenance. It does not include preelection machine set-up. Readying 
voting devices for voting, including programming, is discussed in a 
later section. 

2.4.2 Summary 

Voting systems are usually used only once or twice a year, therefore, 
voting machine maintenance requirements are not like those required by 
a business machine used daily. Most voting machine repair requirements 
can be traced to damage in transit or to misuse. Maintenance problems 
covered by normal wear are unusual. As a result, routine maintenance 
deals with machine set-up (discussed in Section 2.5) and the stripping 
of the machines after the election. 

Experienced service staff must be on hand to provide almost immediate 
repair on election day and/or adequate machine backup must be available 
to replace problem equipment. The summary that follows describes each 
system in the areas of service and service training, election day ser- 
vice and ongoing service requirements. Service and Service Training 

Lever: Each of the lever manufacturers have service per- 
sonnel, usually factory staff, who are available during 
the year to provide service to users. At election time 
manufacturers sell set-up packages (see Section 2,5) 
which include servicing machines prior to election and 
on election day. Most jurisdictions, however, have 


permanent staff or part time staff trained to perform 
such maintenance services. The lever manufacturers have 
periodic training programs to train local personnel. 

Punch Card: The punch card voting devices are basic 
mechanical machines with only one or two moving parts, 
depending on the system. The election staff can learn 
minor set-up and maintenance in an orientation session. 
There is no formal training necessary for service (see 
Section 2.5) staff. Damaged voting devices can be easily 
shipped to the factory for repair. 

Optical Scan: These central tally systems are made up of 
complex electronic devices. Maintenance must either be 
performed by factory service personnel or by engineering 
firms who have been factory trained. Election Day Maintenance 

None of the sites visited had experienced any major elec- 
tion day problems caused by machine down time. System 
training and implementation were existing problem areas 
mentioned at most locations. Minor maintenance required 
on election day is discussed in the followine section. 


a number of backups are maintained at central locations 
and sent to replace down machines. Such problems are rela- 
tively rare. One possible problem that was pointed out was 
that a counter could malfunction during an election and 

not be noticed until a considerable time after the election. 

None of the sites visited had experienced such a problem, 


Punch Card: Enough punch card machines are placed at each 
poll location to insure that a machine breakdown does not 
result in critical problems. 

One important consideration within the punch card operation 
is support system maintenance. What if card readers, ballot 
tabulators and/or computers malfunction? Trained service 
personnel must be available and/or backup equipment avail- 
able. Los Angeles County, for example, provides back-up 
computer capability on election night so that a computer mal- 
function will not completely cripple the tallying process. 

Optical Scan: The poll location requires that a sufficient 
number of marking devices be available for the ballot mark- 
ing process. Maintenance requirements are critical only 
at the central tallying point. Most cubic users will have 
more than one machine so that a malfunction will not com- 
pletely stop their tally process. The Gyrex systems fre- 
quently operate with one machine so that a malfunction can 
stop the tallying process. The cubic machine down time 
reported by the locations was minimal with Contra Costa 
County only reporting 3.5 hours total down time on fifty 
machines since 1966. The Gyrex system, on the other hand, 
experienced 4 hours of down time in Cincinnati during the 
1972 general election. 

2-31 Ongoing Service Recj L uireni&nt^ 

Because of the infrequent use of the equipment there are 
no ongoing preventive maintenance requirements. Ongoing 
service requirements are usually dictated by the size of 
the jurisdictions, as in San Francisco, where the process 
of stripping lever machines after an election, checking 
machines and making repairs is a full-time, one-man 
operation. Little ongoing maintenance is required 
for punch card systems except to strip and set up ma- 
chines in large jurisdictions. There is no ongoing 
maintenance for the optical scan systems except that 
the Gyrex recommends that the machine be run every six 
to eight weeks. 

2.4.3 Systems Discussion AVM 

Ail of the machines manufactured by AVM have the same 
minimal maintenance requirements. Although the vendor 
feels no maintenance on the equipment is necessary, in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, where over 3,300 machines 
are used, the maintenance performed includes oiling and 
greasing the moving parts of the machinery. In other 
jurisdictions, machines are checked for rnrrosion and if 


factory in Jamestown, New York. When a jurisdiction pur- 
ciiases AVM devices, the manufacturer will provide full 
training for people to become machine custodians during 
cne first two elections. This training is free, coming 
Part of the purchase package when a jurisdiction buys 
AV7! equipment. Although most jurisdictions use local 
staff to provide equipment service, in Herkimer County 
i upstate New York, AVM servicemen are on call for all 
-"* Although local staff who service the machines are 
aor^lly tralned at the AyM ^^ ^ ^ ^^^ 

the AVM machines have been used for fif ty yearS) ' 
-e local servicemen are trained by working on the 
r..ichines with their superiors. 

maintained in other* 

that d 

"on, v isited reported 
^ -chine 


a ;r:; n T ed 

" On 


B ause of 

becoffle " 

during traneit. 
of these 



undergoes ^ 


a petroleum based lubricant on the interlocks, and repair 
of any machines damaged between elections. This service 
can be provided by either IES staff, service contractors 
or by trained local government staff custodians. Training 
is usually conducted by IES at a 3-5 day seminar held at 
the IES factory in New Jersey or at one of several regional 
centers. New customers, under a warranty, pay only the 
transportation expenses of their service people, all remain- 
ing expenses are paid by IES. Customers not under the 
warranty pay both transportation and per diem for the cus- 
todian, while IES pays for the training. IES also sends 
factory servicemen to local jurisdictions to perform on- 
site training. In these instances, the local jurisdiction 
pays the serviceman's transportation and per diem while 
IES pays his salary. 

No maintenance records on the voting equipment were kept 
at the jurisdictions visited. Equipment malfunctions did 
not appear to be a serious problem. However, In Milwaukee 
two machines had to be replaced in one election. Each had 
the same malfunction, the straight ticket lever had been 
broken off. Servicemen were available on election day 
In all jurisdictions if required, if needed, but none 
were needed. 


,-iupport for two elections. The local jurisdict I on f<; 
responsible for all subsequent maintenance!. I,oc-.'i I :t( ,-i i I 
^rviccmen are trained at the R. F. Shoup factory Ln Nor t h 
Cirjlina for approximately one week. Although no IMIJ'-. 
Jiccions could be visited that had used tu;]. K ,,, fl cJi l.i.r du, I,,,: 
.":i election, the vendor indicated that tlicro would l>r 
sen-icemen available to handle minor repair* on cK-v/,^.-, ,,, 
the polls on election day. 

'4.3.4 Accuvote 

r each eeoao ail punch card devj _ ..... _ ..... 

e,. Hllll ... 

does all tha malntenanril W( , 

o .ervice-nen to be trained. If ldev( """ ''"'" 

"lection dav it , G 'Ur.,m : t i,,,,,, , 


dav it , 

<"ay, Slmp i y ls not use 

P device 1 S available itiause / ;''; '" " 

ia, ln the ,, ed ' iu Y "' 

cue 1972 general ejection n 

1 had to be re , 

becnu seofai|li|Ui||it;(: , (|u _ 

- 4 -3o CES 
B th 

and the 


to CES . ,, r 

for repair rr 


' ^ rep laca(1 


jurisdiction that was visited kept detailed maintenance 
records since maintenance was a small part of the opera- 
tion of the total system. Patavote 

The Datavote punch card device is virtually maintenance 
free, only the slide must be oiled between elections. A 
local staff member can oil the slide and, therefore, 
there is no need for service training. If other malfunc- 
tions occur the device is replaced with a backup and 
the broken device is mailed to the factory. One of the 
jurisdictions visited kept maintenance records showing 
that in the 1972 general election in Ventura County, 
California, fifteen devices out of 3,000 malfunctioned. 
Each device was replaced with a backup machine. Fidlar and Chambers 

This punch card device has only one moving part, the 
template spring, and requires no preventive maintenance 
nor related training. If a device malfunctions it is 
returned to Fidlar and Chambers. If a device malfunctions 
on election day, it is replaced by a backup device. Seiscor 

The four Seiscor voting devices have no preventive main- 
tenance program recommended by the vendor since the 
machine also has only one moving part. , Therefore, no 
service training is required. Any device not operating 
properly can be returned to Seiscor for repair. If a 
machine malfunctions on election day, ,it is replaced by a 
backup device. 


for two ele 
responsible f or 

^ J ur "diction is 

appl ,, iraately one 

1tlona could be visited 

. the vendor l 

avallable tg 
on " *""** 


would be Accuvote 

Aftr SaCh Action, al! punch 

vendor. The vendor 
and oiled; all screw. 

d es ail th e maintenance 
>e trained. if a 

'imply is not used 
backup device ls available . t 

p-ii-fc . . u in Yuba County 


f 351 h*H i-i. ^ electl0n th ree devices 

->J-L nacl to be renl^ Q ,j t.__ 

-if a malfunction. 

2 -4-3.5 _c E g 

Both the Model 1 and the Model ^ 


staff tlauilng 


: n - 

l nd 



jurisdiction that was visited kept detailed maintenance 
records since maintenance was a small part of the opera- 
tion of the total system. 

2*4.3.6 Datavote 

The Datavote punch card device is virtually maintenance 
free, only the slide must be oilecl between elections. A 
local staff member can oil the slide and, therefore, 
there is no need for service training. If other malfunc- 
tions occur the device is replaced with a backup and 
the broken device is mailed to the factory. One of the 
jurisdictions visited kept maintenance records showing 
that in the 1972 general election in Ventura County, 
California, fifteen devices out of 3,000 malfunctioned. 
Each device was replaced with a backup machine. Fidlar and Chambers 

This punch card device has only one moving part, the 
template spring 3 and requires no preventive maintenance 
nor related training. If a device malfunctions it is 
returned to Fidlar and Chambers. If a device malfunctions 
on election day, it is replaced by a backup device. Seiscor 

The four Seiscor voting devices have no preventive main- 
tenance program recommended by the vendor since the 
machine also has only one moving part. , Therefore, no 
service training is required. Any device not operating. 
properly can be returned to Seiscor for repair. If a 
machine malfunctions on election day, dt is replaced by a 
backup device. . 


Data Corporation 

-i" i* a central tallying system which has no preventive 
"o, H ce program requirements for the local operation 
- -'-"dor provides all service for the IIIachine flnc| pei _ 
^ *ny nalntenance as a part of the preparation and 
" : -^ " the equipment prior to an election. Since all 
'^ is performed by the vendor there is no local 

''-ieo training required. On electfrm * 

un election day servicemen 
to monltor ae voe t 

eneral election 

o a humzdity problem. The CDf 
Present and worked until 

two ]loura , 


opera tlna 

e work 


" e flying process on 
,l, tance . " 



day to provlde 

lnvoived i 



report periods of 

total ln ail . 0ntra c a Count 

" al l Contra Cost* n ' 

usc a County 


weeks and running sample ballots. This procedure assures 
the equipment is in working order. More complex set-up 
and programming of the devices prior to an election is 
performed by the Gyrex service staff. Local servicemen 
are trained by the Gyrex personnel through on-the-job 
training at the local jurisdiction when the equipment is 

Basic maintenance records are maintained by different 
jurisdictions using these machines. Gyrex servicemen are 
available during the ballot counting process. In Cincinnati, 
Ohio in the 1972 general election the Gyrex system ex- 
perienced four hours of down time, while the Gyrex staff 
worked to correct the malfunction. 



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2.5.1 Purpose 

This section discusses machine set-up requirements for the election 
process, testing requirements prior to, during and after the election 
and who performs these services. 

2.5.2 Summary 

Set-up and testing of a voting system is critical to the conduct of an 
accurate, trouble free election. >The sequence demanded by ballot rota- 
tion and by offices and issues specific to the election districts re- 
quire different set-up configurations for each election. Machine set- 
up requirements are discussed within the following sub-sections which 
include Set-up, Testing, Service and Staff. 

Lever: Set-up procedures for lever machines use requires 
placing the ballot on the machine and programming the 
machine to match the ballot. The machine is programmed 
to assure that overvoting cannot take place. Machine 
prevention of overvoting is a strong point of lever machine 
operations, however, no audit trail can be obtained from 
the system. 

Punch card: The Accuvote and Datavote systems require 
no set-up of the voting device itself. The printed ballot 
Itaelf sets up these systems and the voting device needs 
only to be checked to assure it is working properly. 

The CES, Seiscor and Fldiar and Chambers systems require 
that aaske be affixed in the voting devices and that ballot 
pag., he attached. The masks are punched to correspond to 


the ballot pages so Chat individual ballot cards can 
only be punched in legitimate voting positions. Because 
of ballot rotation each machine must be individually set 
up and controlled for distribution to poll locations. 

Punch card systems require additional set-up for the 
tallying process. Ballot tab systems require that pro- 
gram cards be prepared for each ballot configuration. 
Computer systems require that programs be developed to 
account for every ballot configuration. 

Optical Scan: The optical scan systems use a manual pro- 
cess for ballot casting so no set-up of election devices 
is required. Special programs must be prepared for each 
ballot format to provide processing instructions for the 
optical scan device. The Gyrex system uses punch paper 
tape and the Cubic system uses a program sheet which is 
optically scanned. Testing 

Lever: After set-up the lever machines are tested to 
insure that the machine is operating properly and that 
overvoting cannot occur. The counters are usually tested 
for at least one count and frequently eleven to insure 
the counters are functioning properly. A "complete" test 
would require voting 100 times for each counter to insure 
that the hundreds counter was working properly, 

Punch Card: The CES, Selscor and Fidlar and Chambers 
voting devices must be tested to insure that masks and 
ballots are compatible. 


A tallying test is performed by punching a controlled 
number of test ballots for each ballot configuration. 
These votes are then processed against the tallying 
system (ballot tabulator or computer system) and compared 
to manual counts to assure the ballot configurations are 
properly established and the tabulating programs properly 
written. (See section on computer tallying for associated 
problems. ) 

Optical Sean: Sample ballots are marked and hand tabulated. 

The ballots are then processed using the appropriate pro- 
gram sheet or tape to assure each ballot configuration will 
be. properly tallied or counted for computer processing. If 
a computer Is used, the program is tested against the 
manual results to assure the program is accurate for various 
ballot Inputs. Service 

Services other than actual set~u P required for the various 
ByHteme are minimal. Voting devices require some lubrica- 
tion and optical scan systems require some electronics test- 
ing . Staff 

The section on Equipment Maintenance describes the staff 

or 'contractor requirements for service and machine set-up. 


and testing for all lever machines is similar. 
ot face is first p l aced on the nlachlne and the 
I,>cu combinations of levers programmed. The 
s are reset to zero, sealed and locked before 
a! , ap0 rted to the polls. The testing of the 
occurs after S et-up and normally before the 
sent to the polls. In most caseg all ^ ^_ 

- --ked by operating all voting levera at 

,,. Approaches do vary within jur . sd . ct . onsj 
KeBYork) theconmissio ^ 

the devices, whl ie LackawanaCoun 

u takes twanty mlllutes pfir 


^st the machines will V ar w -*.i 

y Wlttl 

the C0 of 

of the 

'"' to 
as. Ii, 

that there 

; u ' 

n tai "Pering wit l, 

'*'- Detecti 



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of staff and trucks. Some jurisdictions avoid the trans- 
portation problem by storing the machines from year to year 
near the polling place. Others find that for maintenance 
work and control reasons it is better to keep all devices 
in a central storage area. 

On election day itself to prepare the machine for voting the 
precinct staff needs to crank the machines to an operating 
position, open the steel doors, hang the curtains, check 
the counters and break the seal. On the Print-0-Matic 
machines a printout of all counters should be made before 
opening the polls. IES (Shoup) 

As soon as the ballot has been structured, engineers can 
affix the ballot face to the machine and begin programming. 
Concurrently, other aspects of the machine's operation 
are checked, including an inspection of curtain cables for 
fraying. After the machine is set up, voting machines are 
tested and each vote position is operated at least once. 
Test time for lever machines is proportionate to the number 
of candidates running although the City of Milwaukee reports 
an average of only five minutes to test their machines. 
After the set-up and testing has been completed, the machine 


door is locked and so is the custodian's rear door. The 
front door is also locked as a final security measure. 
With this combination of locks and seals there is no chance 
of tampering with the device without its being detected. 
Once the machines are at poll locations they will be 
locked in a room until election morning whenever possible. 
Opening the machines on election morning should take only 
about three minutes. All ballot faces must be rechecked 
with the sample ballot, and counters rechecked to be sure 
they show zero votes. When this check has been completed 
the polls can be opened for voting, R.F. Shoup 

The set-up of an R.F. Shoup voting device involves the 
same basic steps that are involved in any lever machine. 
The ballot strips must be affixed properly to the front 
of the machine. All programming adjustments, to assure 
proper voting by all .voters, are made at that time and 
then a test is run on each machine. All voting levers 
are operated twice to assure that the votes will be regis- 


ready each machine for voting. The voting machine must 
be raised from its lowered storage position. This is 
accomplished by using a hydraulic foot pedal, raising 
the device to voting position immediately. Other lever 
machines, stored in a lowered position, are raised by 
means of a hand crank, a process that is more difficult 
and takes more time. Once the machine is raised the 
doors are unlocked, the curtains hung, the ballot strips 
checked, and all counters certified. The machine is then 
ready for voting. 

The set-up of punch card systems varies somewhat but generally it in- 
volves placing a mask on the device, and attaching the ballot pages. 
Each device is then tested by using sample ballots and punching out 
the holes to assure that every vote position is operable. The complete 
process requires five minutes or less for each device. On election 
morning the punch card device is then removed from its storage box 
and placed in a voting booth. Those punch card systems that have a 
self contained booth require somewhat more time to set up. 

2.5.3. 4 Ac cu vote 

The Accuvote punch card device is set up by the vendor. 
Local jurisdictions, therefore, are not concerned with 
preparation of the device for voting and they are de- 
livered to the local jurisdiction ready to be used. 
The only security that needs to be maintained over the 
device is to prevent theft. This device is more 
difficult to tamper with since the voter sees the vote 
he is making on the ballot. Devices may be taken to 
the polls by any convenient method. In Yuba County, 
California, for example, the Elections Department pays 
a vendor to perform this function. 


On election morning, prior to opening the polls, each 
machine is tested after being removed from its storage 
box. Testing involves a random check of the holes which 
are all visible. To assure that the punch operates the 
top and bottom holes are punched and one other hole is 
randomly tested. This entire process should take about 
a minute for each device tested. CES_ 

The yellow mask in the CES machine is an integral part of 
the device itself and is manufactured in the same process 
that produces the ballot pages. The mask's function is 
to guide the punch to the desired position on the ballot 
card. Once the yellow masks and ballot pages are produced, 
they are sent to the local jurisdictions and attached to 
the individual voting devices. At that point, using a 
sample ballot, all vote positions are punched out to assure 
that the holes in the yellow mask are properly aligned. 
If the test indicates the punch machine is operating correct- 
ly, a t serialized seal is used to lock the ballot format 
into position. The devices are then packed in their boxes 
to be sent to the assigned poll. Delivery is usually 
accomplished in one of two ways;, either the Elections De- 
partment hires a vendor for delivery as is done in the 
City of Bloomington, Illinois,. or the precinct judges are 
required to. come by the Elections Department to pick up 
their devices prior to the election as in Will County, 
Illinois. On, election morning there is little set-up 
involved. The machine is removed from the box, and a few 
holes are randomly punched out to assure that the device 
is still working. 

2-47 Datavote 

This punch card device requires no set-up, however, each 
voting position is operated at least once to assure that 
it is working correctly. Like the Accuvote this punch 
card device needs security controls only to prevent theft. 
The voter sees the hole the device is making beside the 
printed name of the candidate selected. To get the devices 
to the polls a vendor can be hired or, as in the State of 
Hawaii, the elections judges can be given the task of 
picking up the devices for their respective polls. On 
election day itself the device only need be placed in the 
voting booth. Fidlar and Chambers 

The set-up for this punch card device requires the placing 
of the mask on the machine and attaching the ballot pages. 
A test is then run to assure the proper functioning of the 
device by using a sample ballot and punching out holes in 
all voting positions. Once this 'has been successfully 
completed, the device is sealed in such a way that any tam- 
pering would be detected by a broken seal. The device 
is then placed back in the box for shipment to the poll 
location. Such testing normally takes about five minutes 
per machine. Shipping the devices' to the poll location 
can be done either through a vendor or by having local pre- 
cinct personnel pick them up at the central office since 
the devices are small and can be easily handled by one 
person. The morning of the election the device merely 
needs to be removed from the box and plugged in so the 
electric light will work. 


:.-. :, <.:n-d device requires similar set-up procedures, 
>'. -.:i<I ballot; pages are attached to the device and 

:.- -i id* to insure that each position is votable. 
- ::.'J.loc is inserted and all positions voted. On 
" r.oniing the devices are removed from the boxes 

precinct staff retests the working mechanism. 

corral tally machines are each set up and tested in a 

After Che ballot formats have been established the 
vjg ramrod to properly 

ballot format and every 

ihe test clerk -fo ,, j , 

. , , - . 1S run and the machine tally 

--,.. a) a manual tally totaled from that 

>-'-'..'- -...Koh, the machine is assumed ready tt 
;i - c -P is necessary on election day. 

infi3S =aehine s are central tally devices fl nH 

-0 .TiCrr.-.riV^i 3nd are set 


atnrae perfectlv n, 
girded 24 hours a dw H Counter is 

1 - - 

2-49 Cubic 

The Cubic tally device uaes ballot sized sheets, 8 to 18 
inches in width and 25 inches long, that are fed into 
the. machine to program it for each ballot: type prior to 
counting actual ballots. After the machine is programmed 
to tally each ballot type, a set of marked ballots is run 
through the. machine. Once the machine tallies match the 
manual tally of the test deck, the machine is ready to 
accept ballots on election night. There is no further set- 
up of the machine required on election day. The machines 
may be tested prior to, during or after the election to 
assure their accuracy. Larger jurisdictions may not be 
able to Htore machines adjacent to a room large enough 
for the tallying process. This introduces a transportation 

2., '3. 3 .11 Gyjr^x 

Sot-up procedures for this optical scanning ballot tally 
machine aro similar to those for the Control Data and 
Cubic machines. The machine la programmed to tabulate 
the bnllota, taking into account the varying ballot for- 
mats, A test deck consisting of all possible voting com- 
binations and ballot formats is run through the computer. 
When the machine and manual totals agree the machine is 
ready to accept raw votes on election night. The test 
deck is rerun during the counting process to assure that 
the system ia continuing to operate correctly. 



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2.6.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is to examine the extent to which the 
various systems provide security from fraud and inaccuracies. 

2.6.2 jjunmary 

Although fraud is a term that is used frequently in discussions concern- 
ing voting systems, fraud seldom or never occurs as a function of the 
system operation. In the conduct of this study we have been unable to 
identify any instance of fraud that occurred as a result of a system 
operation. An environment more conducive to the perpetration of fraud 
may be developed W here procedures related to the operation of any system 
are not adequately spelled out, However, where election procedures 
are properly established, systems are completely tested and elections 
are effectively managed, fraud will not pose a problem regardless of 
what .system is used. Inaccuracies may be created through the system 
operation, therefore, voting systems should be tested periodically to 
assure that they are operating properly, where such system malfunc- 
tions occur, however, the outcome is not controllable and 'ihe problem is 
one of inaccuracy rather than deception. 

The summary provided on the following pages discusses those procedures 
related to equipment security, tallying system security and result 
validation which must be followed when the varying types of voting 
equipment are being utilized. Voting Equipment Security 

Voting security requirements vary by type of device being 


Lever: Since the lever machine itself is the total 
voting and tallying system, care is required in machine 
set-up and operational security prior to election day. 
Machines must be programmed to prevent overvoting for 
each office, the counters tested and set to zero and 
the machines sealed. On election day poll judges must 
check to insure that the counters have remained set at 
zero. In order for the counters to be set at a number 
other than zero using this system, collusion between 
machine set-up personnel and the poll judges would be 
required. Machines can be set up improperly so that 
certain votes are not recorded on counters. If poll 
judges check set-up activity, however, this again re- 
quires collusion. Finally, counters may also be "fixed" 
to permit vote tallying only as high as 99. This 
condition will be identified by a thorough exercise of 
the equipment on election day. 

Punch Card: The CES, Fidlar and Chambers, and Seiscor 
systems require that ballots be secured in place on the 
machine by use of a seal prior to the election. Each 
machine and ballot are subsequently checked by the poll 
staff prior to the election. Machines and ballots can 
be checked periodically during the day to assure they 
are correct and functioning properly. Since the ballot 
itself is not part of the Accuvote or Datavote machines, 
no machine security is required on these models. 

Optical Scan: No system security problem other than the 
manual control of the system exists in the use of optical 
scan machines. The ballot marking stamps used by voters 
are tested periodically to insure that they are functioning 
properly and that an adequate supply is on hand. 


2 6 . 2 . 2 Tally System Security 

As previously mentioned, tally system security is pri- 
marily a function of system management and staffing. 
The lever systems provide a minimum of tallying problems 
since votes are tallied at each machine. Machine totals 
are transported or telephoned to a central tabulating 
point for tallying. Appropriate security measures require 
that bi-partisan staff copy tallies from the machine, 
transport the tallies to central tallying points and de- 
velop final voting totals. 

Vote tallying from punch card and optical scan systems 
requires considerably more security than the lever system. 
Security considerations include: 

. All ballots whether good, voided or not 
used must be accounted for at the polling 
location. (This applies equally to man- 
ual ballot systems.) 

. Ballots must be transported to a central 
processing point in sealed containers. 

. Ballots from containers must be accepted 
and prepared for machine input. This 
usually requires a physical handling of 
the ballots to insure that they are posi- 
tioned properly for machine input. In 
the case of the CES, Fidlar and Chambers 
and Seiscor systems, the ballots must be 
examined to insure there is no hanging 
chad (incomplete punch) prior to machine 
input . 


. Damaged ballots that cannot be machine 
counted must be duplicated. This should 
'be done by a bi-partisan team. 

. The ballots are physically handled again 
for machine input to convert ballots to 
magnetic tape. 

. The tape may require additional manual 
handling to transport it from the card 
reader area to a computer facility. 

. Computer facility security should be main- 
tained to insure that no tampering with 
the equipment or programs takes place 
during the vote counting process. 

. Computer program design, test and security 
prior to, during and after processing, is 
a major item of concern where computer 
tallying of results is performed. 

More detailed discussion of these requirements is contained 
in the Tally section. Generally, however, where more 
sophisticated systems are used more security is required. Results Validation 

Voting systems are designed to provide methods for rapid 
tabulation of unofficial voting results. Official results 
are usually not prepared until several weeks after elec- 
tion day. In the interim period, the system is canvassed 
and the unofficial vote count validated. A lever system 
canvass is performed by taking the totals from all machines 


(still sealed) and retaliating . There is no audit trail 
for the individual vote and when counters have malfunc- 
tioned, the vote count is lost. Montgomery County, 
Maryland (not in the study but interviewed during the 
study test procedures) experienced such a vote loss prob- 
lem in a recent election. 

The punch card and the optical scan systems use the indi- 
vidual ballot as an audit trail. The precinct totals can 
be canvassed and, as required or desired, ballots manually 
counted. California law requires that a manual count be 
nade in at least 1 percent of the precincts. Manual tabula- 
tion is a difficult visual process particularly using 
systems such as CES, Fidlar and Chambers or Seiscor which 
do not have names printed on the ballot. 

System Discussion AVM 

Security safeguards required or built into an AVM system 
will vary, depending upon the jurisdiction using the system. 
The machine itself establishes no audit trail to permit 
manual counting of votes cast after the election. If a 
voter tampers with the machine during an election it is 
detectable since either the machine will jam or, if the 
ballot is defaced, it will be noticable to a precinct 
official who is observing. Eurlng the votlng procegs 
intermittant checks can be made to verify that the machine 
is counting accurately. The public counter will show 
whether or not votes are being recorded, although it will 
not show .if the votes are being tallied for the correct 


Additional security measures provided by the local juris- 
dictions vary. When in storage some jurisdictions lock 
the steel doors of the voting devices xriiile some - Lackawana 
County, Pennsylvania, for example - maintain a 24 hour 
guard over the machinery. Most jurisdictions, however, 
feel safe storing the equipment in a warehouse under lock 
and key. Prior to the election, once the voting machines 
have been moved to the polls, most jurisdictions simply 
keep the machines locked in a room and on election morning 
all machines are rechecked. During the election the local 
precinct staff is responsible for security over the system 
while it is in operation. Such security is maintained by 
observation of voting machines by bi-partlsan members of the 
local precinct staff. IES 

The IES machine characteristics are similar to those of 
AVM. The voting devices do not provide an audit trail 
of each elector's vote during an election. Tampering 
with a machine can be detected because the machine will 
jam; or if there is defacing of the ballot on the machine, 
it will be noticeable to the precinct official who is 
observing. The IES machine is equipped with a public 
counter which indicates to the local precinct staff that 
the votes are registering on the machine. During off 
election periods the machines are individually locked 
and usually locked in a warehouse, 

Once readied for an election the machines are kept under 
observation and after being delivered to the polls they 
are locked in the room. On election day after checking 
each machine carefully, the precinct staff is responsible 
for security through observation. 

2-58 R.F. Shoup 

The R.F Shoup machine characteristics are similar to 
those of other lever machines. Like the others, the 
R.F. Shoup provides no audit trail for tracking indi- 
vidual votes. Tampering can be detected through 
checking the seal, and once the back of the device is 
opened the machine will no longer function. If the 
ballot face has been altered, it will be noticeable 
to the precinct official as will any malfunction in the 
public counter. 

During storage the machines are lowered inside their 
steel legs after the doors have been shut and locked. 
These devices can be padlocked in this down position 
and cannot be opened until they are raised. The manu- 
facturer suggests locking the poll after the machines 
have arrived. On election day the local precinct staff 
is responsible for security through observation. Accuyote 

This punch card system produces an audit trail that 
provides a manual recount of votes if necessary. If 
the device were tampered with, it would be quite notice- 
able to a voter, so the precinct staff seldom checks for 
tampering. Neither the manufacturer nor the local juris- 
diction visited felt it was necessary to make such a 
check when using punch card devices. Also, no security 
was deemed necessary "over these machines when kept in a 
storeroom. Once delivered to the poll the machines 
were locked up in the ballot boxes. On election day 
voting is monitored by the precinct staff. 

2-59 CES 

Since CES is a punch card system it provides the local 
staff with an audit trail. Tampering with the device 
requires that the seal be broken and that the ballot 
format and punch positions subsequently not match the 
official set-up order. The manufacturer recommends that 
the equipment periodically be checked for broken seals and 
for vandalism on ballot pages. Most jurisdictions appear 
to follow this procedure. Devices are ordinarily locked 
in a storeroom when not in use. Prior to an election the 
local jurisdictions handle security at the poll in differ- 
ent ways, but most lock all supplies in a closet in the 
poll area - opening it on election morning. On election 
day voting is monitored by the precinct staff. Pat a vote 

Since Datavote is a punch card system, it provides the 
local jurisdiction with a complete audit trail in case 
a recount is required. Tampering with the device may 
be detected through periodic equipment checking. The 
precinct staff who are in charge of the operation and 
in charge of security for the devices maintain security 
on election day by observing the voting and occa- 
sionally checking each device. Poll locations usually 
take no special security measures after the devices 
arrive at the poll locations prior to election day. 
The machines are usually locked in a storeroom prior 
to and between elections. 


2.6.3,7 Fidler and Chambers 

Since Fidlar and Chambers have a punch card system, it 
provides an audit trail and requires periodic checking 
during the election to insure that the system is working 
properly. Tampering with the system will result in a 
broken seal or defaced ballot pages. The local precinct 
staff checks periodically to be sure that such tampering 
lias noc occurred. Prior to the election the kind of 
security that is maintained over the devices at the poll 
will vary, but in many instances the devices are locked 
in a room until election morning, and are stored in a 
secured room between elections. Seiscor 

Since Seiscor is a punch card system, it provides a com- 
plete audit trail of votes cast. Tampering will result 
in a broken seal or defaced ballot and security measures 
are maintained by occasional checking on election day and 
Beeping the machine in a locked room at other times. 

2 -6.3.9 Control Data 

The Control Data voting system requires a central count- 
1B8 of paper ballots. As a result the system does provide 
the local staff with an audit trail <n 

trail - Since the tabulator 
is used in a central office nrfiHm fl i 

required. However ln J ^ Precautlons 

uses this " e JUrlSdlcti " that currently 

L : :; r a 8uard is < 

tallying room once the machine has 



a locked room in the central office. Once the device 
is started on election day there are observers present 
from both parties to insure the system operates correct- 
ly. Also, before and after tallying, and periodically 
during the vote count, a test check of sample ballots is 
run through the machine to assure observers that it is 
operating correctly. Cubic 

This optical scan system also uses paper ballots that 
are automatically counted by machine election night. 
Extensive security is enforced at the counting locations 
and local jurisdictions run checks to insure that the 
machine is counting the ballots properly. In most juris- 
dictions the devices are not checked periodically during 
the counting process, but they could be if this were 
desired. A test deck is run prior to the counting pro- 
cess to insure that each item tallies correctly. Vote 
results are examined in some areas through an audit of 
the vote after the unofficial results are announced. 
The users of this system in the State of California for 
example are required to perform a 1 percent manual audit 
of the vobe to check for any irregularities. Between 
elections the tallying devices are stored in different 
areas but usually under lock and key in a secure room. 
In Sharon, Massachusetts and Imperial, California, tally- 
ing devices are wheeled into a storage closet just off 
the room where they are used on election night. 

2-62 Gyrex 


i'he Gyrex optical scan system has the same basic charac- 
teristics with respect to security as the other systems. 
Gyrex produces an audit trail that allows local officials 
to recount each vote if necessary. The Gyrex system is 
tested every hour during the vote tallying process to 
insure that the system is working properly. This test 
check exercises all possible voting configurations. 
Machine security is maintained by bi-partisan observation 
of the process to be sure that the devices are accurately 
counting the ballots. In between the elections the rooms 
within which the Gyrex machines are stored are locked. 


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2.7.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is to examine ballot size and format and 
relate size and format to such considerations as printing, ballot con 
trol, absentee voting, write-ins, ballot rotation, etc, (The relatio 
ship of the voter to the ballot is discussed in Section 2.11, Voter 
Process. ) 

2.7.2 Summary 

The table on Page 2-78,79 describes the ballot considerations for eac 
tern. There are three types of ballots; 

, Lever machines which have a printed ballot 
affixed to the machine. There are no indi- 
vidual ballots. 

. Punch card systems which have a ballot the 
size of a punch card and, in addition, a 
stub for control. 

. Manual and optical systems which use a 
paper ballot, manually marked by the voter. 
Specifications for paper ballf 
elder ably according to local 1 

2-66 Ballot Capacity 

Prior to system selection a jurisdiction should examine 
past election turnouts to determine the ballot capacity 
required. Additionally, they should consider what effects 
litigation or local legislation may have on their system. 
For example, where no filing fees are required, the number 
of candiates and issues may exceed the capacity of the 
voting device. Lever machines and the Harris Type punch 
card systems (CES, Fidlar and Chambers, Seiscor) have 
greater capacity for one ballot ranging from 200 to over 
500 possible positions. When this capacity is exceeded, 
a second machine must be added. Although the occasions 
in which this capacity is exceeded are rare, this can be 
a problem with lever machines from the size and cost 
standpoint. Cost and "convenience" are less of a problem 
with the Harris Type punch card systems, where an addi- 
tional machine must be added. 

The Accuvote and Datavote punch card systems and the 
optical scan systems increase ballot capacity by adding 
ballots. The Accuvote and Datavote capacity per punch 

2-67 Write-in Procedures 

The Optical Scan, Manual, Accuvote and Datavote systems 
write the write-in candidates name on the ballot. Over- 
votes are identified mechanically in the tally system. 
The lever systems provide space at the side or top on the 
machine for write-ins and are controlled so that there can 
be no overvote.* The CES, Fidlar and Chambers and Seiscor 
systems, require the write-ins name be written on the 
ballot envelope and require a manual check after polls are 
closed to assure that no overvote occurred. Absentee Procedures 

Lever machines use printed ballots or .one of the other 
systems for absentee votes. In some jurisdictions absen- 
tee ballots are voted by officials on their lever machines 
Punch card systems use their own prescored ballots which 
are punched out with a pencil or special instrument pro- 
vided in the absentee packet. The optical scan systems 
use their own ballots which are either marked by pencil 
or use adhesive backed dots printed with florescent 
ink which the voter affixes to register his vote. 

The Assistant Elections Attorney for the Secretary of State in 
Connecticut reports that during an examination of the IBS lever 
machine they were able to advance the public counter by inserting 
a nail file in an opening adjacent to this counter. He further 
reports that over-votes could be cast by depressing a vote pointer 
for a candidate and later depressing a .write-in pointer for the 
next office, writing in the choice for the second office and then 
returning to depress the second pointer for the preceding office; 
thus creating an over-vote for that office. Connecticut has not 
certified IES. -, 

2-68 Ballot Rotation 

Ballot rotation presents printing and system control 
problems rather than ballot or voting device problems. 
All systems handle rotation in essentially the same 
manner. Each must print and distribute the various 
formats to the proper polls and set their tallying equip- 
ment to recognize each format used. If rotation were 
required for each voter, lever machines could not be 
used; and ballot printing, distributing and tallying would 
be infinitely more difficult for the other systems. 


2.7.3 System Discussion AVM 

The ballot for all AVM lever machines is printed and 
placed on the machine itself. Therefore, only a small 
number of ballots are actually printed, one for each 
machine. The ballots are actually strips which are 
affixed to the machines below and beside the levers to 
indicate to the voter the proper positions and candidates 
for whom he is voting. Since only a small number of 
ballots need to be printed, control over ballot faces is 
less complex and is usually under the direct control of 
the chief elections official. Once the ballots are placed 
on the machine, they are sealed to prevent tampering with- 
out the seal being broken. Sizes vary for the four differ- 
ent machines. The maximum number of voting positions on 
the machines ranges from 270 to 540. In any one election 
the ballot format may limit the use of some possible voting 
positions because of the machine's mechanical limitations. 

The number of referendum issues that can be placed on an 
AVM machine varies from 4 to 7 depending on how many 
columns the device contains. To increase the number of 
voting positions two machines must be used or a supple- 
mental paper ballot can be employed. Both Scranton and 
San Francisco have encountered this problem and both have 
used two machines for one voter. San Francisco reported 
that this cut the number of available machines in half, 
caused voting hold-ups and forced the polls to stay open 
until 11:00 p.m. Ballot rotation is very easily accom- 
plished, where required, by having ballot strips printed 
in different order for each precinct. 


To write-in a candidate's name on the AVM machine the 
voter pushes up the door of a slot at the top of the 
machine. Once opened the voter writes the name of the 
candidate on the paper under the door. The paper is on 
a continuous roll which turns every tine the lever la 
pulled to record all votes and exit f rom the machlne 
At the end of the day the paper roll is removed from fche 
achine and the names entered are tallied for each office 
Locating the wrlt e-in slots at the top of the machine 
Hakes it extre m ely diffi cult for shortr persons ^ ^ 
nigh enough to write in a name. 

Absentee procedures are generally determined by each local 
jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions absentee voters who 
come into the central office are allowed to vote on lever 
machines. Voters who vote by mail are mailed a printed 
ballot in some cases or as in San Francisco, a punch card 
is mailed out. Special instructions are provided for all 
absentee voters. The returned ballots are tabulated either 

n the central office or sent out to the precincts to be 


voting positions unuseable. If voting positions were 
required either two voting machines or a supplemental 
paper ballot must be used. Rotation of the ballot, 
where required, is accomplished by changing the format 
on the ballot face in different precincts. 

Write-in voting requires opening a slide on the left 
hand side of the device and writing the desired name on 
the paper roll inside. The location is backward for left 
handed writers. Once a slide for a position has. been 
opened all levers for that position become inoperable to 
prevent the voter from voting twice. When the polls 
close, the paper rolls with write-in votes on them are 
removed and tallied. 

Absentee votes are counted in varying ways. Voters 
who vote absentee in the central election office usually 
vote on a machine set up for that purpose. Those who 
vote by mail are mailed a paper ballot to be marked by 
pencil, and ballots are in most cases forwarded to the 
local precincts to be tallied at the end of election day. 


machine to 350 on the 10-35 device. If the ballot does 
not fit on this voting device, there is no way to increase 
its capacity without using two machines for one ballot or 
using a supplemental paper ballot. As in the other lever 
machines, ballot rotation is accomplished by using differ- 
ent ordering within different poll locations. 

Write-in procedures are also similar to .other lever machines 
A slot must be opened within which the voter writes the 
name of the candidate. The R.F. Shoup machine provides 20 
slots, located near the bottom of the machine. The paper 
roll on which the write-in names have been collected is re- 
moved from the device so the votes can be totaled when 
the polls are closed. Absentee voting procedures can vary 
according to local jurisdictions' preference, but the 
manufacturer suggests that the mailed in ballots be tallied 
at the precinct level at the end of the election day. 

2.7.3*4 Ac cu vote 

The Accuvote punch card system uses the standard IBM 
card size with an attached control stub. The ballot is 
printed front and back and has 38 or 52 possible voting 
positions, 19 or 26 on each side. By using more than 
one ballot card the ballot capacity is unlimited. Control 
is maintained over ballots by recording the pack of 
ballots given each precinct which are numbered and wrapped 
in bundles of fifty. All ballots used can then be accounted 
for after the close of the polls on election night. Ballot 
rotation is accomplished by changing the order of names on 
the Ballot, and by modifying the tallying program to correc- 
tly topal fjrom each format. To write in a candidate's name 
the voter writes the name on the blank line provided on the 
ballot and then punches out the hole opposite that line. 


Absentee procedures require that the voter use the same 
ballot with prescored holes. The voter is told to take 
a pencil and punch out the holes opposite the candidate's 
name for whom he wishes to vote. Votes are then totaled 
by machine. CES 

The CES voting system uses a standard sized IBM card with 
an attached control stub. Individual votes are recorded 
on the card, but the ballot itself is printed on separate 
pages, which Indicate which holes should be punched. 
There are 228 possible voting positions using the CES 
system. Of the users that were surveyed, none ever required 
more voting positions than the 228 provided by one card. 
If the position capacity needs to be increased, however, 
this can be done by using another card and another voting 
device with additional ballot pages. As in other punch 
card systems, the precinct official uses ballot stub serial 
numbers for ballot control. Ballot rotation where required 
is accomplished by changing the ballot format on the ballot 
pages and modifying the tally program. 


received in the mail is sent out to the precincts 
to be processed as if the voter voted that day. In 
other jurisdictions, like Sacramento County, California 
the ballots are counted earlier and the totals stored on 
tape until the polls close on election night. Datavote 

The Datavote punch card system uses a standard IBM card 
with an attached control stub. Card capacities may be ad- 
justed to three levels, 76 punch positions are available. 
Using a template the capacity can be decreased to 52 or to 
the standard 38 position card. If more than the 76 posi- 
tions are needed for an election, the voter must use two 
cards. Ballot control is maintained through the prenumbered 
stubs on all ballots. Local precincts keep an account of 
all ballots at the close of the polls on election day. Ballot 
rotation is accomplished by changing the format of the 
ballot cards at poll locations. Latavote has recommended 
prepunching precinct numbers on ballots when they are 
printed to identify the format used and simplify the tally- 
ing identification task. 

To write in a candidate's name the voter writes the name 
on the blank line provided under each position listed on 
the ballot. Votes are then tabulated by hand on election 
night . 

Absentee voters who vote through the mail receive the 
same ballot card, except that their cards have prescored 
holes. Holes are punched out with a pencil to indicate 
a vote for a candidate before they are mailed back to the 
central office. 

2-75 Fidlar and Chambers 

This punch card voting system uses a standard sized IBM 
card with a control stub. The capacity, 235 voting posi- 
tions, is increased by using two ballots and two machines. 
Ballot rotation, if mandated by local regulation, can be 
accomplished by changing the ballot format from precinct 
to precinct or machine to machine. 

Write-in voting is done by writing the name of the desired 
candidate and his position on the lines provided on the 
ballot envelope. These are checked after the close of the 
polls and any marks are tabulated. 

Absentee ballots are mailed out with styrofoam backing and 
a special punching pin. The voter matches the hole number 
to the candidate of his choice and punches out that hole. 
The ballots are returned to the central office for tallying 

2-76 Control Data 

This optical scan system uses a basic paper ballot that 
can vary in size from 2.6 by 4.5 to 4.5 by 8.5 inches. 
There are 240 voting positions on each ballot, using a 
ballot overlay device which eliminates the printing of 
candidates names on each ballot. Any increase beyond 
240 positions requires multiple ballots. Ballots are 
wrapped in packets of 500 and are controlled by the use 
of the numbered stubs which are printed on each ballot. 
At poll closing, the local precinct staff is required to 
account for all ballots. Ballot rotation is accom- 
lished by changing the ballot format for individual pre- 
cincts. The ballot reader must also be programmed to 
accept differing formats as appropriate. To write in a 
candidate the voter must write the name on the blank 
line provided and also darken the box opposite that name. 
The procedure for voting as an absentee is the same as 
that for a voter voting on election day. Cubic 

This optical scan system uses a paper ballot that can vary 
ize from about 8 by 11 inches up to 18 by 28 inches. 

maximum capacity of 300 voting positions, each of 
which must be marked by a special fluorescent inked marking 
device. To increase the capacity of the system a second 
ballot is required. All ballots are printed and bound in 
pads in serial sequence and precinct officials must account 
for all ballots. 

The write-in procedures require that the voter place the 
candidate's name on the line provided and then also make 


a mark in the box opposite that previously blank line. 
Ballot rotation requires reformating the ballot and 
modifying the program that tallies the ballots. Absentee 
voters who vote by mail are given the identical ballot 
with a strip of removable adhesive backed dots which are 
transferred into the appropriate boxes on the ballot 
itself. Once returned in the mail, these ballots can 
be treated like a regularly voted ballot. Gyrex 

The Gyrex system uses a ballot that must be a standard 
length of 26 inches. The ballot width can vary from 
9.5 to 36.5 inches. This ballot has a capacity of 500 
voting positions and where this number is exceeded the 
use of another ballot is required. All ballots are 
numbered as they are printed for local precinct officials' 
control. Ballot rotation can be accomplished by changing 
ballot order and reflecting these changes in the tallying 

Write- in votes are recorded by the voter writing the name 
of the desired candidate on the blank line(s) under each 
position. It is not necessary for a mark to be made in 
the box opposite this line since these ballots will be 
separated in the counting process for manual tabulation. 

Absentee voting is done with the same ballot. The voter 
is mailed a special strip of peel off dots to be used 
to mark his absentee votes. Once done the ballot is re- 
turned to the local jurisdiction for tabulating. 

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urpose of this section is to identify the staff requirements necessary 
f active operation is to be achieved by the various systems. 

ing considerations transcend several operational areas, such as 
ing' and security. Frequently, however, machine related tasks are 
full time activity. A compilation of tasks from the systems studied 
general definition of machine related jobs is contained in the 
on Page 2-87. The chart identifies job categories and indicates whether 
:ular systems require that job activity. 

the number of registered voters dictate the numbers of staff and 
J. needed for the tasks, the staff requirement cannot be specified. 
igest any jurisdiction planning to purchase a new system contact 
lictlons of similar size to make staff determinations. 

:ime and full time staff requirements are also size dependent. Jur is- 
ms having large lever systems will require a full time maintenance 
while medium size systems can use part time staff, or more economically, 
,ct for set-up. 

ng'> patterns for jurisdictions with lever systems are different from 
attern required by other systems. Set-up requirements are more 
e When lever systems are used. The CES, Hdlar and Chambers, and 
r systems require some set-up time while other punch card systems 
tlcal Scan systems require very little or no set-up time. Staff- 
quirements at the poll location are basically the same for all systems. 
allying staff is required, however, for the punch card and 
1 scan system than the lever system since these systems process 


individual ballots while the lever system processes machine totals Voting 

Device: Set-up - The preparation of a voting device 
for operation on election day. 

Device: Maintenance - The servicing of a voting 
device between elections to insure that it will 
function properly on election day. 

Device: Operator - A person whose presence and 
actions are required before a voting device can 
be used by any voter. 

Poll Clerk - Person(s) who must be present at 
the local precinct to perform any tasks on elec- 
tion day other than operate the machines. 


Transporter - A person who has the responsibility to 
"move ballots or tally sheets from the precinct to a 
central location. 

Ballot Receiver - A person who has the responsibility 
at the central tallying office to monitor ballots, 
tally sheets, and supplies that come in from the 
precinct and start them through the counting system. 

Ballot Inspector - Individuals who examine all ballots s 
checking to be sure the ballots are faced, that there 
are no hanging chad, and that all cards are machine 

Ballot Duplicators - A person is given ballots that 
are. not machine readable and asked to make a machine 
readable copy of the ballot. 

Ballot Feeders - A person who is responsible for putting 
each ballot or stack of ballots into the ballot reader. 

Counting Staff - Those individuals responsible for man- 
ually counting ballots, or adding up totals from tally 
sheets into aggregate totals. 

Data Processors - A person who provides programmed in- 
struction to the computer hardware to permit the pro- 
gram to perform desired data operations. 

Machine Serviceman - A person who is skilled in the 
mechanical operation and repair of advanced electronic 
equipment . 


2.8.3 Sys terns Pi s cuss ip_n AVM - IES - R.F. Shoup 

Staffing patterns required for effectively identifying 
all lever machines are similar. A lever system which 
does not employ a computer to tally results will be 
staffed as indicated in Chart 9 , although special 
procedures may require some altering of this pattern. 

Personnel as required to set up the voting machine 
prior to each election and to perform maintenance 
on that machine throughout the year is necessary. 
At the precinct on election day, a poll worker must make 
the machine operable, and personnel are required at the 
polls to check names in poll books and to provide re- 
quired voter instruction. Assuming that the jurisdiction 
will manually tabulate the precinct results, there is, 
therefore, no set-up or maintenance of tallying devices. 
However, precinct totals must be transported to the 
central office where a counting staff must combine the 
precinct totals for final results. Where a decision is 
made to use automated equipment to aid in the tallying 
process additional job functions will be required. Accuvote and Datavote 

These voting systems require no staff to maintain or 
set-up voting devices. Normal staffing patterns are 
required, however, at the poll location on election day. 
Poll staff must check the authenticity of all voters 
and maintain proper security over ballots and the voting 
devices. The tallying process associated with these 


systems requires that someone, usually two members of 
the poll staff, be responsible for transporting the 
ballots to the central tallying location. Here a re- 
ceiving staff checks in the materials returned and di- 
rects the ballots to another group for inspection 
where "unreadable" ballots are identified and duplicated 
to make them machine readable. Another "group" of people 
are required to feed the inspected ballots into the machine 
The ballot card reader is obviously part of a computer 
system requiring that data processing staff and machine 
servicemen be available election night to address re- 
lated problems. When the local jurisdiction uses ballot 
tabulators to generate precinct totals, the data processing 
staff requirements are eliminated. This approach, how- 
ever, adds the necessity for a counting staff to manually 
combine precinct totals and produce grand totals. 

2.8.3,3 CES, Fidlar and Chambers, Seiscor 
These punch card systems require that each voting de- 
vice be set up prior to the election and a new ballot 
page and a new mask be placed on the device for each 
election. At this time "maintenance" is performed on 
the device. There is no need for any other maintenance. 
Poll staff is, of course, required on election day. The 
number at each poll is determined not by the voting 
devices being used, but by the procedures established 
by each local jurisdiction. 

Staffing requirements for tallying are similar to those 
of other punch card tallying systems. Numbers of the 
staff will change "based on the volume of work being done 
but the job functions remain constant. Ballots must be 


transported into a central tallying area and their de- 
livery monitored. Ballots must then be inspected for 
hanging chad, duplicated where necessary and fed into 
the ballot reading machine. Any' ballot that has been 
folded or mutilated must be duplicated. 

In most instances the card reader is part of a system 
that is capable of aggregating totals and generating 
precinct and county/city totals. This capability re- 
quires that both data processing personnel and machine 
service representatives be present. If, however, the 
ballots are read by a card reader that only produces 
precinct totals, the requirements for data processing 
and computer service staff are replaced by a require- 
ment for a counting staff to aggregate precinct totals 
into county/city wide totals. CDC, Cubic, Gyrex 

Since optical scan voting is done on a paper ballot 
which is marked, there is no voting device to set up 
or maintain at the poll location. The size of the poll 
staff that is required on election day is a function of 
the local jurisdictional procedures rather than a 
function of the system being used. 

When the polls have closed all ballots are transported 
to the central tallying office, usually by two members 
of the local precinct staff. At the tallying center 
all incoming supplies and ballots are checked. Ballots 
that are not machine readable are removed and counted 
manually. Ballots are then fed into the machine, by 


precinct, to total figures. These totals are then 
stored in the tallying system or printed on paper 
tape, as in the Cubic system. Paper tape with 
precinct totals are then manually tallied. If stored 
in the system, other precinct totals are accumulated 
and the machine prints out aggregate totals. A com- 
puter tied tally system permits a jurisdiction to aggre- 
gate votes in differing format totals to permit elec- 
tion night vote analysis. The use of a computer also 
implies the use of a processing staff and the avail- 
ability of computer service personnel on election night, 






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2.9.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is to identify the staff training require 
ments of the various systems to discuss available training and to in- 
dicate how such training is provided, 

2,9.2 jumniary 

rhe Table on pages 2-96,97 summarizes training requirements of the various 
systems. The three major types of training provided are for machine 
Custodians, precinct workers, and tally staff. Machine Custodian 

Lever machines require specialized training for programm- 
ing machines for elections. The vendors offer formal 
training courses, usually with the vendor picking up 
the major portion of the expenses. Punch Card system 
requirements are minimal in the custodial area and 
this training is provided as a -by-product of set-up 
for the first election. Optical Scan systems recommend 
the use of their service so such training is not a re- 

2-9.2.2 Precinct Workers 

Proper training of precinct workers is critical to the 
successful performance of an election. Election offi- 
cials interviewed during the study pointed out that 
system problems can usually be traced to precincts with 
workers who had not received training, or when precinct 
judges had not adjusted to training in a new system oper- 


Vendors usually perform such training for the first 
several elections after which time local election 
officials assume this responsibility. Tally Staff 

Training requirements for the punch card and optical 
scan tally stystems are more extensive since ballots 
are processed individually. Training is frequently 
conducted just prior to the beginning of the tallying 
process since all workers are in one area and under 
close supervision. Staff training is required during 
the first several elections after a new system is pur- 
chased. Once the system Is established, a nucleus of 
trained workers is available to assist in election per- 
formance, and the permanent staff can properly oversee 
the operation. Initial vendor training services are 
usually part of the purchase of a system and are spec- 
ified in the purchase contract. Most vendors will also 
provide these services as part of an election services 
package sold separately. Prior to system procurement, 
agreement on the training to be provided should be de- 
tailed to include both training time and staff that will 
be provided. If possible, expecially in larger systems, 
the vendor's staff should be identified by background. 
One jurisdiction buying vendor election services traced 
election problems to the fact that the vendor had sent 
a new, inexperienced worker to perform the election 


2.9.3 Systems Discussion AVM 

This company offers extensive training for machine cus- 
todians during a two day training course given at the 
vendor's factory where the machines are produced. The 
custodians are given instruction in the set-up and on- 
going maintenance of. lever devices . A second training 
course is available to local jurisdictions dealing with 
precinct worker instruction. This training is held on- 
site because of the number of poll workers who must 
attend. They receive instruction in the operation of 
the machines used in the operation at the poll on elec- 
tion day. AVM provides written guidelines for each 
training program, The two training packages are provided 
for two elections free of charge to any jurisdiction that 
purchases AVM equipment. After two elections similar 
training can be provided but at the expense of the juris- 
diction. Most localities continue instruction for poll 
workers, but use local staff to handle training. Some 
jurisdictions send custodians back to the AVM factory 
for a refresher course, who in turn train others upon 
their return. 

2.9,3.2 'IBS. 

The machine custodian course offered by IBS lasts a week 
and is conducted at regional sites around the country. 
The custodians receive instruction in the set-up and 
maintenance 'the leveir machines. A complete Custodians 
Manual is also provided for reference after returning to 


the local jurisdiction. A second training course is held 
in the local jurisdiction to instruct poll workers in the 
operation of the voting machines and the procedures that 
must be followed to obtain accurate and legal vote 
totals from lever machines. This is usually a two hour 
course, augmented by a printed manual which can be used 
as a guideline by poll workers on election day. During 
the first two elections after purchase or lease of IES 
equipment, these two courses are available to the local 
jurisdiction at no charge except for travel costs. R.F. Shoup 

This company offers a two day custodian course at the 
R.F. Shoup factory in North Carolina emphasizing set- 
up and maintenance of the lever machine . The company 
also offers a poll workers course covering the oper- 
ation of the machine and other procedures required for 
effective election operations. The poll worker train- 
ing class is a two hour class. The course is provided 
by the R.F. Shoup Company for two elections after system 
purchase. The custodian course is also free for the 
first two years. Accuvote 

The vendor feels that the simplicity of this punch card 
unit obviates the need for extensive training. However, 
when a jurisdiction initially adopts this voting system, 
corporate representatives from Accuvote provide a one day 
training session within the jurisdiction. This training 
part of the system contract package is proviced 'at no 
additional cost to the purchaser. No other formal training 


is provided by the vendor. After this initial training 
local jurisdictions assume the responsibility for train- 
ing poll workers. CES 

When a jurisdiction purchases the CES system, the vendor 
provides training to both precinct workers and central 
tallying staff at no additional cost. CES maintains a 
general training outline which is adapted to the require- 
ments of each local jurisdiction. After the first election, 
CES observes the second, but no longer provides formal 
training, leaving the training responsibility to the local 
county or city. 

Finding instructors to train the sometimes large number of 
poll workers can often drain an already small and over- 
burdened election stafff just prior to an election. Two 
jurisdictions using CES equipment and, therefore, now 
responsible for their own training have found imaginative 
methods for providing poll worker training. In Sacramento 
County, California, the League of Women Voters trains the 
1,400 precinct workers that must receive instruction prior 
to election day. The Board of Elections in the city of 
Bloomington, Illinois, mails a training course consisting 
of written procedures and a test to election day poll 
workers. In each of these jurisdictions the local approach 
frees staff personnel from conducting training classes at 
a time critical to elections administrators. Datavote 

This punch card manufacturer provides both precinct staff 


training and training sessions for the central tally staff, 
including the data processors. These training classes are 
provided to any local jurisdiction for the first two elec- 
tions after the purchase of Datavote punching devices at 
no extra cost. The staff of the local jurisdiction then 
assures the training responsibility. Poll worker train- 
ing is primarily in the area of local election day pro- 
cedures since there is little training required in the 
operation of the punch unit itself. Central tally staff 
instructions must be well planned to assure that ballots 
flow freely, yet with sufficient control from receipt to 
machine count . Fidlar and Chambers 

During the first two elections after the purchase of 
voting equipment from this company, Fidlar and Chambers 
assists in any training required to conduct the elections 
effectively. Both precinct worker and central tally office 
training is provided. After these first two elections, the 
local jurisdiction assumes training responsibilities. Seiscor 

Seiscor contracts with its distributors so that any jur- 
isdiction that purchases Seiscor voting devices will be 
provided training support for its first two elections. 
This includes both instructions for poll workers and those 
for the central tally staff. Poll workers are trained 
in the operation of Seiscor device and in related pro- 
cedures that must be followed, especially during the first 
election. Central tally staff training is aimed at mov- 
ing ballots swiftly through the control and tallying steps 


on election night. After two elections the local juris- 
diction assumes the training responsibility. In Fresno 
County, the twenty staff members involved in the com- 
puterized counting of the ballots hold a simulated elec- 
tion preceding the actual election day to be sure their 
training has been effective. Control Data Corporation 

This company manufactures an optical scan tallying sys- 
tem that is used in only one location. Therefore, this 
vendor offers no training for precinct officials or any 
training for tally staff. The system is operated during 
the election process by representatives from the vendor. 
The instructions provided to precinct officials are 
handled by the local election officials, and the tally- 
ing equipment has little bearing on poll worker training. Cubic 

Optical scan systems require little training of poll 
workers since a basic paper ballot is still in use. 
One election representative from Cubic, however, will 
assist in any training that is necessary to insure 
effective election procedures are implemented. After 
the first election the local jurisdiction assumes the 
training responsibility. The data processing staff 
responsible for the tallying process receives instructions 
for one election. Contra Costa County in California, 
which has machines for converting ballot information to 
magnetic tape, trains the machine operators for 15 min- 
utes prior to the tallying process and has successfully 
conducted its elections, 

2-95 Gyrex 

The Gyrex optical scan system uses a machine to tally 
paper ballots. The vendor, therefore, does not provide 
training for precinct staff workers, but does provide 
training for the central tallying staff and extensive 
instruction for machine operators. Once the tallying 
machinery has been installed, representatives from the 
vendor provide on-the-job training for the operators 
of the machinery beginning up to three months prior to an 
election. After the first election the training function 
is assumed by local elections officials. 


10 to u-i 

(N w n 





2.10.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is to discuss "new" systems, how they are 
introduced to the voter, and what devices and/or training is provided 
at the precinct level to the voters who must use the new system. 

2.10.2 S umma ry 

The magnitude of the voter education problem is difficult to assess. 

The precinct workers cannot, as a rule, enter the voting booth with the 

voter and, therefore, when voters experience difficulties, these diffi- 

culties may not be apparent to the precinct worker. Analyzing punch 

card and optical scan ballots for overvotes and voided ballots 

would provide some indication of the number experiencing problems with 

this system, however, within jurisdictions visited no attempt was made 

at such analysis. Since lever machines restrict overvoting, such analysis 

cannot be made within lever systems and error voting. Voter understand- 

ing of ballot layout cannot be determined, and general system operation 

cannot be readily estimated. 

Most ms have developd 

o o w . tems operate Bhen vQng ^^^ has taten 

h H S 7 USe are rdlnarlly PrOV " ed ^ SaCh *** I'ooth and 
the voting d evice so that those who can read can> ag a 

i n s tru e, lo ns. The lever TO provlde 3mall 

prove 3mall ^ 

r v ::; practice on prior to enterin8 the -^ ^. - 

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2.10.3 Systems Discussion AVM 

Although techniques employed for voter education differ 
among local jurisdictions, most elections officials us- 
ing AVM machines attempt to get a sample ballot face 
printed in the local newspaper. Many also send out 
sample ballots with voting instructions printed on them 
to registered voters and try to get civic groups, espe- 
cially the League of Women Voters, involved in educating 
the voter. The AVM company provides model machines 
which can be used as demonstrators at the polls on elec- 
tion day. These demonstrators are a facsimile of a 
portion of the front of the voting machine and demon- 
strate to the voter how to pull the small individual 
candidate levers. Posters which can be placed inside 
the voting booth are also available from AVM and in- 
struction brochures for use prior to election day can 
be purchased. In most jurisdictions both the demon- 
strators and some type of instruction card are used 
at every poll. In Kankakee County, Illinois, 15 actual 
machines are put on display prior to an election in 
banks and other public buildings so voters may become 
familiar with the machine operation, IES 

The voter education material provided by IES includes 
a voting machine demonstrator and printed detailed vot- 
ing instructions. There is also a three step set of 
instructions painted on the top panel of the machine. 
All of these are normally used with each voting machine 


at the polls. Prior to the election m ost Jurisdictions 

printing it in the newspaper, by mailing, or both. 
These sa^le ballots have the voting instructions 

printed on them. 

2 10.3.3 

Tnl s voting -chine has been marlceted for such a short 
ti no voter education materials have been developed, 
but the vendor intends to tailor^aka his voter ed- 
ucation materials to the needs of the Jurisdiction us- 
ing their devices. The manufacturer intends to produce 
post ers and written voting instructions tor all locali- 
ties. Other types of materials may also be produced 
depending upon the particular Jurisdiction. 


This punch card manufacturer recommends the use of a 
demonstration device at the polls on election day. 
Unlike the snail lever machine demonstrators, this demon- 
stration votins device is identical to the device upon 
which the voter casts his ballot. In fact, the demon- 
strator is left in the poll as a back-up machine in 
case one of the others malfunctions. The manufacturer 
also has instructions that are attached to the voting 
device, and additional voting instructions on the wall 
of the voting booth itself. Prior to the election, 
sample ballots are used to acquaint the voter with the 
ballot layout he will see on election day. Voting In- 
structions are printed on the sample ballots. In Yuba 
County, California, when these punch card voting devices 


were first being used, the Elections Department was able 
to obtain TV coverage to describe the proper use of the 
voting system. CES 

CES provides a number of voter education materials in- 
cluding television film clips, training slides and films, 
printed instructions, and demonstration devices. The 
demonstration devices are old Datamedia devices that 
can be used by the poll officials to show voters exactly 
how to vote. These are not back-up devices. The printed 
instructions are placed in each voting booth. Sample 
ballots are ordinarily mailed out s and newspapers print 
a sample ballot which contains voting instructions on 
it. Most jurisdictions report a steady decrease in the 
amount of coverage the media gives to voting instruction 
depending on the number of years the same system was used 
The city of Bloomington, Illinois, shows all persons 
registering to vote how the CES device operates, while 
college students were used in Tar rant Acounty, Texas, to 
demonstrate the machine. Datavote 

Like other punch card systems, Datavote sells demon- 
stration devices that are also back-up devices which 
could be put into use if required. Datavote also sells 
posters containing instructions which are placed in the 
voting booth with each device. In addition, in Ventura 
County, California, a precinct clerk orally reads the 
instructions before the voter enters the booth to vote. 
Sample ballots are also mailed to voters along with 


instruction cards which tell the voter how to cast his 

2 '10.3.7 Fidlar and Chambers 

Fidlar and Chambers also sells demonstrators that can 
be used in the polls as back-up machines, but whose real 
purpose is f or voter education. This vendor sells bro- 
chures that contain instructions on how a voter casts 
his ballot using that device. Because no user of this 
equipment was visited; we are not certain which material 
is used at the polls, but one would assume the demon- 
strator and brochure would both be used. Seiscor 

Printed instructions on how to cast a ballot are avail- 
able from Seiscor when a jurisdiction first purchases 
this punch card voting system. After a number of years 
in one jurisdiction, the need for this material is not 
as acute and no longer available to the county. Most 
jurisdictions use a back-up extra machine to demonstrate 
the proper procedures for voting. ' Also, inside each 
voting booth is a set of written instructions telling 
each voter how to cast his ballot. In most jurisdictions 
pre-election advertising is achieved by mailing sample 
ballots to registered voters, and, at the same time, mail- 
ing voting instructions for the Seiscor punch device. 
The users of this system that were vlsitedj howeverj 
indicated a much more active voter education drive '' 
was used when the system was initiated. 

2-103 Control Data Corporation 

The vendor provides printed instructions on how to vote, 
but because this system uses a paper ballot the vendor 
and jurisdiction feel little need to provide the elec- 
torate with voting instructions of the type mentioned 
above. There is little pre-election advertising, but 
a copy of voting instructions is required in every vot- 
ing booth. Cubic 

This vendor provides voting instructions for use in the 
voting booths and polls on election day. The posters 
are graphic and contain written instructions on how to 
use the Cubic marking device to cast a ballot. All 
pre-election instruction is performed through mailing 
a sample ballot since all sample ballots have written 
voting instructions printed on them. In states where 
sample ballots are not required by law, there is no 
pre-election instruction on system use. 

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2.11.1 Purpose 

This section is concerned with those steps required for a voter to vote, 
procedures for correcting voided ballots, and how voting secrecy is assured. 

2.11.2 Summary 

Voting concerns from the purchasing jurisdiction's perspective should focus 
on: Will the voters understand and use the system? As indicated in the 
previous section (voter education), it is difficult to determine if a voter 
really understands how the system operates and if he casts his ballot in tliu 
desired manner. If the voting process is straightforward and not complex 
we can assume voters are using the system appropriately. Every system must o\w- 
ate satisfactorily with respect to; how a vote is cast and validated, how 
an accidentally voided ballot is corrected, and how ballot secrecy is 
assured . 

2.11,2,1 How a Vote is Cast and Validated 

The manual and optical scan systems are the easiest 
systems to operate since the voter is required to 
mark a paper ballot. The voter validates the ballot 
by rechecking the ballot. 

Lever systems require that a lever beside each candi- 
date's name be moved exposing a voting mark for that 
candidate. After all offices are selected, a master 
lever is moved to record all votes at once and open 
the voting booth. Validation is visual, insuring that 
the "X" is by the name desired. 


In the CES, Fidlar and Chambers and Seiscor systems > 
a pre-scored ballot card with all vote positions num- 
bered is placed in the voting device and the numbers 
adjacent to the candidate desired are punched with a 
stylus. The vote is verified in two ways. While in 
the machine it is checked to make sure that the proper 
hole beside the desired name is punched out, and after 
removing the ballot card the voter may check each num- 
ber to make sure that the proper number for the candi- 
date selected has been completely punched out and no 
chad is still attached to the ballot card. This is 
not an impossible check but it is more difficult than 
other systems. 

The Accuvote and Datavote systems require the voter to 
position the ballot in the machine and punch the' hole 
beside the candidates name on the punch card ballot. 
The vote is validated by visually checking to see that 
the punched hole is beside the name desired. There is 
no possibility of a partially punched hole in these 
systems. All of the punch card systems require the 
voter to position the ballot in the voting device. How an Accidently Voided Ballot is Corrected 

In the lever systems, when the voter wishes to change his 
selection, the position lever is reset to its original 
position and the proper lever moved to expose the "X" . 
All changes except write-ins can be made prior to cast- 
ing a vote with the master handle, Overvoting will be 
eliminated if the machine is properly programmed. 


In all other systems the voter returns the improperly 
marked ballot to the poll judges who void that ballot 
and issue a new one. How Ballot Secrecy is Maintained 

The lever machines are set so that when the master handle 
is moved the vote is registered for all offices for whom 
individual levers have been depressed and the levers 
returned to the neutral position prior to the voting 
booth curtain opening. 

Punch card systems all use ballot envelopes. The ballots 
are placed in these envelopes by the voter and the poll 
judge tears off the stub and places the envelope in the 
ballot box. The manual and optical scan ballots are 
folded and inserted in the ballot box by the voter or 
by a judge. 

2 11 3 Systems Discussion AVM - IES - R.F. Shoup 

All lever machines operate in the same fashion when 
a voter casts his ballot. The voter walks into a 
voting booth within the machine and pulls the large 
handle which hangs from the top of the machine or 
protrudes from the center. The lever, when pulled, 


ballot, the machine will mechanically prevent the lever 
from moving. Once the voter has cast the votes he wishes 
to, he opens the curtains hy pushing the large lever, 
used before, back to its original position. As this is 
done, it registers all the separate votes the voter has 
cast on the counters inside the voting machine. One 
current R.F. Shoup variation of the lever machines is 
equipped with an electric motor which allows opening and 
closing the curtains by push button. Each time the large 
lever or the push button opens the curtains a bell rings to 
indicate to the poll staff that another voter has cast 
his ballot. In order to vote on a lever machine, a poll 
worker must he present to activate the machine prior to 
voting by pressing a button on the outside of the machine. Accuvote and Datavote 

Voting with these systems requires that the voter re- 
ceive the ballot card(s) and security envelope before 
entering the voting booth. Once into the voting booth 
the voter inserts the ballot card into the voting device 


2.H.3.3 CES - Fidlar and Chambers - 
These punch card voting systems require that before the 
voter enters the voting booth he must receive a ballot 
inside a ballot envelope. Once inside the voting booth 
the voter removes the ballot card from the envelope and 
inserts the card into the top of the device making sure 
the two large holes in the top of the card fit down onto 
the pegs at the top of the device. Starting with the 
first of the ballot pages the voter punches out the hole 
opposite the appropriate candidate with the specially 
designed stylus. The voter continues, turning all the 
pages until the ballot has been completed. Any write- 
in votes must be written in the space provided on the 
ballot envelope. If the voter accidentally voids his 
ballot by overvoting, for example, he can return the 
ballot to a poll official who will mark the ballot 
"Spoiled" or "Void" and issue the voter a new ballot. 
Once the voter is finished voting, he removes the ballot 
from the device. To check the holes that have been 
punched out, the voter can match the holes that have 
been punched out with the numbers beside the candidate's 
name on the ballot pages and remove any chad still 
attached to the ballot. The voter then inserts the 
ballot in the envelope and leaves the voting booth, 
depositing both ballot card and envelope in the ballot 


Data Corporatlnn - 

The voting process for all optical scan systems Is simi- 
lar to a manual paper ballot process. The voter receives 
a paper ballot before entering a voting booth. Once in- 
side, the voter marks the square opposite the candidate of 


his choice. With the CDC system the mark is made with 
a pencil, while both the Cubic and Gyrex systems pro- 
vide a special marking device for the voter. The voter 
continues to mark all his choices until the ballot is 
complete. If the voter spoils his ballot he can return 
it to a precinct official who will mark it "Void" and 
give the voter another ballot. Before leaving the 
voting booth, to insure complete secrecy, the voter 
folds his ballot so that no marks may be seen and places 
it in a ballot box. 


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2.12.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is to review the steps required to provide 
unofficial totals after the polls close. The subsequent section, Com- 
puter Support, specifically discusses computer usage in the tallying 

2 . 12 . 2 Summary 

Each system is designed to permit the tabulation of unofficial vote 
totals as quickly as possible after the polls have closed. Since 
official totals are usually not required by law until two to three 
weeks after election day, the primary purpose of the tally system is to 
satisfy demands for a timely approximation of voting results. A second 
function of the tally system is to validate unofficial returns for the 
official election process. Each jurisdiction must also recognize the 
additional work and personnel required to provide information quickly, 
when using the various systems. The order of importance in which these 
considerations are perceived vary according to the characteristics of 
each jurisdiction s and local jurisdictions will have to decide what is 
and is not important within its particular environment. Unofficial Total Production 

In a previous OFE study, entitled Survey of Election 
Boards, ^ ASI requested information about time required 
to produce unofficial election totals. An analysis of 
the response data was performed by the OFE staff, com- 
paring time required for vote counts from jurisdictions 
of similar size. The results showed that all systems 
provided unofficial vote count totals in approximately 
the same amount of time. 


The lever systems have a slight advantage in this area 
since each poll location, can immediately provide indi- 
vidual totals to satisfy public as well as media needs. 
Action has been taken in several jurisdictions to speed 
the process of providing unofficial totals. An election 
official in one large jurisdiction, using a punch card 
system, indicated that one of the major television net- 
works offered help to obtain totals from selected pre- 
cincts. Washington law permits the ballot box to be 
picked up and replaced during the day to permit the prep; 
ration of ballots for processing. As a result, tallying 
in Washington begins as soon as the polls close and 
approximately 50 percent of the totals are available Witt 
an hour or two. 

2 . 12 . 2 . 2 Official Tabulation 

In the section, Equipment/System Security, we discussed 
available options for canvassing (validation) for pro- 
duction of official totals. To briefly review: 

. Lever systems require a check of the tally 
sheets from each machine with the actual 
counters on the machine (still sealed). A 
major weakness of this system is that there 
is no audit trail of the individual ballot. 

. Punch Card and Optical Scan systems have 
Individual ballots. . Canvasses can be made 
by reprocessing the ballots or by a manual 
count of selected precincts. The individual 
ballots- offer an advantage in the validation 
process. However, paper ballots and prescored 
ballots will tear if used too frequently for 

2-115 Processing Considerations 

Lever systems need process only one "piece of paper" 
(tally sheet) for each machine while other systems pro- 
cess one or more pieces of paper/cards for each voter. 
When jurisdictions are considering the purchase of a 
voting system all processing implications of a system 
should be clearly understood with respect to how parti- 
cular system requirements relate to the unique charac- 
teristics of the jurisdiction. These considerations 

. Ballot Transportation - All systems require 
the transportation of ballots or machine 
totals, and transportation of machine totals 
can be a much less cumbersome process. 
Mendiceno County, California, which has many 
isolated areas felt that their Cubic vote 
tabulation was not performed faster than the 
previous system they had used because all 
ballots had to be transported to a central 
tallying point. At some outlying poll lo- 
cations this transportation required several 

. Manual Ballot Handling - All systems, punch 
card, optical scan and manual systems, require 
a considerable amount of individual vote 
handling. Poll judges must handle all ballots 
to prepare ballots for transportation and to 
account for all ballots. Depending on the 
system, when the ballots reach a certain 
tallying point, they are scanned and prepared 


for processing. All systems require 
one person to process ballots through 
each machine and one person to handle 
processed ballots. Special procedures 
must be established for reconstructing 
damaged ballots and for handling over- 
voting and write-ins. Ballots must 
then be repackaged, sealed and stored. 

. Ballot Security - Individual ballot 
systems require a considerable amount 
of ballot handling. In addition to 
staffing and training, there are security 
considerations. These considerations in- 
crease significantly with the amount of 
handling required. 

. Space - Space requirements for a centra- 
lized tallying system must be considered. 
Centralized tally system components in- 
clude input devices such as ballot tabu- 
lators, card readers and optical scan 
devices that require space for storage 
and operation. Additionally, space must 
be provided for concurrent manual ballot 
processing activity. 

2 . 12 . 3 Systems Discussion AVM - IBS - R.F. Shoup 

The tallying process is similar for all lever machines 
starting when the polls close. The machines are open* 
to expose the counters on which the votes have been 


accumulated during the day. The precinct staff records 
the counter totals on tally sheets which are then trans- 
ported to a central tallying location. Here all tally 
sheets are combined to generate county/city totals. No 
tallying equipment is mandatory and in small jurisdictions 
the tally sheets are added manually. Larger jurisdictions 
use adding machines or other computing devices., 
although the City of San Francisco which totaled the votes 
of 234,000 people on election day in November 1972 did so 
without the use of a computer. Conversely, the County of 
Katikakee, Illinois, which processed only 40,000 voters 
that day, did use a computer. As a rule, jurisdictions 
which use lever machines and have a large population do 
use a computer to facilitate swift and accurate addition 
of precinct totals. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Allegheny 
County) is a good example. This county has over 1,200 
precincts and 676,000 voters but in November 1972 the 
county was able with the aid of the computer system to 
provide relatively accurate total figures to the press in 
four hours. Jurisdictions that use a computer to aid in 
vote tallying use available county hardware and staff 
where possible to prevent extra cost. In most cases, the 
jurisdiction has staff available that can develop the 
software and perform necessary testing. Tests usually 
are made through use of a sample card deck which tests 
addition in all voting categories. Tests are normally run 
before, after and during the counting process to assure 
that programs for totaling are functioning correctly. 

In most jurisdictions partial voting totals are available 
within 1/2 hour from the time the polls close, and most 
jurisdictions provide an unofficial complete count within 


four hours. When a recount is required, a recanvassing 
of all tally sheets is made by rechecking the counters on 
all machines to insure that the numbers were transferred 
correctly. Some states require an audit of results while 
others do not, and where required, the audit is handled 
like a recount of the vote. Accuvote - CES - Datamedia - Datavote - Fidlar 
and Chambers^ - Seiscor 

All punch card systems use similar operations for tally- 
ing votes on election night. Upon closing of the polls 
ballot boxes are opened and the ballots and ballot en- 
velopes are removed for counting. Write-in votes are 
totaled and the ballot cards are checked for damage. At 
this point, the cards are stacked in preparation for 
transportation to the central tallying office. Once they 
arrive there the central tally staff recheck all ballot 
cards in preparation for their being counted by machine. 
Any cards that are too damaged for card reader input are 
duplicated prior to the counting process. Cards are 
checked for hanging chad (CE3, Fidlar and Chambers, and 
Seiscor systems' only) and faced in final preparation for 
the card reader. Card reading devices may be either pro- 
grammed ballot tabulators which are programmed to provide 
desired vote totals, or "regular" card readers which simply 
transfer the card image to tape, disc or other data storage 
form. Time required to compile unofficial totals varies 
among elections and jurisdictions but averages about five 
hours from the time the polls close. Partial totals 
become available much more rapidly, usually during the 
first hour after the close of the polls. Recount pro- 
cedures vary from a full manual recount in some locations 
to a rerun of all ballots through the card reader in 


The equipment used in the tallying process will vary 
locally but each jurisdiction does need a device to 
gather vote totals for punch card systems. Several 
manufacturers of punch devices also sell card readers 
and card tabulators. The companies include: Carlisle 
Graphics; CES and Datavote. Other standard card 
readers can be purchased to assist in ballot counting. 
Some jurisdictions elect to tie a card reader to the 
computer system available in the county/city government, 
Where large numbers of precincts and ballot formats 
are used, this approach will facilitate vote counting 
and the memory capability of the computer will permit a 
variety of vote aggregations useful for analysis. Control Data - Cubic - Gyrex 

In all optical scan systems, ballots are gathered at the 
precinct and transported to a central tallying location. 
The precinct elections staff is responsible for stacking 
all ballots and separating damaged ballots. Once this 
preliminary checking occurs, the ballots are transported 
to a central location. Here the central office staff 
rechecks all ballots and prepares them for machine 
processing. After being counted by the machine, ballots 
will be stored to provide an audit trail if required. 
Any ballot or portion of a ballot to be voided is voided 
by the tallying equipment. 


requires additional output hardware. The CDC 921 Card 
Reader, which is being used only in the District of 
Columbia, is tied into the following extra hardware: 
a Control Data 8092-D Teleprogramrner; a CDC 608 Magnetic 
Tape Transport; and a 1713 Operators Console. The 
totals from card readers are processed through the tele- 
programmer and stored on the tape in the 608 Transport. 
These tapes are then placed on a large IBM 370-155 com- 
puter for analytic and display formating. 

The Gyrex Vote Tally System has the following equipment: 
the Gyrex Ballot Reader and Control Electronics; Reading 
and Analysis Unit (R/A); the Storage and Control Unit; 
Operators Console, Power Supply System; Univac High 
Speed Card Punch. As the Ballot Reader receives signals 
from reading the ballots, the R/A unit allocates the 
votes on the ballot to the proper candidate. The storage 
unit records precinct totals and provides the signal 
to the Univac Card Punch to permit it to punch cards with 
the accumulated vote totals. The Operators Console pro- 
vides status indicators, control switches and interface 
between Storage, Control and Card Punch. The resulting 
cards are then used by local jurisdictions data processing 
system to accumulate county/city-wide totals. 

Each system is capable of being tested using a test deck 
of sample ballots. In all cases the test is run prior 
to the actual live ballot to be sure the system is 
operating effectively. Manufacturers and users of the 
Cubic system feel that it is not necessary to test the 
system during the vote counting process as the other two 
optical scan systems do. All users, however, do test 
the system again at the end of the tallying process. 


Partial totals are available, using these systems, 
usually within an hour of the time the polls close, and 
normally the final unofficial results are available in 
about five hours. The one exception is that the Gyrex 
system tends to take longer to accumulate the vote totals, 
and the final results are not usually known until ten 
hours after the polls close. 



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sheets at central counting area 

Record counter totals on tally sheets - 
sheets at central counting area 

Remove ballots and envelopes from ballot 
for damaged ballots - face ballots - tra: 
tally center rechecked - machine read ba: 

Remove ballots and envelopes from ballot 
for damaged ballots - face ballots - trai 
tally center rechecked - machine read baJ 

Remove ballots and envelopes from ballot 
for damaged ballots - face ballots - trar 
tally center rechecked - machine read baJ 

iemove ballots and envelopes from ballot 
:or damaged ballots - face ballots - tran 
:ally center rechecked - machine read bal 

lemove ballots and envelopes from ballot 
:or damaged ballots - face ballots - tran 
:ally center rechecked - machine read bal 

Chart 14, Tally Procedures Summsrv 

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2.13.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is to examine the various areas that must 
be considered in the use of computer systems for tallying. This in- 
cludes equipment requirements, software preparation, testing security 
and tallying. 

2.13.2 jJumtnary 

Each of the systems studied have utilized computers to tally the vote 
at some locations. Lever systems, all punch card systems and the cubic 
optical scan system can operate without the use of computers. Lever 
systems provide individual machine totals which can be manually pro- 
cessed. The punch card systems can produce precinct (poll location) 
totals on ballot tabulators which can then be tallied manually. The 
Cubic machines will produce precinct totals which may also be tallied 
manually. The only two systems which require additional output devices 
are the Control Data and the Gyrex systems. 

Computers are generally used for tallying where the jurisdiction is 
large and a demand for fast tabulation exists. The use of a computer 
implies a need for additional controls. Election officials have in 
the past felt secure, having more direct control over each element 
of the election process. The computer introduces complexities, 
which are frequently beyond their scope of understanding and thus 
malfunctions in the system may become more threatening. Such frustra- 
tions are usually short lived,- and generally potential for fraud is 
not increased significantly through the use of computers, particularly 
if sound administrative procedures are followed. Such procedures 
are reviewed in' the following subsections. 

2-127 Software (Computer Programs) 

CES and Datavote have developed vendor software pack- 
ages for customer use. Accuvote is presently in the 
process of developing a software package. CES provides 
a service in which the customer provides the ballot for- 
mats from which CES will generate a program for their 
use and an edit list which is a facsimile of each pre- 
cinct ballot. The system is usually provided in assembly 
language making it difficult for local programmers to 
examine and validate the program since it would require 
restructuring from machine languages. CES states the 
program is available in assembly and cobol languages, 
however, most IBM computer systems users are currently 
sent the assembly program. 

Many jurisdictions develop their own computer programs 
either using staff available from the jurisdiction com- 
puter facility or by contracting locally for such pro- 
gramming support. When contracting or developing such 
programs internally, local officials must know what to 
request in terms of output and controls. A complaint 
consistently echoed by election officials is that soft- 
ware technicians frequently treat election programs in 
the same fashion as they might address software such as 
payroll programs. Such an approach demonstrates a lack 
of understanding of the level of difficulties that can 
be caused by errors or malfunctions. Another problem is 
that each election requires a new program or at least a 
modification of that portion of the program describing 
the ballots. As a result, programming staff or capability 
tends to be an ongoing requirement. The National Bureau 
of Standards ^ is presently addressing this area and 

U.S. General Accounting Office Interagency Agreement with The 
National Bureau of Standards Institute of Computer Sciences and 


will be providing performance standards for developing 
and testing computer programs. The procurement guide de- 
veloped by ASI as part of this contract identifies the 
considerations that should be included in system programming, Equipment Requirements 

Appropriate computer equipment and facilities are critical 
to effective election processing. Dedicated computer time 
must be assigned for elections, meaning that no other 
computer processing could be performed during that time- 
frame. Jurisdictions with on-line operations such as 
police systems may find this is a problem. If dedicated 
time is not available, jurisdictions will have to use other 
systems. Using other systems creates added administrative 
burdens, requires additional security and introduces 
other uncontrolled inputs into the election system. 

An alternative approach to having separate election facili- 
ties is to use commercial facilities such as those provided 
by computer service organizations. When such facilities are 
used, however, local elections officials must maintain con- 
trol over the handling and processing of elections data. 

All jurisdictions must consider the problem and implications 
of machine down time. Los Angeles County, for example, 
maintains backup computer facilities ready to operate if 
the primary computer is down for a long period of time. 
The backup computers, to date, have not been used. Where 
commercial operations are used for elections by local juris- 
dictions, they must insure that adequate priority is offered 
to insure that election results will be produced under any 
operating conditions. In summary, prior to adopting a com- 
puter tallying system, each jurisdiction must insure to its 
satisfaction that vote results will be made available under 
most any circumstances. 

2-129 Testing 

Programs must be tested to insure that they are properly 
programmed and to test system security. 

System tests are developed by punching or marking each 
ballot style (usually by precinct) . Such sample ballots 
are manually tabulated to reflect clear winners for each 
office. The sample ballots should then be processed 
through the equipment to generate input data, the results 
tested using the appropriate computer program and the 
computer produced totals compared to the manual tally. 

After successful testing, the input cards and the pro- 
gram should be stored in a secure area. A first step 
prior to beginning the tally process is to rerun the 
test to insure proper operation. A print-out of the pro- 
gram is then processed to show that all counters are at 
zero, and the tallying process can be started. 

The test can be run anytime during the processing if 
an accuracy check is desired. It should also be rerun 
anytime the computer has malfunctioned or been "down". Validation 

Although a system teat such as that recommended will 
demonstrate the ability of the computer to operate on 
a limited number of ballots, the program may be con- 
structed so as to branch to another routine after 
processing a set number of ballots or votes. To address 
such problems California has a regulation that one percent 
of the precincts be manually counted during the canvass 
for the official count. Effective validation would de- 
mand that all jurisdictions using computer tallying per- 
form similar manual counts. 


Secondly, the computer program can be constructed to 
include a "self checking" component. This component 
would analyze voting results by precinct by comparing 
votes to predetermined standards such as party regis- 
tration totals or previous vote histories. Such a 
comparison would assist in the pointing to precincts 
in which manual tabulation may be appropriate. Contra 
Costa County in California has a program such as this 
included within its tallying program. 

2.13.3 Systems Discussion 

All voting systems do not provide related software. The following die- 
cussion deals with those who do provide such support. CES 

The CES program was originally prepared for use by 
IBM in the 1960s. CES has a staff of programmers who 
modify the basic program to meet local needs. CES 
provides a service for all users by updating their 
program for each election. The user sends the ballot 
format to CES, and the information is keypunched and 
processed through a program which generates office 
titles and punch positions, This data is subsequently 
merged with program modules developed for the various 
computer models to provide an updated program. An 
edit list containing a facsimile of every precinct 
ballot is generated as a by-product to verify that the, 
correct precinct ballot format and voting device set- 
up has been produced. 


CES provides initial programming as part of the initial 
sales contract. The programs are a proprietary package, 
so that the customer is not permitted to develop his 
own program from the existing program. CES sells the 
program services to users for each subsequent election* Accuvote 

Accuvote is in the process of designing a tabulation pro- 
gram as well as a program for vote analysis. They pre- 
sently plan to sell these programs to customers for a 
fixed fee. The program is written in Fortran language 
which may cause some problems since many jurisdictions 
will not have the Fortran programming capability necessary 
to establish ballot formats for individual elections. 

2 . 13 . 3 . 3 Datavote 

The basic Datavote counting program is available to 
customers at $12,500 and $200 per election to update. 
Actual programming for each election may be accomplished 
by the county official. The local official can readily 
prepare program cards for each ballot type. These pro- 
grams accept intermixed Datavote and CES punched ballots, 
therefore, a jurisdiction can concurrently use Datavote, 
Accuvote, CES, Seiscor, Fidlar and Chambers devices and 
perform the vote count using this program. Fidlar and Chambers 

This company writes the counting program for each customer 
The program is included in the original purchase price, 
but an additional program cost is charged for successive 
elections. The company also creates and maintains test 
decks of ballot cards for their customers. 


2.14.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this section is 
operate a system, and includes 

2.14.2 jkimmary 

One of the objectives 

. J - J .V-I_L.J.UIL curort was to collect 
describing costs for supplies 


"" " ' procurement 

T d t T ussions contaln the equlpment - 

e by the manufacturer . These can be used in 

e cost tlon the system selectiQn guide (see . 

eos t estimates for system comparlsQn _ HQW ^ * 

and voiurae 

or accurate up to date cost data before flnfll 
eterminations are made. 

upplles retired to perfo an election fall into two general 

These are the supplies required to run the election 
at precinct level. General supplies such as paper 
registration books, ballot shipping containers, seals, 
etc. These supplies are either purchased separately 
and put together b y the Jurisdiction, or there are 
suppliers who will 0^11 -( . - 

wj. J.J. Sat; J.J. in a STlPPlalliT ~i- i 

, a =>^t;(_j.axj.y prepared precinct 

^t. These kits are ma de up especially for the system 

2-133 Specific System Supplies 

These are supplies that are required every election and 
which are necessary to operate the voting and tallying 
system. Each system has a unique set of required supplies 
These include: 

. Lever Systems: The supplies required for 
each election are: 

- Numbered seals 

- Plain seals 

- Paper rolls (for write-ins) 

- Ballot faces (not provided by vendor) 

- Interlocks and compensators for pro- 
gramming machine 

. Punch Card Systems: The on-going supply re- 
quirement by the CES, Fidlar and Chambers 
and Seiscor systems are: 

- Official prescored numbered 
ballots (not provided by vendor) 

- Ballot security envelopes (may 
be reused if no write-ins) 

- Masks (to program machine) 

- Demonstration ballot cards 

- Test ballot cards 

- Seals 

- Crimp hinges 

The on-going supplies required by Accuvote and 
Datavote punch card systems are: 

- Printed ballot 

- Ballot security envelopes (may 
be reused if no write-ins) 


- Demonstrator ballot cards 

- Test ballot cards 

Optical Scan: The on-going supply requirements 
of optical scan systems are: 

- Printed ballots (not provided 
by vendor) 

- Test ballots 

- Marking instruments 

Several of the punch card vendors offer computer program packages. These 
are covered in detail within the computer support section. CES provides 
on-going service for a fee while Accuvote, Datavote and Fidlar and 
Chambers usually will sell a one time package. 

:n addition to on-going supplies, there are set-up and election day 
-rvices which all vendors market. The cost of such services vary de- 
>end ln g on the parameters of the service, the number of machines used 
.nd the number of precinct, within the Jurisdiction. The cost is usually 
eveloped based on an hourly rate plus transportation and per diem 



Systems Discussion 

2.14,3.1 ATO , . . 

This manufacturer sells a wide variety of machines, 
supplies and services. New machines that can be pur- 
chased range in price from $1,848 to $2,462. If older 
refurbushed machines are available these can be pur- : 
chased from AVM at a less expensive figure. The supplies that 
AVM has available for purchase include all the mechanical 
parts that are necessary for AVM model machines repairs. 
In addition all printing related to elections, including 


absentee ballots, ballot strips, print packs, etc., is 

available through AVM. The vendor estimates that these 

election supplies average about $5.00 per machine for an 

AVM provides all services necessary to assure an effi- 
cient election operation for two elections following 
the purchase of AVM equipment. It is hoped that during 
this time period the county can become familiar enough 
with the system and its operation so that after two 
elections the local staff can run the election by it- 
self. AVM representatives will provide assistance to : 
the local printer who is selected to print the ballot face 
that must fit correctly on the front of the .machine. It 
is essential that the name of the candidate and the proper 
lever line up exactly. The set-up of AVM lever voting 
machines is performed by the AVM staff for two elections, 
and as part of this performance, local machine custodians 
are trained. For the first two elections the AVM staff 
is also responsible for training precinct officials who 
are in charge of the machine operations on election day. 
This is done through formal classes, following the opera- 
tor's manuals and guides. AVM also supervises the voter 


Capital Equipment 



column size (non-printer) 




column size (non-printer) 




column size (non-printer) 




column size (non-printer) 




column size (Print-o-Matic) 




column size (Print-o-Matic) 




column size (Print-o-Matic) 




column size (Print-o-Matic) 



Vendor estimates all associated supplies 
to hold an election can be purchased for : 


For two elections after purchase: 
ballot layout and. printing assistance 
machine programming 
training of machine custodians 
training of precinct officials 
supervision of voter education 
After that: 

AVM will still provide these services but will 
charge based on what is to be done 

$5.00 per 
election unit 

No charge 


2-137 1ES 

The lever machines offered by this company sell for 
$1,975 and $2,250. IES also sells rebuilt and recondi- 
tioned machines. IES sells the demonstrator, which 
is required by law in many states, and a ballot die which 
is used in printing the ballots. Replacement parts for 
the machine are also available as are other supplies that 
will be consumed in the course of one election, e.g. , seals 
paper rolls, etc. 

Services offered by IES are free for two elections after 
the lease or purchase of IES equipment. During that period 
IES will furnish required literature and train elections 
officials in the operation of the IES lever machines. The 
vendor will also provide literature and an educational 
program for the voters to help them better understand how 
to vote on an IES device. IES representatives will assist 
in the printing of the ballot and be available election 
day for service that might be necessary. A custodian's 
course will be offered at either IES or at a regional 
center to which the jurisdiction can send local staff 
requiring training to service the machinery. Training 
lasts from three to five days and only travel costs are 
charged to the local jurisdiction. After two elections 
the county/city staff should not require extensive ser- 
vice. If such assistance is needed, IES representatives 
will provide additional services for $10.00 per hour 
plus travel and per diem. 


G a p ItaJ^JEg u ipm en t 

IBS 2.5 Voting Machine 
IES 3.2 Voting Machine 
IES Demonstration Models 


$ 40.00 


Numbered seals 

Plain Seals 

Paper Rolls (40 bank) 


For two elections after lease or purchase: - 

training elections officials - including fur- 

nishing literature 

assisting in preparing ballots 

being available on election day for service 

training machine custodians - except travel 

After that: 

Set-up and Maintenance of Machines 

$ 6.00/c 
$ 3.00/c 

$12.50 ea. 


$10.00 per 
hour plus 
travel and 
per diem 

2-139 R.F. Shoup 

This manufacturer sells three sizes of a similar voting 
machine which ranges in price from $1,600 to $1,930. They 
also provide the necessary supplies and in addition sell 
some parts for other lever voting machines. Services pro- 
vided are free for two elections after purchase of an R.F. 
Shoup machine. These services include assistance in 
printing ballot faces and setting up of the machines for 
the elections. Also as a part of the purchase price, 
R.F. Shoup will provide training for precinct officials on 
how to operate the machines on election day and will super- 
vise voter education. Training for machine custodians 
is also provided. Technicians from the local jurisdictions 
are sent to the factory in North Carolina for a week or 
more of training in the repair, set-up and maintenance of 
the R.F. Shoup machine. After two elections R.F. Shoup 
will provide maintenance and set-up at an hourly rate 
plus cost and materials. 


C_ap_i t al Jjj l_q a 1 pm .en t 

R.F. Shoup 8-25 Voting Machine $1,600.00 

R.F. Shoup 10-25 Voting Machine $1,700.00 

R.F. Shoup 10-35 Voting Machine $1,930.00 


Key Envelopes 10-15$ ea. 

Seals 3 - 7 ea. 

Paper Rolls $10.00 ea. 

Curtain Cables $ 7.00 ea. 


For two elections after purchase: Free 

printing assistance 

machine set-up 

training of machine custodians 

training of precinct officials 

supervision of voter education 

After that; 

R.F. Shoup will provide maintenance and set-up 

at an hourly rate plus cost and materials 

2-141 Accuvote 

Carlisle-Graphics which manufactures and sells the 
Accuvote system sells the 38 position punch for $62.50 
and the 52 position punch for $72.50. These devices lease 
for $7.50 each, and the lease costs may be amortized over 
ten elections. Several counties have found this arrange- 
ment helpful so they can purchase the system out of revenue 
sharing funds. Carlisle-Graphics also sells the Accuvote 
Ballot Counter for $12,500 and an Accuvote Mini Computer 
for $22,500 both of which are used for vote tallying. 
A ballot counting program written in Fortran with the ex- 
tra capability of vote analysis will be available for pur- 
chase from Carlisle-Graphics at approximately $7,500. 
The program can be purchased once and then may be updated 
by the local jurisdiction. Numerous supplies are avail- 
able, from ballot stock to voting booths. Many of the 
prices listed will vary because of "custom" ordering. 
Service is provided at $25 an hour by the vendor when 
maintenance or set-up is necessary. 


Capital Equipment 

Accuvote 38 position Punch 
Accuvote 52 position Punch 
Accuvote Ballot Counter 
Accuvote Mini Computer 
Ballot Security Envelopes 
Ballot Counting Program 


Ballot Stock 

Ballot Printing 

Sample Ballots 

Accuracy Deck 

Duplicating Deck 

Precinct Kit 

Security Boxes 

Vote Count Overlay ( for ballot counter) 

Douglas Voting Booths 

$ 62.50 

$ 72.50 



$ 30.00 Thousand 

$ 7,500.00 

$4.00-17.00 Thousand 
$16.00/M one side 

$10.00-40.00 Thousand 




.75$ each 

.75$ each 

$145.00 each 


Maintenance and Set-up 


2-143 CES 

Computer Election Systems, Incorporated sells two different 
punch card devices ranging in price from $140 to $230 de- 
pending upon the model and the volume being purchased. The 
CES demonstration unit sells for $45. For jurisdictions with- 
out access to a computer, CES sells a Ballot Tab for $19,900 
or $22,900 (300 or 600 card per minute). They also market a 
BMX Ballot Multiplex unit for $80,000 which converts ballot 
data, to magnetic tape for computer input. The BMX processes 
ballots at 4,000 per minute. Each BMX can also function as a 
Ballot Tab. Other supplies sold by CES which assist a juris- 
diction in preparing the punching devices for voting include: 
seals, mask punch, absentee supplies, automatic or manual 
crimpers, demonstration ballots, ballot envelopes, ballot 
boxes, transfer cases, and page hinges. 

After the purchase of CES punch card devices, the vendor will 
provide additional services at no cost during the first elec- 
tion. During the second election, the vendor will observe 
to insure the accurate preparation and smooth operation of 
the system. These election services include all training and 
preparation of written materials. The CES representatives 
work with the local jurisdiction on ballot design and assembly, 
and in addition, they perform necessary coordination with the 
data processing staff to insure the ballots are accurately 
tallied on election night. These services also include the 
preparation of tallying programs. The jurisdiction must send 
a sample of each ballot page style to CES. CES enters this 
information into its computer and automatically produces a 
computer program for the jurisdiction's computer. This ser- 
vice of preparing the program for each election with new 
candidates, offices, and punch positions, costs from $2 to 


$10 per precinct depending on the number of candidates. 
A facsimile of every precinct ballot format, called the 
Edit List, is produced as a by-product of this update, which 
is used to insure that the counting program and Votomatic 
devices in each precinct are identical. After the second 
election, any other on-site service such as precinct officer 
classes or election day stand-by coverage that a CES repre- 
sentative is asked to perform will be performed for $300 
a day. 

GES states that their representatives normally review ballot 
page layout and election preparation with their customers 
at no charge. Set-up and maintenance of lever machines is 
performed at $12 an hour. 

CES also offers a service to print ballot pages (and sample 
ballots) and assemble pages into the Votomatic frames. This 
is done with their computerized typesetting equipment at the 
main plant in Berkeley, California. 

In addition to the punch card equipment and supplies, CES 
reconditions and sells lever equipment. The lever machines 
are usually trade-ins, reconditioned if necessary, at a CES 
facility in Nashville, Tennessee. CES also provides set-up 
and election day maintenance services competitive with that 
of the lever machine vendors, 

CES markets two principle models of its Votomatic. The 
Model I is designed to sit on the shelf of a standard paper 
ballot voting booth. The Model IIIA is a self-contained unit 
which consists of an aluminum case that functions as a voting 
booth. The legs, light, and Votomatic device are contained 
in a briefcase-style case weighing 18 pounds, thus easily 
stored and transported. 


Capital Equipment 

Model I Votomatlc 

Model III A Votomatic 


Ballot Tab (small computer) 

BMX Ballot Multiplex unit 

Ballot Assembly Aid - only need 1 

Crimper Automatic - to crimp hinges 

Crimper Manual 

Mask Punch, Gang 

Mask Punch, Single Row 

Transfer Cases - One per precinct 


$140 - 168 each 

$210 - 230 each 

$45 each 

$20,000 approx. 

$64,500 - $84,500 approx, 

$125 each 

$980 each 

$185 each 


$9.40 each 

Ballot security envelopes - re-useable except for 


Yellow masks - 1 per machine each election 

Demo cards - approximately 50 per precinct 

Ballot cards - left-overs can be used in some 


Seals - 1 per ballot box and 1 per each 

voting device 

Crimp hinges - 1 per page 7 per voto- 

matic, not reusable 

Styrof oam backed for absentee ballot which is 

Estimated @ 4% of vote 

Punch for absentee ballot 

Yellow mask - gang punching service 

$ 9 - 15 per k 
$ .35 each 
$25 per k 

$20 per k, approx. 

$ . 10 each 
$35 per' k 

$ .03 - .08 each 
$ .02 each 
$ .20 each 



For one election and observation of second: Free 

Ballot Design and Assembly 

Coordinating with Data Processing Training 


Training Precinct Judges 

Coordinating Voter Education 

Written Procedures 

Assistance where necessary 

Set-up and Maintenance of Lever Systems $12.00 per hour 

Programming for Tallying up to 

250 precincts - $5.00 per precinct + $5.00 per candidate 

250 - 500 precincts - $4,00 per precinct + $4.00 per candidate 

500 - 750 precincts - $3.00 per precinct + $3.00 per candidate 

750 - 1,000 precincts - $2.00 per precinct + $2.00 per candidate 

over 1,000 precincts - $1,00 per precinct + $1.00 per candidate 

Minimum price $350 00 

All prices FOB - Berkeley, California 

5 year lease - 9% interest on unpaid balance 

2-147 Datavote 

This punch card device is sold by Diamond International 
Corporation for $100 each, with discounts ranging up to 
20 percent for quantity purchases. Diamond International 
also sells a ballot processor, modular in design, which 
ranges in price from $26,200 to $75,000 with the capability 
of processing from 36,000 to 240,000 cards per hour. These 
prices include Datavote ballot processing software. A basic 
program has been prepared by Datavote which can be purchased 
for $15,000. This is a complex tallying program which will, 
once modified for a particular election, allow the feeding 
of ballot cards in any positions: upside down, left side 
first or right side first. The cost of updating this pro- 
gram yearly is $400. Datavote, through its Election Print- 
ing Department, offers a complete list of supplies including 
ballots, ballot printing, precinct kits, legal forms, etc. 
Datavote personnel assist with printing, staff training, 
voter education and the set-up and maintenance of the 
voting devices and tallying systems. After the first elec- 
tion, Datavote will provide specific services on request 
with costs dependent on the services provided. 


Cap ijtal E i gjuipm enjE 

Datavote Punch Unit $100.00 

Datavote Ballot Processor $26,200 to $75,000 

Computer Program $15,000 

Yearly Update $400.00 


Ballots, Ballot Printing, Precinct Kits, etc. Price List 


For two elections after purchase: Free 

printing assistance 

machine set-up 

training of machine custodians 

training of precinct officials 

supervision of voter education 

After that; Varies 

Datavote will still provide these services 

but will charge based on their standard rates 

in effect at that time. 

2-149 Fidlar and Chambers 

This manufacturer deals primarily in printing materials, 
selling a punch card unit as one line item. Because the 
company has just begun manufacturing devices, rather than 
selling those purchased from someone else, they were not 
able to quote unit prices on their machine. They will 
offer training, software and supplies along with the 
system purchase. 

Capital Equipment 

Vote Recorder 1 


All election materials 

S ery i ce 

For first two elections: Included in 

training purchase price 


2-150 Seiscor 

The Seiscor punch card manufacturer sells devices varying 
in price from $73,90 to $112, depending on the model and 
volume. Although Seiscor does not manufacture' a tallying 
unit, a card reader must be purchased to provide the 
jurisdiction with ballot totals. A limited inventory of 
supplies is available for use in a Seiscor system includ- 
ing masks at $.30 each and seals at $.10 each. In our 
visits with users of the Seiscor devices, it was noted that 
most jurisdictions purchased only the punching devices 
themselves from Seiscor. Most supplies that were needed 
were being purchased from other sources. 

Capital Equipment 

Seiscor Basic Punch Unit $ 73.90 - 84.00 

Seiscor Standard Punch Unit $ 83.16 - 92.00 

Seiscor Deluxe Punch Unit $ 90.72 -100.80 

Seiscor Voting Station $100.80 -112,00 


Masks $ .30 each 

Seals $ .10 each 


Services provided through distributors 

2-151 Control Data Corporation 

This system manufactured by CDC uses the 921 Ballot 
Reader as the central unit within the system. This 
optical scan device sells for $61,000 or leases for 
$1,745 a month. The 8092 teleprogrammer and the 608 
Tape Transport are also needed to operate the system. 
Complete maintenance service including parts is avail- 
able from CDC at $600 a month, and set-up and service 
for an election is $500 extra each time. Supplies, 
including ballots and absentee ballots are also avail- 
able from CDC. 

Capital Equipment 

CDC 921 Ballot Reader $61,000.00 

CDC 921 Ballot Reader (lease) $ 1,745.00 

CDC Teletypewriter 

CDC 8092 Teleprogrammer 

CDC 608- Tape Transport 


Absentee Ballots 


Maintenance (parts included) 

2-152 Cubic 

The Cubic system is an optical scan system that uses the 
Cubic 5-62 Vote Counter to tally the ballots. The systei 
sells for $33,900 per unit. Additionally, Cubic sells a 
CM-11 Buffer for $10,000 and a CM- 15 Buffer for $29,300. 
The CM-11 Buffer can handle up to ten vote counters, 
while the CM- 15 can handle up to twenty units. Cubic 
sells both new ($1.50 each) and refurbished ($.50 each) 
ballot markers that make marks readable by the tallying 

Service contracts from Cubic are $550 per year. These 
contracts include assistance in printing the ballot and 
support in the area of data processing, including pro- 
gramming, to insure the ballots will be accurately 
tallied. This service also provides a Cubic representa- 
tive on election day if the machine malfunctions during 
the tallying process. 


Capital Equipment 

Cubic 5-62 Vote Counter 
Cubic CM-11 Buffer 
Cubic CM- 15 Buffer 
Cubic Tally Program 


Cubic Markers (new) 

Cubic Markers (refurbished) 



assisting in ballot printing 

support in data processing 

$33,900.00 each 
$10,000.00 each 
$29,300.00 each 
under $5,000.00 

1.50 each 
. 50 each 

$ 550.00 yearly 
per machine 

maintenance election day 

2-154 Gyrex 

The cost of the total Gyrex system, having two ballot 
readers, varies between $1.1 million and $1.5 million. 
The equipment in this system includes two ballot readers., 
a reading and analysis unit, a storage and control unit, 
an operator's console, and a Univac 0600 card punch. The 
vendor also supplies a printing chase which is helpful 
to a printer who must print these ballots within very exact 
specifications. Gyrex supplies all equipment necessary 
for the operation of this system including special markers 
and spindle trays for stacking all voted ballots. Gyrex 
also provides free consulting service for one election to 
assist the jurisdiction in transferring from the existing 
vote counting method to the new Gyrex system. The service 
includes assistance in both machine installation and ballot 
printing. Gyrex also provides training for machine opera- 
tors, coordination with local data processing staff and' 
general assistance on election day. Gyrex will also assist 
in obtaining state approval for the system that is necessary 
before use. Once the first election is over Gyrex will con- 
tinue to provide the services at varying costs. 


Capital Equipment 

Gyrex 3021 Vote Tally System (2 readers) $1,155,000.00 

Gyrex 3022 Vote Tally System (2 readers) $1,556,000.00 

Single Printing Chase $ 3,200.00 

Double Printing Chase $ 4*600.00 


Gyrex Marking Stamps $ 3,00 each 

Re- Inked Marking Stamps $ , 5C each 

Gyrex Spindle Trays ,$ 15.00 each 


For one election: Free 

operator training 

ballot printing assistance 

general assistance 


State Approval 

EDP Staff to set totals 

After that: Varies 

Gyrex will continue to provide service 

charging on what needs to be done 





None of the existing voting systems, when taken in total, has a clear 
advantage over other systems in all jurisdictions. Management and con- 
trol are more important in effectively operating a voting system than 
the system itself. However, the characteristics of a system such as 
lever, as opposed to punch card, do tend to give one system an advantage 
over the others where jurisdictions find cost, storage, accuracy, etc., 
a particular problem within local operations. 

The system selection guide provided on the following pages was developed 
to assist jurisdictions to identify their special requirements and to 
select a system to meet those requirements. The guide relates each 
element of the voting system to operational considerations so that 
there are no "surprises" involved in the system implementation. The 
guide can be used: 

. To assess the present system. 
. To compare several systems. 
. To develop system costs. 

. As a guide to make sure all items have been 
considered prior to purchase. 

. As a .process for presenting findings to local 
election boards, commissioners, etc. 

. As a management planning tool. : 

The selection guide is structured to cover the same system elements 
as are covered in Part 2.0. Data was obtained from the Interviews used 
for Part 2.0; from opinions expressed by current system users; and 
from vendors. 



Data required to complete the selection guide may be developed by local 
election officials, by the vendors, or by the two in combination. The 
methods used to develop the data depend on the election officials' pre- 
ference and on state of the local system development. The following 
procedures are recommended for completing the guide. 

3.2.1 Preliminary System Evaluation 

A total selection guide for the present system should be completed by 
the jurisdiction to provide a basis for subsequent comparisons. Juris- 
dictions considering changing their elections system should make a pre- 
liminary selection of which systems to give serious consideration, by 
selecting sections of the guide such as storage, vote tallying, etc., 
which are of primary consideration to their location and completing 
these sections of the guide for all systems. The information contained 
in Section 2.0 of this report is sufficient to permit the completion 
of these areas. 

3.2.2 Detailed System Comparison 

Complete guides should be developed for all systems being considered. 
A considerable amount of the information can be compiled from Section 
2.0 if the election official wishes to do this himself or the form may 
be given to a vendor with a request that he provide the required des- 
criptive information about his system. We recommend that the election 
official complete as much as possible and then call in the vendor to 
review the questions on the guide, completing all unanswered questions 
and making sure all questions have been properly answered, 

The election officials can then use the selection guide summary (Section 
3.2) to summarize the results of this data collection and assist in a 
comparison of the merits of the systems. This data can also be used as . 
a basis for presentations to be made to the election board and to govern- 
ment officials. 



- ~ 

Al) Number of Registered or Qualified Voters 

A2) Number of Polling Places 

A3) Largest Vote Turn-out in Last 5 Years 

A4) Election Day Polling Places Staff (Present) 

A5) Election Day Vote Tallying Staff (Present) 

A6) Rate of Growth (%) Registered Voters in 

Last 5 Years 

Last 3 leata 

A7) What Will Additional Equipment Requirements 
Be For Present System 

B. Equipment Requirements and Characteristics 

Bl) Number of Voting Devices Required 

B2) Number o Back-up Voting Devices Required 

B3) If Voting Devices Are Not Required, Are New 

Voting Booths Required 

B4) Number of Tallying Devices Required 
B5) Guarantee: 

Parts and Labor 

Parts Only 
B6) Special Poll Location Requirements (Facilities) 

B7) Are Voting Devices Available Now (Yes, NO) 
B8) What Is Total Coat of Voting Devices 
B9) What is Total Coat of Specialized Tally 

BIO) What is Cost if Voting Booths Are Required 

C. Equipment Storage 

Cl) Number of Machines (Voting and/or Tallying) 

Times Machine. Weight= 

C2) Number of Machines (Stacked if Possible) __ 
Times Space Requirement - Total Space 



C3) Is Space Available Now 

C4) Are There Special Conditions Required of 

Space (Air Conditioning, etc. ) 
C5) Does Present Space Meet Criteria 
C6) Will Finding and Keeping Space Be a Problem 
C7) Can Machines Be Prepared for Election While 

In Storage Space 
C8) What Will Space Cost You or Local Government 

D. Equipment Maintenance 

Dl) What Happens If A Voting Device Becomes Unuseable 

During The Election Process? Is It Recalled, 

Can It Be Repaired and Used, Do You Increase 

the Load on Other Equipment 

D2) Is Vendor Service Required on Election Day 
D3) How Close is Vendor Service in Miles 
D4) Is Vendor Training Needed and Available for 

Local Staff 
D5) What Ongoing Servicing Staff Requirements are 

D6) What are Maintenance Staff Requirements During 

the Election Process 
D7) Are Local Staff Available to Perform this 


D8) What Will Local Full Time Staff Cost Be 
D9) What Will Part Time Staff Costs Be 
D10) What Will Vendor Maintenance Election Day Service 

Cost Be (If Not Included in Set-up) 

E. Machine Set-up and Testing 

El) Does Voting Device. Require Special Set Up, 

If so How Much Time Per Machine (Major Election) 
How Much Time For All Machines (Major Election) 

E2) What Test of Voting Device Would We Be 

Satisfied With ^_^________ 

E3) How Long Would This Testing Require 

E4) What Other System Test (Tally etc.) Would 

We Be Satisfied With 



E5 How Long Would This Testing Require 

E6) What are Transportation Requirements for 

Voting Devices and/or Tally Equipment 

ij tart 


How Long Prior to Election Day Must 
Transportation Begin 

Locati * Problem 




Are You Satisfied That the Voting Devices can 
be Properly 3e t Up and Inspected to Prohibit 
in-nouse Fraud 

-v-^j-uii ti.uutia 

Can Tally Devices Be Tested 
n Elec f; on / ra cess and is it Important 
Does the System Provide an Audit Trail to 

T Ti? ReC Unt f Each Vote C 
Is Audit Trail Really a Necessity 

(Security is primarily a problem, of management and people rather than 
e q u ipment . ^ ami f vot tampering ^ ^^ . urisdictim ^ ^ a 

problem, yo u should attempt to identify those problem areas and attempt 

System Security".) 


G. Ballot 

Gl) What is the Maximum Number of Candidates that 

can be Displayed on the Ballot 
G2) What is the Maximum Number of Referendum etc. 

that can be Displayed on the Ballot 
G3) How Many Elections in the Last 5 Years 
G4) How Many Times in the Last 5 Years have we been 

Over that Capacity 
G5) How Can Ballot Capacity be Increased ___^ 

G6) How Does This Affect Equipment Costs 
G7) What are Procedures for Write-ins 

G8) Is Write-in Convenient for Voters 
G9) In Your Opinion is the Ballot Convenient 
For Voter Use 

G10) How is Ballot Prepared (Printed, etc.) 

Gil) What is Estimated Ballot Cost for a Major Election? 

H - Staffing Mo. Hrs. Cost 

HI) Full Time Staff Required to 

Maintain and Set Up Equipment XXX _____ 

H2) Part Time Staff Required to 

Maintain and Set Up Equipment 
H3) Staffing Requirements at Poll 


H4) Staffing Requirements for 

Transporting Ballots /Tallies _____ 

H5) Staffing Requirements for 

Tallying all Jobs Including 

Ballot Receipt 
Ballot Checking 
Ballot Processing , 
Tally Processing 
Special Judges 
H6) Total Staffing and Costs XXX 

I. Training 

11) How Many Poll Workers will Require Training 

12) How Long will That Training Require 

13) Who Will Perform Training (Vendor?) 

14) Will Maintenance Staff Require Training 

15) How Many 

16) Who Will Provide Training 

17) Cost of Maintaining Staff Training 

18) How Many Tally Staff Will Require Training 

19) Who Will Provide that Training 

110) How Much Time will be Required 

111) How Much Total Vendor Staff Time is 

Alloted to Training 

J. Voter Education 

Jl) What Packages are Available for Pre- 

Election Voter Training 
J2) What Devices are Needed for Training at Poll 


J3) How Many Training Devices will be Needed 

J4) Cost of Training Devices 

J5) Will Extra Poll Staff be Required for Training 

J6) Number E*tra Needed at Each Poll Location 

J7) Total Number Extra 

J8) Cost for Extra Workers 

K. Voting Process 

Kl) Does the Jurisdiction have any Special Soclo- 

Economic Characteristics that Should be Considered 

K2) Will All Voters Easily Understand the Ballot 
K3) Will the Voting Process be Difficult 
K4) Will the Absentee Voter Understand the 
Voting Process 


L. Vote Tallying 

Ll) List and Briefly Describe Each Step in the Vote 
Tally Process. (Be Sure Staffing is Included in 
Section H.) 

L2) How Long will it take to Transport All Ballot/Machine 

Tallies to Central Tallying Point _ 

L3) Will This Affect Time Required to Produce 

Unofficial Totals __ 

L4) Is Transportation of Ballots and/or Vote 

Totals Better or Worse than Present System _ 
L5) What Time should You Expect Unofficial 

Totals from Major Election __ 

L6) Are Input Devices (Not Listed in Section B) 

Such as Card Reader Needed in the Tally Process _ 
L7) What is Their Speed Per Hour __ and 

How Many are Needed _ 

L8) Are These Available in Jurisdictions Now 

and can they be Isolated for Election Night Use __ 
L9) If These Input Devices are not Available for 

Election Use, Will they be Leased or Purchased _ 
Lip) When will these Input Devices be stored if 

Storage is Required _ 

Lll) Who will provide Maintenance of Equipment if 

Required during Election Process _ 

L12) How much Space is Required for the Operation 

of all Ballot Input Devices _ 

L13) How much Space is Required for Staffing 

Tally Process _ 

L14) Is Tally Space Available 

L15) Can Tally Space be Secured _ 

L16) What is' Lease or Purchase Cost of Input 

Devices _. 

L17) What are Tally Operation Space Costs 


M. Computer Support 

Ml) Does System Require Computer Support 

M2) what Computer will be used 

M3) Will that Computer be Available for Election 

Processing only for a Set Time Frame 
M4) What Happens if the Computer Goes Down 

M5) "here is Computer Physically Located in Relation 
to Central Tallying 



Ml 3) 

Who will be Responsible for Program Tests 

At what Points in Time Will Programs be Tested 

How will Unofficial Results be Validated 

What will be Cost for Computer Use (Testing 

Programs and Election Processing) 
What will be Cost for Initial Computer programs 
What will be Cost for the Update of Computer 

Program (Per Election) 

M6) Who will Prepare Initial Computer Programs 

M7 > Who will Update Programs tor Each Election 

will Program Test be Accomplished 

N. Cost 

When obtaining a quotation for a new system f rom a vendor you should 
ake sure that all supplies and services necessary for the first election 
are included and priced individually. Additionally, you should identify 
those items that will have to be purchased for each election, their 

volume and their present cost. 
Nl) T -Inltial Election 

Capital Equipment 




N2) Subsequent Elections 

Present Supplied 
Supply Item Volume Required Cost By Vendor Other 



The selection guide summary, outlined on the following page, permits 
summarization of the information from the system selection guide for 
comparison purposes. The summary provides space for comparing the 
present system with several proposed systems. We recommend that a 
system selection guide be prepared for the present system to assist in 
assessing the proposed system. 

The sugary sheet pewits a "one through four" rating for each of the 
system selection guide elements. For example, a system with large 
costly storage requirement would be rated A (Poor) in that area. That 
same system raay rate 1 (Excellent) for equipment maintenance, thus 
each system should be rated individually for each element. 

To com pare systems for your needs, you must determine which elements 
are most important to your jurisdiction's needs. For example, in one 
jurisdiction equipment/system security may be the most important item 
while in another vote tallying may be more important. Such decisions 
belong to the local jurisdiction. 

The, second portion of the selection guide summary permits cost compari- 
son of present and planned systems. It contains the same information 
as Section N of the system selection guide. The purpose of this 
portion of the guide is to permit a comparison of costs by cost area 

and total. 



Rating: 1 Excellent 2 Good 3 Fair 

4 Poor 




Equipment Requirements & Characteristics 
Equipment Storage 
Equipment Maintenance 
Machine Set-Up & Testing 
Equipment /System/ Security 
Voter Education 
Voting Process 
Vote Tallying 
Computer Support 





Cost Summary 
PI) Initial One-Time Costs: 
Training Equipment 
P2) Ongoing System Cost 
Equipment Lease/Rental 
Equipment Lease/Rental 
Equipment Lease/Rental 
Ballot Printing Preparation 
Peripheral Equipment 
Peripheral Software 
Maintenance Vendor 
Maintenance In-House 
Storage Costs 
Staffing On-going 
Staffing Election Time Period 



















































s" " 

$ " 








See detail in Section "N 1 





Thxs section of the report sumnarizes current research and development 
efforts that may have significant lm pact on the voting and tally processes, 
The section deals with new approaches. !t does not include refinement or 
improves of existing equipment. Four vendors not presently in the 
votmg equipment business, who are developing systems, were identified. 

The list is not necessarily a comprehensive list and there may be 
other efforts which we had no way to uncover. For exa^nple, the follow- 
ing quote from the March issue of Datamation contains one research 
effort not visited. 

" -' 1 ; , 



a. ,!!, 


Present State of Development 

System Equipment Development Operation 

Vendor Data 



4.2.1 Sys tern Purpose 

This system electronically tabulates votes as they occur on the Shoup 
lever machine. This tabulation can be automatically transmitted to a 
computer by a data phone when polls close, permitting complete unofficial 
tabulations within 1/2 hour of poll closing. 

4.2.2 Present State of Development 

The system has been developed and tested within the IES factory. IES 
has not sold any system to date but feels that the system is ready for 

4.2.3 System Equipment and Operation 

Electronic sensors are attached to each voting spindle on the Shoup 
voting machine. Each time a vote is registered on a mechanical counter, 
the same count is registered on an electronic counter contained within 
a scanner. The scanner may serve one or several machines. 

The scanner has a data phone (telephone) connection which will transmit 
counts to the computer. As soon as the Shoup voting machine is switched 
to the polls closed position, the scanner will accept a call from the 
computer. Counter's totals within the scanner are transmitted to the 
computer which may be programmed to accept data from varying ballot 
formats. The computer can tabulate unofficial totals almost immediately. 

The system would not change the process for vote accounting. The judges 
will certify and copy votes from mechanical counters and forward the 
results to central tallying, 

Vendor Data 

See Section 1.0. : 



4.3.1 System Purpose 

This machine is designed to tabulate the CES punch card ballots at the 
precinct level. Such tabulation would permit the immediate summary of 
precinct totals and provide for quicker unofficial tabulation by centr. 
tallying of precinct totals rather than individual ballots. 

4.3.2 Present State of Development 

The equipment for this process is currently still in the design phase. 
The prototype will be developed by July. They expect to produce 10-15 
by October and to test these in the November election. Marketing prodi 
tion would begin after that time. 

4.3.3 System Equipment and Operations 

After the voter has prepared his ballot card for the regular CES voting 
device, he will process it through the precinct ballot counter. It is 
planned that this device immediately rejects ballots containing over- 
votes. The accepted ballots will be tabulated. The totals will be 
available at the time the polls close. 

4.3.4 Vendor Data 
See Section 1.0. 



4.4.1 System Purpose 

The Gyrex Major Tally Box-One (MTB-1) is an optical scan device designed 
to be used at precinct level to provide precinct totals. 

4.4.2 Present State of Development 

The machine has been designed and tested in the Washington, D.C. June 
primaries. Washington, D.C. has purchased thirty machines and will use 
them in one ward in the November election. 

4.4.3 Sysjiein Equipment and Operation 

This is a precinct oriented tally system that has the capability to pro- 
duce precinct vote totals immediately upon poll closing. The device 
measures 36 inches high by 16 inches wide by 30 inches deep, and weighs 
less than 60 pounds. There are no special conditions for either opera- 
tion or storage, and the device sells for $5,200 if ordering fifty or 
more at one time. It is intended that only one device be used at a 
voting place, however, a jurisdiction could also use it as a central 
counting device. The device folds into Itself providing its own 
storage container. It also occupies considerably less room, reducing its 
height from 36 inches to 18 inches. 

To prepare the MTB-1 for an election, the ballot formats for a precinct 
must be established. This information is programmed into the PROM 
(Programmable Read-Only Memory) so that it will total the votes correc- 
tly. A test is run on the device using a check of sample ballots to ; 
make sure the device is functioning properly. Other than this set-up 
the normal servicing and maintenance of the MTB-1 would be handled by 
Gyrex under the warranty which covers parts and labor for two years or 
two elections, whichever comes first. Once the device is programmed 

and ready for delivery to the polls, the security is assured by a lock 
which prevents access to the inside of the machine. 

On election day the precinct staff prints out a tape to indicate 
all counters are at zero before voting begins. The MTB-1 is merely a 
ballot box. The voter goes Into a booth and marks his ballot with any 
pencil or most any ink. The ballot is 3 1/4 inches wide by any length. 
Before leaving the booth the voter puts the ballot in an envelope. The 
voter now hands the poll worker the envelope with the end of the ballot 
protruding. This portion of the ballot is fed into the device which 
pulls the rest of the ballot out of the envelope and tallies the votes 
on the ballot before dropping into the bottom of the ballot box. Because 
this procedure is similar to any manual system from the point of view of 
the voter, little preelection voter education is necessary. The staff 
required at the polls will not be affected, and the tallying staff 
should be reduced from that required for manual tally. 

Once the polls close, the key is turned, and the device will print out 
the totals it has accumulated all day. The actual ballots provide the 
required back-up. Total figures are transmitted to a central tallying 
location where they can be added with those of other precinct totals. 

The peripheral equipment requirements of this system are limited since 
the MTB-1 is complete in itself. There must, however, be the standard 
voting equipment: pencil, ballot and voting booth. 

4.4.4 Vendor Data 
See Section 1.0. 



4.5.1 System Purpose 

This is an optical scan system which will permit ballot tallying at the 
precinct level. 

4.5.2 Present State of Development 

The system consists of three pieces of equipment to be located at pre- 
cinct level. The Hewlett-Packard 9830A calculator and the thermal page 
printer are presently being used for other systems. The 9860A marked 
card reader was developed for this system. It has been tested but not 

4.5.3 S y s t em K q u ipme n t Q p e r a t i o n s 

The tally system requires three pieces of hardware to operate: a cal- 
culator, a card reader, and a thermal page printer. The card reader, 
a Hewlett-Packard 9860A Marked Card Reader is 3 1/2 inches high by 5 1/3 
inches wide by 11 1/4 inches deep and weighs 6.4 pounds. Its cost is 
$875. The Hewlett-Packard 9830A calculator is about the size of a large 
typewriter and weighs forty pounds. This can be purchased from Hewlett- 
Packard for $6,475. The thermal page printer can be purchased from 
Hewlett-Packard for $2,995 to complete the system. The equipment is 
sold with a 90 day parts and labor warranty. Although not In use yet, 

used by sanitary engineers, assessors, and surveyors. It should also be 
noted that a smaller and less expensive card reader, the 9870A, has 
been developed. 

Pre-election procedures to prepare this system for operation would 
involve the development of a program tape for the calculator that would 
tally the votes accurately. A basic program could be prepared, then 
modified for each precinct. After the tape had been tested by the use 
of a sample check of ballots, tight security would need to be maintained 
over the program tape. The on-going maintenance of the system would be 
provided in a service contract from Hewlett-Packard. System hardware 
would require transportation out to the poll location and return after 
the election. 

Prior to the election there would be no need for additional voter educa- 
tion since the voter is still marking a paper ballot. The voter marks 
his ballot in a voting booth and inserts it into the card reader to be 
read on the way into the ballot box. The ballot is 3 1/2 inches wide 
and can be any length. The card reader will reject any ballot which 
has reason to be rejected within two seconds. The reason for rejection 
will be flashed on the screen of the calculator and the voting official 
can inform the voter why the ballot was rejected. Overvoting or damaged 
ballot will be the two major reasons for this rejection. After the 
polls close the calculator can print out totals it has been gathering 
all day, The totals will then all be tallied in a central location. 
This system will lessen tally staff requirements since all ballots will 
be counted in the precinct. No extensive training in this system will be 
required since the operation of the calculator will be necessary only to 
print totals at the end of the day. 

The system requires little peripheral equipment, but cassettes and 
printer paper will be available from Hewlett-Packard for $10 and $2.50 
respectively. Other standard supplies like voting booths, ballots, pen- 
cils and tally sheets will also be needed to run an election. 


4.5.4 Vendor Data 

The Hewlett-Packard Company is a large international company with twent; 
manufacturing plants producing test equipment, calculators, computers, 
and medical, chemical and engineering instruments. The company is listt 
in the New York Stock Exchange with 50 percent of the stock being owned 
by Hewlett-Packard. The remainder is common stock. The program calcu- 
lator which is the heart of this tally system was first developed and 
patented, in 1968, by the Calculator Products Division of Hewlett-Packai 
in Loveland, Colorado, In 1970, the 9800 series was developed using 
alpha numeric representation and the capability for shifting memory 
program data. Once ready for marketing this tally system will be dis- 
tributed by the Hewlett-Packard calculator salesmen who number over 
100 with at least one in each state. Service will also be available in 
all states. 



t.6.1 System Purpose 

Chis system records each voter's choice simultaneously on mechanical 
counters and on punch cards for computer processing. 

i.6.2 Present State of Development 

Although the pilot model of this machine has been tested, there is not, 
it this time, any manufacturing agreement. The equipment has not been 
narketed or purchased, although marketing activity has begun. 

4*6.3 System Equipment and Operations 

Ihis machine is marketed by Accuvote International, Inc. of Dallas, Texas, 
and should not be confused with the Accuvote punch card device marketed 
by Carlisle-Graphics, described elsewhere in this report. 

The Accuvote model C-4 is designed for storage and transport in its 

own carrying case measuring 26 1/2 X 30 1/8 X 10 1/2 inches and weighs 100 

pounds, exclusive of its stand which folds into its own carrying case. 

When opened for operation the machine is a complete voting booth. The 
panel or ballot board is 25 3/4 X 27 3/4 inches and provides for 320 
voting buttons. 

Although the machine operates on a standard 110 volts 60 cycle electricity, 
it can also be operated by a hand crank in case of power failure. 

To prepare the machine for an election a custodian unlocks and removes 
the ballot cover, inserts the ballot and sets any interlocks (vertical 
and horizontal) required to prevent overvoting. He sets all counters 
to "o", relocks the machine, and it is ready for voting. 


After setting up the machine, the poll staff opens the tray-like drawer 
causing all counters to print confirming that they are set at "o". 
Upon closing the drawer, new paper is advanced for recording the vote 
at the end of the day. 

Each qualified voter is given a blank data card (punch card) which when 
properly inserted in the machine turns on a green ready-to-vote light. 
The voter makes selections by depressing buttons beside the printed 
names of candidates or issue postiions he has selected. This lights 
a luminescent "x" beside each selection made. The machine may be set 
to prevent overvoting whether one or more candidates may be elected to 
office. By depressing a button entitled "write-in" the voter may write 
in his choice on his data card. Straight party voting is accomplished 
by depressing a party button. After depressing this, or any button 
except "write-in", the voter may pull up any button and depress a 
different one. 

On completion of his selections, the voter presses a "vote" button 
which registers the vote on counters in the machine and punches them 
in his data card. The data card is placed in a box for central computer 

When the polls close, the counter tray is pulled out like a drawer. This 
action causes each counter to print on. a sheet the total votes cast for 
each postion. 

4.6.4 Vendor Data 

The Accuvote patent on their interlocks was issued In 1965, and the 
patent on their card punch in 1970. Riverside Press of Dallas, Texas, 
bought the patents in 1970. The prototype was manufactured by Mayo 
Engineering of Dallas, Texas, and at this time no production manu- 
facturing agreement had been made. 



4.7.1 System Purpose 

This voting device projects successive portions of the ballot stored on 
a 35 millimeter film strip ontp a panel with 48 voting buttons. Votes 
from several Video Voters units are collected in a control unit which 
produces vote totals for the poll. 

4.7.2 Present State of Development 

This machine has been certified in the State of Illinois and three 
counties in Illinois have purchased the system. It will be used in the 
November 1974 elections. 

4.7.3 System Equipment and Operations 

The Video Voter measures 25 X 26 X 30 inches without stand and weighs 
35 pounds. Each Video Voter in a poll is connected by cable to a video 
control unit measuring 24 X 20 X 18 inches and weighs 75 pounds. The 
Video Voter sells for $1,600 and the control unit for $2,450. Creating 
ballot film strips will cost approximately $40 per ballot format. 

Each ballot format is pasted up as camera ready copy from which a 35 
millemeter film strip is made. Pre-printed codes on the past-up provide 
numbers for each frame that may be optically scanned. 

Each frame of the master film strip is projected in turn on the Video 
Voter and the vote buttons are used to program a tape cartridge in the 
control unit, All possible voting positions for each frame are identi- 
fied in the cartridge as well as overvote and straight party vote con- 

A copy of the film strip is made for each Video Voter and a copy of the 
programmed tape cartridge is made for each control unit. 


The Video Voter is placed in "vote" condition before each voter casts his 
vote, by an election official activiating a switch outside the Video Voter 
in a remote control unit that can be placed across the room on a judge's 

The voter moves a switch to "start", then depresses vote buttons for se- 
lected candiates. Beside each selection made, an illuminated "x" appears. 
Depressing the "new page" button displays each successive page of the ballot 
A "review ballot" button permits the voter to review each page with his 
selections showing illuminated "x's" for each successive frame or 
page. To cast his votes, the voter moves the "start" switch to "end". 
Provision has been made for write-in for any office on the Video Voter. 

At the end of the day election officials open the control unit and dis- 
play each candidate's vote total in turn on the Vote Register Display 
unit. Thses totals are copied onto a poll tote sheet and carried along 
with the tape cartridge from the control unit to election headquarters. 
There the poll totals are combined to create county totals. The tape 
cartridge may be processed to computer magnetic tape and totals produced. 

4.7.4 Vendor Data 

The Frank Thornber Co. has been in business for 50 years selling print- 
ing, forms, legal documents and election materials to county and city 
officials in Illinois. In the late 60 's they marketed the Harris Votronic 
and later the Shoup voting machines. The Frank Thornber Go. has a man- 
ufacturing agreement with Terminal Communications, Raleigh, North Carolina, 
which was founded in 1969. In December of 1973, Terminal Communications 
was purchased and became a subsidiary of the Norden Division, United 
Aircraft, Incorporated. 


(Subsidiary of AVM Corporation) 

4.8.1 System Purpose 

EVE is a punch card voting system consisting of a precinct card reader 

which provides precinct totals and a central unit to tally precinct 

totals. The precinct system can read either a punched card or cards 
marked with a pencil. 

4.8.2 Present State of Development 

Announcement of the system was made 31 May 1974 by Harold J. Ruttenberg, 
Chairman of AVM Corporation. The News Release states that production 
will begin in 1975. 

4.8.3 System Equipment and Operation 

The precinct card reader is a self contained unit measuring 15X19X32 
inches weighing less than 100 pounds. It will accept a ballot of 
punch card size that has either been punched with a stylus by the voter 
or marked by the voter with a regular pencil. The voter makes his 
choices in either fashion and inserts the ballot into the precinct 
card reader. The reader has been programmed to reject any ballot with 
an overvote and to identify the location of his overvote for the voter. 

The ballot card is similar to that used by CES and related manufacturers 
since it contains no ballot printing. A booklet positioned in each 
voting booth unit contains the ballot. The ballot card is inserted so 
that as each page of the ballot booklet ia viewed, the proper posi- 
tions of the ballot card are exposed for punching or marking. The 
difference in the EVE system from the "CES type" systems is that it 
allows the voter to mark or punch his choices. EVE recommends use 
of the marking of ballots rather than punching. 


Upon closing the polls, the precinct election official activates a total 
control which causes the precinct reader to produce total votes for 
each office in several copies of a printout. Ballots with a write-in 
are automatically separated by the reader to a separate container in 
the machine. This container can only be opened by poll officials so 
that they can tabulate write-in votes. All other votes have been 
counted by the reader. Poll officials return these write-in ballots 
to the reader and the machine is locked until the canvass is conducted. 

One copy of the printout is posted on the poll wall for observers, press, 
etc.; the second copy is retained in the reader and the third copy Is 
used by poll election officials as the source document for them to 
use in marking or punching summary cards with the printed vote totals 
for each candidate. These summary cards contain totals for as many as 
twelve candidates per card and are taken to election headquarters for 
processing along with a copy of the printout. 

At election headquarters the central card reader is utilized to tabulate 
summary cards from each poll and to produce totals for the entire 
jurisdiction. This central unit may also be used to process absentee 
ballots. Although no dimensions are now available for the central 
card reader, it appears to be approximately desk sized with a typewriter 
keyboard which may be used for instructions, i.e., programming, and 
for printing out the jurisdiction totals. It also contains a high 
speed card reader for reading the summary cards and a mini-computer 
to perform the necessary calculations. 

4.8.4 Vendor Data 

Electronic Voting Machine Corporation was formed on 31 May 1974 as a 
wholly owned subsidiary of AVM Corporation. EVE was formed to design, 
manufacture and market the new electronic voting system. (See Section ; for AVM corporate history.) ; 



Since most local governments do not produce goods and services for their 
own needs, these must be purchased from private vendors. As a result, 
purchasing at all levels of governments is usually a major effort. Most 
governments have central procurement facilities which exercise strict 
control over the procurement functions. 

One of the major functions of central procurement is to work with the 
users to insure they are ordering and receiving the quality of supplies 
and services necessary to perform their function. It is the purpose 
of this section to provide information that will permit the election 
official to effectively convey his needs to the purchasing department. 
The following items are discussed in this section. 

- Methods of Procurement 

- Bid Solicitation 

- Bid Invitation 

- Bid Evaluation 

- Contracting 

5.1 Methods of Procurement 

The five major procurement processes used by most government agencies 


1. Informal bids for open market purchases. This 
consists of receiving bids by telephone or in 
person for items that are stocked for sale. This 

method is usually used only for small volume ; 

purchases. i 

2. Formal bids for contract purchases. This 1 re- i 
quires advertising bids and providing the : 


prospective bidder with documentation explaining 
the bid items and requirements. The bidder in 
turn documents his response including price quota- 

3. Purchase by negotiation. This process is usually 
restricted to small volume purchases or where 
only one acceptable source can provide an item 
required. It is also used when bid prices are not 

4. Emergency purchases. This process is used only in 
cases of extreme emergency such as a fire or a 
major machinery breakdown. Such purchases usually 
have a dollar limit which cannot be exceeded with- 
out the approval of the procurement department. 

5. Small order purchases. This process is used when 
the procurement process cost would exceed the cost 
of the items to be purchased. This is usually 
imprest or petty cash purchasing. 

Critical supplies and services required by election officials are usually 
provided under a formal bid process, although because of the limited 
number of supplies purchased, negotiations may be used in some situations, 

5.2 Bid Solicitations 

The process of soliciting bids may vary slightly by jurisdiction. How- 
ever, the most common process is for the procurement office to maintain 
lists of potential bidders categorized by commodity. Some jurisdictions 
also require that bids be advertised in newspapers. 


The election officials should make contributions to, if not completely 
develop, the bid list. As previously mentioned at the time of system 
purchase the election official should compile files on all essential 
supplies and services including sources. These sources would be iden- 
tified by the vendor and other users of the same system. 

Additionally, potential vendors will often call on election officials 
to inform them of their products and services. If any of these vendors 
appear to have the required qualifications they should be added to the 
bid list. The election official might also ask for examples of comparabl 
work references to assess their ability to perform. As a result, when 
the bid is ready for submission the bid list will also be ready. 

Another procedure which may be followed is to request qualifications 
statements from interested bidders. For example, a jurisdiction may 
have 100 "printers" but only one or two can meet the specifications for 
a required ballot. A request for qualifications, including required 
specifications, should be made by newspaper or mail. The potential bidd, 
will respond with their ability to meet specific requirements as well 
as provide business background information. This information may be 
supplemented with financial reports from the vendor or from Dun and 
Bradstreet. The financial stability of the vendor should be assessed 
prior to acceptance for bidding. 

5.3 Bid Invitation 

The invitation to bid is usually a standard form which provides for the 
identification and description of the desired commodities, the volume 
required and the time required. The election official must have the 
complete specifications at hand to assist the purchasing agent. The 
purchasing agent will assist in formatting the bid but will not have 
the technical background required to develop specifications. 


rom the purchasing agents view bid specifications should concisely 
efine the quality level of the desired product, while at the same time 
roviding as wide a competition in sources of supply as possible. 
rom the election official's viewpoint the specifications should be so 
estrictive that only the highly qualified can compete, assuring a 
uality product. 

he vote process requires two distinct types of specifications. These 
re the specifications for supply items such as printing ballots, etc., 
nd services such as personal services (machine set-up and computer 
rogramming) . 

he specifications for all supply items should be detailed completely by 
he system vendor at the time of the voting system purchase. These 
hould subsequently be maiiitained with lists of potential vendors. 

he specifications for personal services should also be developed with 
he vendor's assistance at the time of purchase. All vendors provide 
hese services to varying degrees. In some instances there is considerable 
ompetition between system vendors as well as independent vendors. This 
s especially true in the set up of lever machines. Specifications should 
e set to reflect the qualifications of staff proposed. One specifica- 
ion should be that actual staff be proposed by name and resume, and 
hat if selected, those individuals must provide the service. 

oftware, computer programming, presents a major problem area with 
espect to specifications. Election officials must be capable to con- 
ey his or her requirements to the purchasing agent. In most cases, 
either has sufficient background to develop sufficiently detailed 
pecif ications . 

a effective approach in this situation is to form a committee which 
ill assist in the development of specifications. The committee should 
insist of those individuals who have software backgrounds. Members 


should be obtained from such places as the local government computer 
facility, or local private industry computer facilities. Those from 
private industry should not be from firms that would compete on the 

The election official can then convey general requirements to the 
committee who can develop detailed specifications with built-in controls 
to permit the election official to oversee contract performance. The 
section on Computer Considerations, page 2-126, identifies a number of con- 
siderations for such specifications. 

In general, the bid invitation should include: 

- quality Required 

- Specifications 

- Point (s) of Delivery 

- Time of Delivery 

- Delivery Method (if special requirements) 

- Date Quotation Due 

- Content of Quotation 

- Special Requirements 

- Legal Factors (Warranty - Performance Bonding) 

Special requirements will vary with the type of supply or service 
desired. Important requirements and their uses include: 

1 Testing. Any item that must be machine processed, 
such as ballots, must be tested prior to evaluation. 
The successful vendor, especially a new vendor, 
should be required to provide samples for testing 
soon after contract award. Additionally, the final 
product delivery date should be well in advance of 
election so that sufficient testing can be accom- 
- plished. 


2. Delivery date(s). The product(s), the time and 
place of delivery must be stipulated. 

3. Contract administration. The election official 
should be specified as the contract administrator 
on services and software contracts. 

4. Staff limitations. In those cases, when important, 
the vendor staff that performs a specific job should 
be listed in the contract. 

5. Testing. Testing of products and/or systems should 
be included in specifications. The time, place and 
conditions of the test should be specified. 

6. Performance Bonding. Performance bonding will not 
be required in most cases. However, if the election 
official is concerned about an unknown low bidder, 
this may be used to encourage timely performance. 

7. Acknowledgement. Acknowledgement Is usually 
accomplished by the vendor signing the contract or 
returning a portion of the purchase order. The 
election official wishes to insure the vendor accepts 
the terms of the contract and will perform as bid. 


.dditionallv, as previous!, mentioned, r staff i. a * 
itaa in the case of services and software. The election official ahoul 
rP attention to the experience of the proposed staf Corpo- 

u ,nnpnt-able but the proposed staff may not have 
rate history may be acceptable, DUL v 

\ nre m these -situations staff experience in usually 
sufficient experience, in tnebe 

more important than corporate experience. 

K visit to the vendor. This visit would be to 
A third criteria may be a visit to tti 

, , Q faci lities in relation to his ability to provide the 
assess the vendor's facilities 

required products. Concerns would include: 

- Adequacy of Productive Equipment 

- Procedures for Quality Control 

5.4 Contracting. 

Most of these 
the election 
be sufficiently 


on the type of procurement contemplated: 

!. Specifications. The specifications for the Job .t 
be detailed in the contract. In the case of software 
or services this would be the statement of work. 


2, Milestones. Procedures for measuring progress are 
required, especially for contract for software 
developing. Delivery dates should be established 
for various portions of the software design, develop- 
ment and programming. This will assure the timely 

delivery of a final product that meets the required 

3. Corporate History. Vendors should be required to 
provide information on similar services performed. 
The information should identify type of work per- 
formed and individual(s) to contact. This will 
assist in the selection of a vendor. 

5.5 Bid Evaluation 

The procurement office has a number of criteria for the selection of the 
bid winner. The principle criteria is cost, if the vendor meets the other 
bid criteria. Some also have a buy-at-home requirement. 

The election official should "be included in the bid evaluation process 
for all critical supplies and services. The prime consideration from 
the election official's standpoint, should be previous performance by 
the vendor. If the low bid vendor has not performed previous services 
for the election office, their user references (corporate history) should 
be checked. Telephone calls should be placed to confirm their ability 
to deliver a quality product. Questions should include: 

- Adherence to Delivery Schedule 

- Response to Problems Encountered 

- Technical Inputs of Vendor 

I - Relationship of Vendor Staff to Election Office Staff 
; - Quality of Product 



The following tables summarize the voting machine legislation compiled 
for each state. The tables are: 

. State organization responsible for administration 
of voting machine legislation, 

. Duties of the administrative organization. 

, Procedures required to have machines approved, 

. Specifications for voting machines. 

. State fraud prevention requirements for machines 
or systems. 

. Identification of specific types of machines (if 
in legislation) that are allowed by state. 

Information contained in the tables is summarized briefly below. 

Election laws in 35 states indicate that the Secretary of State or 
Lieutenant Governor has some responsibility regarding voting machines. 
Four states identify an appointed state elections official with similar 
responsibility. 28 states have a commission, board or committee with 
some responsibility regarding voting systems. 

The duties of the state official or body are most frequently to approve 
and/or certify a type of vote counting equipment for use in the state 
and to make the rules and regulations pertaining to that equipment. The 
examination of proposed voting equipment is usually paid for by the 


It appears that other than the certification of voting systems and the 
development of related rules and regulation, the state government has 
little to do with voting systems. 

Notable exceptions to this pattern are: California, Indiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Virginia that also supervise and coordi- 
nate the work of local election boards. Two states, Rhode Island and 
Tennessee, also supervise the setting up of machines before each elec- 

Ten states now provide or assist in the purchase of voting machines to 
local jurisdictions: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon and South Carolina. 

Virtually all states require voting machines to ensure secrecy, permit 
the lawful number of votes to each voter, preclude too many votes for 
each office, permit for and against votes for referendum questions, 
and record votes correctly. 

A significant number of states (18) permit only lever type machines by 
requiring features found only on this type of equipment such as public 
and protective counters. One state, Oregon, effectively prohibits lever 
machines by specifying that the voting machine shall record on paper 
or card ballot the votes cast by each voter. 

The Following pages contain: 

- Tables summarizing the voting machine legislation 
in the 50 states. 

- A map displaying those states that have restrictive 

- A summary of each of the 35 states who have responsi- 
bilities regarding voting machines, including examining 
authority and specifications. See Appendix II. 




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As a part of the study activity, ASI contacted the Embassies of all 
major nations to identify specific voting systems that may be or are 
used. The summary of voting systems used in other countries provided 
on the following pages indicate little use of machine systems outside 
of the United States. 


Paper ballots are used and only manual counting employed. 
Computers are used to project likely results but other- 
wise no machine assistance is applied to vote counting. 

All hand marked ballots are used because of the complexi- 
ty of voting (a "proportional" voting system is in 
effect) . Voting is compulsory and individuals are 
subject to fines for noncompliance. 

A paper ballot system is used with hand tallying at 
each polling place. Vote counts are then forwarded 
through layers of election authorities until the re- 
sults finally reach Vienna. In Vienna, vote results 
are entered into a computer for totalling and analysis. 
Machinery is only used at the central location. Voters 
within Vienna vote no differently since they also use 
the paper ballot process. There are no equipment manu- 

Paper ballots are used and only manual counting is 
employed. There are no equipment manufacturers. 

Paper ballots only are used throughout the country. 
There are no equipment manufacturers. 

Paper ballots are used for marking but computerized 

counting is utilized. Candidate lists are alphabetical. 

Voters mark an X for their choices and the tallying is 
done automatically. 

During the last four years some machines have been 
used, generally only in the larger cities. The machines 
have not been too popular since some mechanical problems 
have been experienced. It is likely that the use of 





voting machines will not greatly increase because of 
the nature of most French elections, i.e., a single 
issue vote (e.g., Presidential election of 1974 in 
which the only vote was for President) does not need 
a machine. 

During the last referendum (i.e., the one on divorce), 
a computer was used for the first time to analyze 
voting. The paper ballot system is the one still in 
use. There are no manufacturers. 

Paper ballots only. There are no manufacturers. 

Only paper ballots are used as well as manual counting 
of the votes. There are no manufacturers. 

Voting ballots are more complicated In the Netherlands 
since there can be up to fifteen candidates on a slate. 
There is no formal voter registration system as one's 
"vital statistics card" automatically handles the pro- 
cess. Voting is not compulsory but there is an average 
85 percent turnout. No voting machines are either made 
nor used. 






All voting is done on paper ballots with no mechanical 
devices used in totalling. There are no machine 


There are 

no machines, 

Only paper ballots are used. Last December Venezuela 
hoped to use machines for the first time but complica- 
tions arose over buying AVM Corporation machines. The 
AVM Corporation contract was cancelled and they had 
to continue to use only paper ballots. Regarding 
ballot security, voters are required to dip their left 
little finger in a "24 hour ink" to identify the per- 
son as already having voted. 

An all paper ballot, manual system is in use but it 

is forseen that machines will be utilized in the reason- 

ably near future. 



Fifty-seven jurisdictions were contacted by telephone to obtain further 
Information concerning charges of vote fraud, where such charges were 
noted on their response to the Survey of Election Boards Questionnaire. 

Only 43 percent of the jurisdictions contacted had actually experienced 
claims of fraud. The remaining 57 percent of reported fraud charges 
were found to result from administrative error. The true charges of 
fraud represent not 3 percent of the total response to the questionnaire, 
as suggested in the survey report, but rather 1.3 percent. 

Reported fraud charges were most frequently related to the absentee 
process. In these instances, ten reported, voters usually sold their 
vote by signing a blank absentee ballot and giving it to others to 
complete. Election officials within these jurisdictions wtio have sub- 
sequently insured that absentee procedures were properly enforced have 
found indications of absentee fraud have disappeared. 

Impersonating voters, 6 instances, were reported where no signature 
matching procedure was employed at the polls. 

Voting machines and systems account for only 6 instances of charged 
irregularity and none of these were shown to be cases of fraudulent 
intent. In one case scored punch card ballots were found to have holes 
in vote positions as a result of improper scoring or handling of the 
cards. In several instances lever machines were improperly set, pre- 
venting votes for some candidates or permitting votes in blank positions. 



Fraud charges stemming from voting 
dictions returning the q l 
laritlea related to the ^^ 
to result from fraudulent intent. 

Lls te d below are the results of the telephone interviews 

are rare Of those juris- 
, n 200 reported irregu- 
rf these were found 

admini S trative errors. 

Macon County, Georgia 
(912) A72-7685 
Mrs. Myra E. Cheek 
County Ordinary 

Liberty County, Florida 
(904) 643-5226 
Mrs. Clara Belle Revell 
Supervisor of Elections 

Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania 

(717) 346-7071 

Mr. James J. Decker 

Chief Clerk 

A miscount was charged by <*- r epf - 

charge was dropped. 

Current election official-^ no 

knowledge of the details of the 
absentee fraud charged. 

m i-he 1971 General Election, 4,000 
In the J.J/J- ^ counted, sealed 

absentee ballots were c 

" -; .!"" 


official was 

m the 1972 General Election, a new 
In the -L?/ instru ctions on how 

official was charged and convicted. 


rdon County, Georgia 

04) 629-2911 

. Harbin M. King 


ion County, Illinois 

18) 833-5711 

. Fred W. Blaylock 

pling County, Georgia 
12) 367-4335 

. John F. Page 

:nam County, Florida 

)4) 325-3893 

3. Vivian T. Rivers 

>tt County, Virginia 
13) 386-6691 

U. W. Bowen 
leral Registrar 

en County, New York 
.8) 943-4191 

William H. Byrue 

A charge was placed in 1968, and 
later dropped that two candidates 
with similar names were being confused 
by the tally staff while counting paper 

In 1970, the County Clerk was charged 
with hand delivering absentee ballots 
instead of mailing them. He has mailed 
them since the charge. No fraud was 
claimed or proven. 

In 1972, a candidate lost the elec- 
tion by thirteen votes. He charged 
absentee fraud of buying votes and 
using the absentee ballot to insure 
bought voters cast votes as desired. 
No evidence was found and the charge 
was dismissed. 

In a 1972 judges race in 37 counties 
in Florida, irregularities in the 
absentee process were charged. The 
court has received evidence of voters 
voting absentee when they were still 
in the county. It is charged that their 
votes were bought and the absentee 
ballot used to insure they voted as 
desired. The case is still in the 
courts . 

Forms "misunderstood" no record of 
any charges of vote fraud. 

Informal charges regarding the 
eligibility of absentee voters occur 
frequently in small communities. The 
complaint states that absentee voters 
are not eligible because they are 
not absent, but no formal charges have 
been made and no evidence of fraud 


Mercer County, New Jersey 
(609) 989-8000 
Mr. August Bruschini 
Deputy Supervisor 

(301) 627-3000, Ext. 411 

Mr. Robert J. Antonetti 
Chief Clerk 

Richland County, South Carolina 

(803) 787-8672 

Ms. Janet Richardson 


Wake County, North Carolina 
(919) 828-4357 
Mr, Irvin B. Tucker, Jr. 
Election Board Chairman 

Wilson County, Tennessee 
(615) 444-0216 
Miss Bonnie M. Phillips 

Wyandotte County, Kansas 
(913) 371-1600 
Mr. William M. Bradish 
Election Commissioner 

Two formal charges are in the courts 
now. In the first, a person voted 
absentee and then in person. In the 


an incorrect address. 

In the 1970 Primary, a formal charge 
regarding improper setup of AVM machines 
was found to be due to "human error" 
caused by last minute ballot change and 
haste, etc. 

The -Circuit Court dismissed the case 
as administrative error and not fraud, 

In 1972, a recount was conducted on 
one very close race. No fraud was 
found . 

In an informal hearing before the 
election board, it was claimed that 
poll officials were assisting people 
who didn't need assistance (only 
handicapped people, illiterate, etc., 
were supposed to be helped) . The 
election board found irregularities, 
but no fraud. 

In 1972, some registration cards did 
not have signatures. Instances of 
allowing registration records out 
of the election office and irregu- 
larities in absentee processing were 
found. Indictments were handed down 
by a grand jury, but the charges were 

Several times voters have complained 
verbally that judges were providing 
improper assistance to voters in the 
booth. No formal charges or evidence 
to support the verbal complaints has 
been found. 


Barry County, Michigan 
(616) 945-3953 
Mr. William Cridler 
County Clerk 

Jackson County, Michigan 
(517) 787-3800 
Mr. Richard D. Hilt 
County Clerk 

Isabella County, Michigan 
(517) 772-0911, Ext. 225 
Ms. Betty Prout 
County Clerk 

Franklin County, Kansas 
(913) 242-1471 
Mr. Bruce Spears 
County Clerk 

Lancaster County, Pennsylvania 

(717) 397-7751 

Mr. Richard S. Good 

Chief Clerk 

Stewart County, Tennessee 
(615) 232-5176 
Mr. Jerry T. Peacker 
Commission Chairman 

Election officials in two townships 
were charged with improperly obtaining 
absentee ballots and pressuring people 
to vote. 

A hearing was held before a judge who 
asked that briefs be filed, but they 
never were and charges were "dropped 1 '. 

A Township Clerk and Absentee Ballot 
Counting Board Chairman were charged 
with improper and fraudulent handling 
of absentee ballots. They were found 
guilty and punished. 

A recount was conducted in one elec- 
tion which produced no changes in the 
totals. No fraud was charged or 

An error in addition was discovered 
and corrected which changed the un- 
official count totals; No fraud was 

The Constitutional Party complained 
that ballots, not marked correctly, 
were counted. A judge reviewed the 
charge and found no justification. 

The Constitutional Party claimed that 
the two major parties sample ballot 
was printed in a different color than 
the ballot of the Constitutional 
Party. A judge ruled in their favor 
and the ballots were reprinted in the 
same color. 

Confusion between two persons with 
the same name prompted a charge of 
irregularity by a losing candidate. 
The charge was cleared up by examina- 
tion of records. No fraud was found. 

Anne Arundel County, Maryland 
(301) 268-4300 
Mrs. Betty Eby 

Jackson County, Florida 
(904) 482-4214 

Mrs . Alyne Pitman 
Supervisor of Elections 

Vanderburgh County, Indiana 
(812) 426-5123 
Mrs. Kibbler 
Chief Deputy 

Shelby County, Indiana 
(317) 398-7448 
Mr. John Thomas 
County Clerk 

Rock Island County, Illinois 
(309) 786-4451 
Mrs . Theodora Ekonomos 
Supervisor of Elections 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
(414) 278-3491 
Mr. Thaddeus Stawicki 
City Clerk 

In 1966, in one district, a blank 
vote position just below the last name 
on the ballot was left operable by 
the machine technicians. This resulted 
in votes registered on this lever. 
The last candidate on the ballot had 
instructed voters to "pull the last 
lever". He lost the election and 
contested it based on the improper 
setting of these machines. The 
court reprimanded the elections board 
but would not count votes on this lever 
as being votes cast for the losing 
candidate. No evidence of fraud was 
found . 

Improper use of absentee procedures 
was charged in a judgeship race by 
the losing candidate. The case is 
still pending in court. 

Poll watchers in one precinct claimed 
that money was given to voters outside 
of the poll. Election attorneys 
dismissed the charge for lack of evi- 
dence . 

A losing candidate for a local office 
claimed a miscount of the ballots. 
A recount was ordered by a judge 
which confirmed the original count 
and the charge was dismissed. 

A losing candidate requested a re- 
count which was done and no change 
in the vote count found. 

A losing candidate in a race for state 
office claimed that twelve individuals 
had voted improperly by using other 
names. This violation was confirmed 
by the twelve registered voters who 
did not vote and whose names were used. 
Since state law prohibits requiring 
any identification at the polls there 
was no way to catch this violation when 
it occurred or to trace back to those 
who had voted illegally. 

Waukesha County, Wisconsin 
(414) 547-2711 
Mr. Richard Sylvester 
County Clerk 

Kandiyohi County, Minnesota 
(612) 235-2727 
Mr. A. H. Hoogeveen 
County Auditor 

Wapello County, Iowa 
(515) 684-4671 

Mr. Paul Mottet 
Commissioner of Elections 

Davidson County, South Dakota 
(605) 996-2474 
Mr. Robert Rolling 
County Auditor 

Chambers County, Texas 
(713) 267-3471 
Mrs. Norma Rowland 
County Clerk 

A voter obtained his absentee ballot 
on time, but failed to have his 
ballot notarized in time to have it 
counted. The voter complained, but 
the judge ruled that his ballot 
should not be counted. 

Election judges were allowing spouses 
to assist each other in the voting 
booth which was called to the atten- 
tion of election officials and the 
practice stopped. Only election 
judges are permitted by law to provide 
this assistance. 

In another instance, a voter verbally 
complained that the paper ballot 
counting procedure was Improper. No 
evidence was found to support this 

In 1968, the State Attorney General 
investigated complaints that senior 
citizens who were senile were being 
improperly influenced in casting 
absentee ballots. A new law requires 
representatives of both parties to be 
present in assisting voters in health 
care institutions. No fraud was 
proved in connection with the charge, 

A previous county auditor was tried 
and convicted of "stuffing ballot 
boxes". The local court was unable 
to provide further information. 

Complaints were lodged against elec- 
tion judges who were assisting french 
speaking voters in the voting booth 
claiming that they were giving im- 
proper advice. No fraud was proven. 
A subsequent law requires other than 
election judges to assist these voters 
and the problem appears to be solved. 
No french ballots are printed in this 


Vigo County, Indiana 
(812) 235-6115 
Mr. Leland Larrison 
County Clerk 

St. Louis, Illinois 
(618) 874-6846 
Mr. John Moynihan 
City Clerk 

Kankakee County, Illinois 
(815) 939-4401 
Mr. Edmund Soucie 
County Clerk 

Aurora, Illinois 
(312) 897-4020 
Mr. Carl D. Bates 
Chief Clerk 

In 1972, a voter claimed that her 
absentee ballot was stolen from her 
mailbox and illegally voted. The 
Post Office and Justice Department 
were notified, but no report had been 
received from them to date. 

In another instance, one candidate 
position on one voting machine was 
locked preventing any votes for that 
candidate on that machine. An inves- 
tigation revealed it to be a mechanical 
error and no indication of fraud was 

There have been several claims of 
improper instructions being given 
to older voters on how to cast their 
votes on the machine. No evidence 
was found to substantiate these 
claims . 

A charge that election judges were 
improperly assisting voters in the 
booth was investigated and dismissed 
by the court. 

136 votes were cast in a school board 
election by persons impersonating 
voters. Since no poll books with sample 
signatures were used in this election, 
the error was not discovered until 
signatures were checked after the _ 
election. The election judges elimi- 
nated all votes from that precinct 
in computing the official results. 
Buying votes was charged in one pre- 
cinct in another instance and the 
judge eliminated results from that 
precinct in computing the official 
results . 

35 out of 44,000 ballots printed had 
the problem of some of the scored 
holes falling out before being punched 
by the voter. No fraud intent was 
f ound . 

St. Martin Parish, Louisiana 
(318) 394-3792 
Mr. M. A. Barras 
Clerk of Court 

St. Louis, Missouri 
(314) 453-4337 
Mr. Harry Leitz 
Director of Elections 

Scott County, Tennessee 
(615) 663-2430 
Miss Helen B. Phillips 
Registrar at Large 

Bloomfield, Connecticut 
(203) 242-6241 
Mrs. Elisabeth F. Jolley 
Town Clerk 

Hillsborough County, Florida 
(813) 223-1311 
Mr. James A. Sebesta 
Supervisor of Elections 

Newcastle County, Delaware 
(302) 521-3460 
Mr. Everett Wilson 
Administrative Director 

Missoula County, Montana 
(406) 543-5128 
Mr. Kenneth J. Wolff 
Election Supervisor 

A reported charge that absentee 
ballots were not properly counted, 
i.e., ball point pen should be dis- 
qualified, X outside of box should be 
rejected, etc. Court ruled no fraud 
or improper count. 

In 1972, two candidates for ward 
conimitteeinan created false registra- 
tions and tried to vote them absentee 
and have them mailed to political 
headquarters. Six to seven persons 
were indicted and the two candidates 
were convicted. 

Some voters were allowed to vote in 
both Democratic and Republican 
Primaries on a paper ballot. The 
election officials were found guilty 
and fined. No challenge to the 
election resulted. 

Survey misunderstood, 
miscount . 

No charge of 

A resident who had moved outside of 
Tampa was still registered and voted 
in the city election. The court 
reviewed the charge and dismissed it. 

Some individuals attempted to im- 
personate other voters in Wilmington. 
Upon discovering that a signature 
comparison was being made, they ran 
from the polling place. 

An administrative error in rotation 
on printing Votomatic ballot booklet 
vs paper ballot resulted from lack 
of coordination between the printer 
and the election office. The elec- 
tion office recounted Votomatic ballots 
with a new program providing a correct 
count. No change in the election 


Bakersfield, California 
(805) 861-2625 
Mr. D. J. Ball 
Election Supervisor 

Spokane County, Washington 
(509) 456-2320 
Mr. George T. Brown 
Supt. of Elections 

Los Angeles, California 
(213) 974-6701 
Mr. Leonard Panish 

Columbus County, North Carolina 
(919) 642-7880 
Miss Annie Ruth Strickland 
Executive Secretary 

Essex, Connecticut 
(203) 767-8201, Ext 
Town Clerk 


Columbia County, Florida 
(Lake City) 
(904) 752-3845 
Miss Mary Jim Crews 
Supervisor of Elections 

(305) 377-7501 

Mr, Joyce V. Dieff enderfer 


A losing candidate claimed that the 
vote punch was rigged. The court 
investigated and dismissed the charge. 

A young man, not registered, did not 
want to admit it to his family so he 
used his brother's name. His brother 
had voted absentee. Signatures did 
not match when checked for double 
voting. The illegal voter was con- 

When punch card voting was introduced, 
a commission was formed to examine the 
possibility of fraud. Double voting 
was a concern that the commission 
studied and found no basis for any 
increased possibility of this type 
of fraud in connection with use of 
the new system. 

A claim of miscount of approximately 
100 votes on paper ballots was made. 
The State Board of Elections investi- 
gated and dismissed the charge. 

Officials currently in charge of elec- 
tions have no knowledge of any fraud 

In 1972, the incumbent sheriff lost 
on regular ballots by 37 votes. After 
absentees were counted, he won by 
50 votes. The court found over 51 
irregularities on absentees, so 
incumbent was removed. Irregularities 
noted included: people voting absentee 
who were not out of town on election 
day; notaries not witnessing signing 
but notarizing ballots; and no oath 
being given to voters . 

counters were rigged to stop counting 
at a pre-set number. Machines were 
examined and no counters that mal- 
functioned were found. 


Smith County, Tennessee 
(615) 735-2092 
Miss Dianna Dillehay 
Regis trar-at~Large 

Shelby County, Tennessee 
(901) 528-3125 
Mr. Jack M. Perry 
Executive Director 

Shelbyville, Illinois 
(217) 774-4421 
Miss Delores Burns 
County Clerk 

Two candidates for Superintendent of 
Schools and County Tax Assessor were 
charged by the Attorney General with 
buying absentee votes. They were 
found not guilty by jury and by the 
state court although some voters 
admitted to the charge. 

Absentee voting - some did not under- 
stand computer counting procedures 
and charged that it was improper. They 
were invited in to see the process 
which resulted in withdrawal of the 
charge . 

1970 charge of rigged machines. 
Grand jury investigated. No indict- 
ments . 

Assisting voters - new law specifies 
illiterate, handicapped and blind 
only may be assisted. No problem 
since these changes . 

Impersonation charges - investigated 
by election office who found no 
signature irregularities. 

Incorrect counting - incomplete tally 
sheets were not found until the next 
day. No fraud was found, just 
administrative error. 

Survey misunderstood, 
fraud have^ occurred. 

No charges of 

r git. Visit Su^ries include the identification 
The following User Site Visi ^ telephone 

of the use,, the s.ste used cont c ^ ^ 

nuffl ber and specific points of interest 

System: Cubic 

User: Mendocino County 

Ukiah, California 95842 

Contact: Mrs. Viola Richardson, 

County Clerk and Recorder 

Telephone: (707) 462-1620 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 26,876 

Mendocino County was selected as a location to be visited because it 

was a small county using an optical scan system which is often associated 

with computer tallying. 

Only four Cubic machines are needed to tabulate precinct totals. Pre- 
cinct totals are then manually tabulated to provide an unofficial total. 
Mendocino County is well satisfied with the existing system and believe 
the system to be particularly efficient under California legislation 
which combines small elections with larger elections. 

The distance which ballots must be transported creates problems. The 
outlying precincts require several hours to transport ballots after 
the polls have been closed and the judges have accounted for the ballots. 
As a result, there is a delay in handling individual ballots and no 
appreciable time is saved over the previous manual system. 

Because of its size, the county relies considerably on the vendor for 


election set-up and election day processing. The vendor changed its 
service representative for one election and the county experienced some 
minor problems. This emphasizes the point that reliance on any system 
vendor for support during the election process creates a potential for 
problems . 

System: Cublc 

y ser . Imperial County 

939 Main Street 

El Centre, 

Contact: MrB - Margaret Mo 1 1 , 

Assistant Countv f 

J* *-., 

Telephone: <71 352-3610 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 25,170 

Imperial County was selected as a location to be visit.-:-', 
small size, use of an Optical Scan System, and xisc of ir . -. 
to tally votes. They reported that vote tallying requUv - 

This county is located in the Imperial Valley wliich e:-:p< r i .. 
high temperatures. These temperatures caused itisl f tmot h^- -^ 
ballot counters. The malfunction was immediately appnr^r^ " 
machine totals provided, and the malfunction was correct,,! -' 
the temperature at the counting center . 

Local printing pressmen are employed by the elections ofrU, 
ballots and operate ballot counters. They are Eamlliar wtt, 
process and operate effectively as machine opeir^tors. 

Bank tellers are employed by the elections office to tnll 

the ballot counters. They are familiar with 

and efficiently generate county election totals 

System: Cubic 

User: Contra Costa County 

524 Main Street 
Martinez, California 94553 

Telephone: (415) 22 8-3000 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 311,143 

Contra Costa County was selected as a location to be visited because of 
its size and because it uses 50 Cubic machines. They are well satisfied 
with their system which they effectively manage. 

The 50 Cubic machines are stored in the same position as is needed for 
election night use, so there are no transportation or special set-up 
problems encountered. Machines are ready for testing as soon as the 
machine is plugged in. Such storage, however, creates a space situation 
that could be a problem in other counties. 

There is one supervisor for every five machines on election night and 
these supervisors are responsible for machine operators. Training 
usually requires less than fifteen minutes, but is obviously effective 
since machine down-time is rare. 

Contra Costa County uses computer software developed by county staff 
ten years ago. The individual election update is performed by the 
registered office staff. This program contains precinct data such as 
the number of registered voters, etc., to permit computer analysis of 
vote by precinct to point out areas where inconsistencies may exist. 

System: Seiscor 

User: Vermillion County 

North Vermillion Street 
Danville, Illinois 61832 

Contact: Mr. Keith J. Smith, 

County Clerk 

Telephone: (217) 442-3700 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 52,000 

Vermillion County was selected as a location to be visited because it 
was the smallest (32,000 registered voters) identified user of the 
Seiscor System. 

Vermillion County uses a local computer service bureau for all com- 
puting and software assistance. The service bureau wrote the initial 
tabulating program, updates the program, stores the program in their' 
facilities and processes all election totals. 

The system tests (software) are developed and observed by each political 
party. This is the only site visited which performed testing in this 
manner. The county is very satisfied with its operation and conducts 
elections efficiently. 

System: Seiscor 

User: Fresno County Elections Department 

1234 L Street 
Fresno, California 93721 

Contact: Mr. Richard Jansen, 

Elections Supervisor 

Telephone: (209) 488-3246 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 200 277 

Fresno County was selected as a location to be visited because they use 
2,550 Seiscor Vote Recorders. This system has been in operation six 
years and Fresno County reported no problems in the Election Board Sur- 

In 1971, Fresno County purchased a new tallying program from Diamond 
International who sell the Datavote punch card system. The Diamond 
International program, which was written in 1970, is the most recent 
software package produced by a vendor. The County data processing 
staff update the programs each election. 

The Seiscor System operates smoothly and there are no unique features 
in the Fresno County operation. 

Fresno is a large county outside of metropolitan Fresno. Most county 
areas are sparsely populated making the logistics of vote collection 
difficult. The precinct inspectors take the ballot to central pick- 
up points where they are picked up by County Deputy Sheriffs who 
bring the ballots from several of the precincts into the courthouse. 

System: Accuvote 

U ser: Yuba County 

215 5th Street 

Marysville, California 95901 

Contact: Mr. Carl Cozad, 

County Clerk 

Telephone: (916) 743-1511 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 14,500 

Yuba County was selected as a location to be visited because it was the 
only user of the Accuvote System in the 1972 election. 

Carlisle Graphics, the Accuvote vendor, provides most of the election 
system services. They maintain and store machines in their facilities 
and assist in the election processing. 

In the 1972 election three of the 351 voting devices used malfunctioned 
on election day. An advantage of the Accuvote system is that the machine 
can be readily replaced without loss of time or votes. 

Yuba County rents the Accuvcte Ballot Tabulator for each election to 
process totals. This machine provides precinct totals, which are then 
Dually totaled. Only a few ballot cards, less than ten, could not 
be machine processed in 1972. Unofficial totals required about fxve 

Shoup IES 3.2 

User: Board of Election Commissioners 

City Hall, 200 East Wells Street 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233 

Contact: Mr. Thaddeus C. Stawicki, 

Executive Secretary 

Telephone: (414) 278-3491 

Type of Jurisdiction: City 
Registered Voters: 338,000 

Milwaukee was selected as a location to be visited because it was a 
large user of IES Shoup machines which identified some vote tally pro- 
blems in its response to the Election Board Survey. 

Wisconsin state law requires that all jurisdictions over 10,000 popula- 
tion have machine voting systems and for many years only lever machines 
were legal within the state. 

Voting nachines in Milwaukee are set up by city staff, but they are tested 
by outside engineers. Two people, one in the front of the machine and 
one in back check each voting lever on each machine. 

Although the Milwaukee response to the Election Boards Survey indicated 
that tallying problems existed, the problems were not machine problems. 
The time required to bring machine totals to a central tallying location 
and to manually tabulate the totals is greater than in comparable cities. 

IES Shoup ~ CES 

u Tarrant County 

County Courthouse 

Fort Worth, Texas 76102 

Mr. E. M. Loftin, 

Contact: i i 

County Clerk 

Telephone: (817) 334-1195 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 317,582 

Tarrant County was selected as a location to be visited since they are 
a large county that used approximately half lever system and half punch 
card system; in 1972, they had 650 Shoup lever machines and 700 CES 


This punch card installation should be contrasted with El Paso 0>o-*ln 

the same state, and, therefore, are subject to the same sta e ele tion laws . ) 

Tarrant County used CES on a trial basis at the direction o the County 

Commissioner, and against the wishes of the County Clerk and his ele t n 

staff. (The custodian for Tarrant County has worked for Shoup on a part 

time basis programing and maintaining this machine in other Jurisdictions 

and other states.) 

The test was not successful. The main reasons appeared to b. that *e 

system was not wanted and, therefore, management did not e " 

prepare for the system. As a result, the punch card idea 

after the 1972 election. 

System: CES/Datavote or Datamedia 

er: Sacramento County 

720 9th Street 
Sacramento, California 95814 

Contact: Mr. William Durley, 

County Clerk and Registrar of Voters 

Telephone: ( 916) 454-535! 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 400,000 

Sacramento County was selected as a location to be visited because it 
had both CES (3,400) and Datamedia (500) voting devices, 

Sacramento County originally purchased the IBM Votomatic System in 1966. 
Additional machines were purchased from Datamedia in 1970, and CES in 
1972. Sacramento sees no basic differences among these devices. 

Sacramento County spreads over 900 square miles, about 607. rural, and 
has over 400,000 registered voters, yet produces unofficial tallies 
within four hours of closing. Transporting individual ballots, pro- 
cessing and tabulating is accomplished in four hours through an efficient 
operation. Sacramento attributes some of their ability to process tallies 
quickly to the CES BMX (Ballot. Multiplex Unit) which converts card data 
to tape. All absentee ballots are processed on Monday afternoon and the 
totals are recorded on tape. The tape, however, is not printed out 
until 8:00 p.m. on Tuesday. 

The precinct elections inspector keeps all devices in her home until 
election day morning rather than leaving them overnight at the polls. 
This procedure is used to provide better controls after the machines 
have been set up for voting. 

System: CES 

User: Will County 

14 Jefferson Street 
Joliet, Illinois 60431 

Contact: Mrs. Clara Hartley Woodard , 

County Clerk 

Telephone: (815) 729-8400 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 135,372 

Will County was selected as a location to be visited because it uses 

Votomatic voting devices made by two different manufacturers, iiuiy had 
indicated in the Election Board Survey that they had experienced probl, ;:, 
of machine breakdowns, voter education and no back-up system. 

Will County originally purchased their system from IBM and later pur- 
chased some voting devices from Datamedia. The problems identified 
in the Survey of Election Boards were minor problems encountered at th, 
time o initial installation only and the county has experienced no 
major problems with any of the equipment. 

Will County stores their voting devices in the locked ballot boxes 
desired for storage purposes. They have recently moved to a new 
building and do not yet have storage space. The ballot boxes e U..- 
up in a public corridor when the site visit was conducted. 

System: CES 

User: El Paso County 

City County Building 
El Paso, Texas 79901 

Contact: Judge T. Udell Moore, 

Commissioners Court 

Telephone: (915) 543-2818 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 134,000 

El Paso was selected as a location to be visited because in the 1972 
election they used IES Shoup machines and reported some problems in the 
vote tabulation process. Since that time they have converted to the 
CES Votomatic System. 

El Paso stated that they replaced the IES Shoup System because of 
problems in the 1972 election. They had a number of machine break- 
downs (102 calls) caused by what they felt to be inadequate mainten- 
ance and set-up. Additionally, anticipated area growth dictated against 
the economics of the lever machines because of storage and trans- 
portation problems. 

Between the 1972 general election and the 1973 primary, Judge Moore was 
elected to his first term as County Judge. His Campaign Manager, Charles 
Sibley, is now one of his assistants. Mr. Sibley is a retired army 
officer (from Fort Bliss) and has brought several other retired officers 
into the county government. These officers, trained in logistics and 
systems, demonstrate the advantages of a sound management and systems 
background in the implementation of any system, including election sys- 
tems. El Paso studied the Maricopa County (Phoenix, Arizona) installa- 
tion and took the best management features and improved upon them. 
El Paso is an excellent example of how to effectively manage implemen- 
tation of a new system (contrast this with Tarrant County, Texas). 

(El Paso County - Continued) 

Texas laws require that a computer program receive a publicly certified 
test three days prior to election. El Paso asks private industry to 
provide three volunteer experts to conduct the certification test. Each 
independently prepares a test deck which is processed against the pro- 
gram. The decks and results are sealed and stored. They are rerun just 

before processing on election day. 

System: CES 

User: Bloomington Board of Election Commissioners 

202 Livingston Building 
104 West Washington Street 
Bloomington, Illinois 61701 

Contact: Miss Louise Muxfeld, 

Chief Clerk of Board 

Telephone: (309) 829-2027 

Type of Jurisdiction: City 
Registered Voters: 40,123 

Bloomington was selected as a location to be visited because the city 
reported in the Election Board Survey that they used the Votomatic System, 
CES and some VIP machines, 

In Bloomington, State Farm Insurance is the major employer. State Farm 
permits the use of their computer for election result processing and 
they supply programmers. The basic computer program used is the original 
IBM tally program and the State Farm programmers maintain and update this 

State Farm maintains the program while it is not in use. The City Clerk 
and State Farm programmers establish and perform all systems tests. 
All State Farm computer time and staff time is provided to the election 
board at no cost. 

Original installations within Bloomington were Votomatic Systems purchased 
from IBM. Subsequently, when IBM left the elections business, some de- 
vices were purchased from VIP. Bloomington now buys CES devices for voting 
use. The VIP voting devices are used only as training devices at the , , 


System: AVM 

Lackawanna County 

200 Adams Avenue 

Scranton, Pennsylvania 18503 

*... Mr. James J. Decker, 

Contact : _ 1 , 

County Clerk 

Telephone: 346-7071 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 134,000 

Lackawanna County was selected as a location to be visited since it is 
a medium sized AVM user who had reported voting problems not directly 
related to the system One purpose of the visit was to determine ,f 
the voting system was part of the problem experienced. 

The problems were not AVM system problems. 

Many of the AVM machines used in this county were purchased in the 1930<s 
and are still functioning well. The county employs one man to ma.ntain 
the machines. This appears to have been an excellent approach since 
virtually no machine breakdown problems have been experienced. 

After initiating a poll official training program for the last election 
they discovered that it. cut emergency calls in half on election morn ng. 
Most trouble calls came from those not attending training. The county 
plans 'to pay officials for attending training next election. 

There is no cost to obtaining an informal count of election returns on 
election evening since a pool of press personnel receive a copy of each 
precinct tally sheet and have organised a team to total and announce 

System: AVM 

User: Allegheny County Board of Elections 

604 County Office Building 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 

Contact: Mr. Will E. Alton, 

Director of Elections and Vote Registration 

Telephone: (412) 355-4500 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 920,000 

Allegheny County was selected as a location to be visited because it is 

a large county which reported no voting system problems on the Election 
Board Survey. 

Allegheny County, which has over 3,300 AVM machines, initiated a poll 
location voting machine storage program several years ago. This pro- 
gram has not,', as originally concluded, solved all problems related to 
storage space problems, set-up, etc. Allegheny County still has some 
machines stored at poll locations, and some centrally stored. They are 
presently moving toward decentralized storage where machines are stored 
in groups near poll locations. 

Allegheny County has experienced very few machine problems and the sys- 
tem operates effectively. Development of an unofficial count requires 
approximately four hours. Allegheny County has an unusual rule permitting 
a three minute maximum period of time to vote, by law. Officials indi- 
cated that the law is not enforced, however. 



User: Herkimer County Election Board 

County Office Building 
Mary Street 
Herkimer, New York 13350 

Contact: Mrs. Frances Dolge and Mr. James Gorman, 


Telephone: (315) 866-4010 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 33,776 

Herkimer County was selected as a location to be visited because of its 
small size (97 AVM machines) and because the county had experienced some 
machine breakdown problems . 

The maintenance problems experienced by Herkimer County were not of a 
serious nature. Within New York State the towns own the voting machines, 
and not the county. The county "oversees" the entire election process 
but does not perform such support activities such as the set-up or 
transporting of machines. 

The county establishes ballot format. The county tests one machine at 
each poll location with each possible combination of votes. The towns 
are then responsible for testing of all remaining machines. 

System: AVM 

User: San Francisco County 

Room 155, City Hall 
San Francisco, California 94102 

Contact: Virgil Elliott, Director of Finance and 


Telephone: (415) 558-6161 

Type of Jurisdiction: City/County 
Registered Voters: 426,338 

San Francisco was selected as a location to be visited because it is 
a major metropolitan area that had used AVM machines for years and was 
using Datavote for absentee voting, and because of its reported problem 
of exceeding the AVM machines capacity during one election. 

California law requires one lever machine for every 250 registered voters 
with a maximum of 600 voters per poll. As a result, two machines per 
poll location are usually used. The poll locations are most often lo- 
cated in a private residence, such as garages. 

The problem of exceeding the machine capacity during one election proved 
to be a major problem. It meant that a second machine had to be set up 
to provide for each single "total" vote. In most precincts this meant 
that only one group of two machines were available for voting. This 
caused voter tie-ups and long lines, and the polls in California were 
kept open for three additional hours to accommodate the San Francisco 

San Francisco has, over the years, developed effective procedures for 
machine control while transporting and storing machines. As a result, 
control of the 1,650 machines is effective and efficient. San Francisco 
appears to manage the entire system with a minimum of effort. They are 

(San Francisco County - Continued) 

currently considering a purchase of a punch card system. 

The Datavote system has been effectively used for absentee voting. 
Walk-in-absentees vote on a Datavote machine using a regular Datavote 
ballot. The mail-out ballots are prescored so that holes can be punched 
out "by pencil . 

System: Coleman-Gyrex 

User : Hamilton County Board of Elections 

622 Sycamore Street 

Cincinnati, Ohio 

Contact: Daniel Ruehlman 


Telephone: (513) 621-9801 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 600,000 

Hamilton County was selected as a location to be visited because it 
is one of the more experienced users of the Gyrex System and had re- 
ported some problems with the system. 

No major machine (Gyrex) problems were found as a result of the site 
visit, however, county officials stated that power drains can cause 
slight malfunctions which change totals. They found that the use of 
an elevator in the building had caused the power drain. Lines are now 
filtered to eliminate this problem. Additionally, the county now pro- 
cesses a diagnostic card and periodically during processing makes 
test runs to be sure that the system is operating accurately. 

Their original computer program was written by United Data Processing, 
a division of United Aircraft. United Aircraft was the original develo] 
er of the Gyrex machine . 



Tleov . Multnomah County 

User ' Election Division Multnomah County 

1040 S.E. Morrison Street 

Portland, Oregon 97214 

Contact- Mr - John D ' Weldon 

Registrar of Elections 

Telephone: (503) 248-3720 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 329,319 

Multnomah County was selected as a location to be visited since it has 
been using the system for over six years without any reported problems. 

Because of its size Gyrex equipment must be stored and operated at the 
same location. The machine was originally located in a parking garage 
that was partially exposed to outdoor weather. A canvas cover was ^ 
placed over the ,achine when it was not in use. The election processing 
was performed in the same area and election workers often wore gloves 
to W ard off the cold weather. The Gyrex machine is still located in 
the same area, however, the area has now been completely enclosed. 

After the Morse and Packwood election, because of the relatively close 
result a 100% recount was required. The net difference in vote count 
between the tally and recount was only 12 votes. 

System: Gyrei: 

User: Orange County 

P.O. Box 11298 
Santa Ana, California 92711 

Contact: David G. Hitchcock, 

Registrar of Voters 

Telephone: (714) 834-2224 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 
Registered Voters: 794,000 

Orange County was selected as a location to be visited because it is 
a large county with over 794,000 voters, who reported no system problems. 
However, in the 1972 election they reported in the Survey of Election 
Boards that it took 15 hours for unofficial tabulation. 

This county found that it required 50 people at the central tallying 
location to inspect each precinct box of ballots and adjust the ballots 
properly on the spindle to insure proper alignment when fed into the 
scanner. They will emphasize the need for such manpower in their next 
training session for poll officials, 

In 1964, a disgruntled candidate organized an effort to steal or destroy 
ballot reading devices on election day. The manufacturer rushed added devices 
to the county and police delivered them to the polls. The election 
ran smoothly in spite of this crisis. Marking devices have been re- 
designed to discourage breakage and chained to voting booths to prevent 

Orange County has a program that effectively recognizes excessive fall- 
off, as opposed to the D.C. program, and is programmed to count normal 

fall-off and flag instances of abnormal fall-off for further examination. 

System: Datavote 

r, . Ventura County 

501 Pol Street 
Ventura, California 93001 

Contact- Mr - Robert Lt Hamtl > , 

0ontaCC ' County Clerk and Recorder 

Telephone: (209) 488-3246 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 191,000 

Ventura County was selected as a location to be Visited because they 
are a large user of the Datavote System (3,000 voting devices). 

Ventura County initially experienced hanging chad problem in earlier 
elections when using punch system and therefore began using non pre-scored 
ballots. One of the advantages of the Datavote System is that Datavote 
ballot cards are not pre-scored. 

i -no ( IU671 of 500,000 ballot cards 
In the November 1972 election, only 229 (.046/oJ or 3uu,uu 

could not be processed and counted automatically. 

The county clerk has developed an excellent manual for use during the 
election operation for personnel involved in the election process. 

System: Datavote 

ser: Office of Lieutenant Governor 

State Capitol Building 
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 

Contact: Morris T. Takushi, 

Director of Elections 

Telephone : 

Type of Jurisdiction: State/County/Honolulu 

Registered Voters: 337,000 - 262,000 

Hawaii was chosen as a location to be visited because it was a statewide 
system and has to deal with the logistics problems of transporting ballots 
and tallies from island to island. 

Hawaii has developed an extensive and well written elections procedure 
manual for election officials that could be used as a guide by other 

A plan for central counting of all votes in the state has been considered 
and rejected for the last two elections. The need for high quality 
telephone lines and expensive equipment in each county to transmit data 
to Honolulu were major factors in this decision. 

The height of voting booth tables is being lowered to accomodate the 
shorter voter and reduce problems of paraliax when the pointer for the 
punch is viewed at an angle relative to the ballot card. This problem, 
similar to looking at a clock from the side, may also be reduced by a 
design which moves the pointer closer to the ballot card. 

System: Control Data 

U ser: District of Columbia 

Board of Elections 

District Building, 14th & E St., N.W, 
Washington, D.C. 

Contact: Charles B. Fisher, Chairman 

Telephone: (202) 347-0488 

Type of Jurisdiction: City 

Registered Voters: 245,000 

This location was selected as a site to be visited since it is the only 
installation of the Control Data System at this time. The District of 
Columbia is being used as a test site by Control Data Corporation. 

Strict tolerances (+ .015 inch) make humidity a problem because the 
paper used absorbs moisture and expands. Expansion is believed to have 
caused some counting problems in D.C. where the center was air conditioned, 
but the ballots were stored in non air conditioned rooms both on election 
eve and on election day. 

D.G. officials indicate that after three scanning runs the ballots tend 
to become mutilated enough to jam the scanner. 

The D.C, counting program was designed to reject undervoted ballots. 
This caused many ballots to be rejected and manually counted that should 
have been accepted since some level of fall-off should be anticipated. 

System: Manual 

User: Jefferson County Board of Elections 

117 North Third Street 
Steubenville, Ohio 43952 

Contact: Mrs. Mary E. Firm, Director 

Telephone: (614) 283-4111 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 45,000 

Jefferson County was selected as a location to be visited since they 
operate a manual system that had reported in the Survey of Election 
Boards that it takes the county nine hours to complete an unofficial 
election count, 

This extended time frame required to develop unofficial totals within 
Jefferson County results primarily from the manual counting process. 
Transportation of summaries from the precincts to central tallying with- 
in the county does cause some delays, however, tallying at precinct level 
takes up the major portion of the nine hours. 

Jefferson County also has unusual peak voting hours. In most jurisdic- 
tions peak hours are during the early norning and early evening. The 
Jefferson County peak hours are noon (12:00 - 1:30) and early evening. 
The county's economic base is built upon farming, mining and manufactur- 
ing. The unusually high number of noon voters consist primarily of 
agricultural workers. 

r. * rtm . Paper Ballot 

System; v 

Cumberland County Election Board 

User: Courthouse Annex, Franklin St. 

Fayetteville, B.C. 28301 

Mrs. Rebecca Clarfc, Executive Secretary 


483-8131 Ext. 219 


Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 47,571 

Cumberland County was selected as a location to be visited becau se it has 
a relatively large potation considering the count, stil 
votine system. We were particularly interested in examining the tallying 
L sociatea W it, operatic a 1 system in a ^ 


The total population of Cumberland County is 225,000, hoover there are 
only 47,571 re g istered voters within the county. This low voter/pop. 
lation ratio ste,. r - ~ -ation o, F ort ^^ ^ 
A large number of the listed population are military famiUes w 
resis ered to vote elsewhere. The identification of this county a 
having a "la^e" population using a manual system was compromised hy 
the voter/population ratio. 


tax base goes to support the local school system 

Th eir present manual system appears to be operating effectiv ely ^ they 
have experienced no tallying problems severe enoOgh to warrant the 
involved in changing systems. 

System: Manual 

User: Union County 

Market Street 
Jonesboro, Illinois 62950 

Contact: Mr. Fred Blaylock, County Clerk 

Telephone: (6 18 ) 833-5711 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 12,000 

Union County was selected as a location to be visited because it is 
a small county that had reported experiencing problems with illegal 
assistance to voters in the booth and in absentee voting. 

The County Clerk was convicted of taking ballots to absentee voters 
and has paid a $3,000 fine. The County Clerk within Union County is 
an elected position and he claims his difficulties are political and that 
the opposition party is accusing him unjustly. He has been charged with 
other illegal activities including changing votes by erasure. 

Manual (converted to AVM in March 1974 

Kankakee County 
User: Kankakee, Illinois 

Mr. Edward A. Soucie, 
ContaCt: County Clerk 

(815) 939-4401 
Telephone: t - OJ - J ' 

Type of Jurisdiction: County 

Registered Voters: 55,539 

Kan kak ee County was selected as a location to be visited because It 
W as a manual system serving only 55,000 registered 

ported ^ing over 16 hours to produce unofficial tallies in the 


recently the state of Illinois passed legislation rearing all counties 
o er 40,000 population) to utilise voting , -^ ^ ^ C - 

chas ed 160 AVM machines to be used starting with the March 1974 pri 

Tnary. is relatively small and has only 74 precincts and t 
period of time ta.en for manual ballot tabulation is nor, a 

individual precincts develop their own totals. Precinc tot^ are 
sub se q uently placed on punch cards and processed through a -11 
Burroughs card processing computer to produce county totals. 

System: Votronic 

User: Town of sha ron 

90 South Main Street 
Sharon, Massachusetts 02067 

Contact: Mr. Arthur E. Collins 

Town Clerk 

Telephone: ( 617 ) 784-6900 

Type of Jurisdiction: Township 
Registered Voters: 8,000 

Sharon is a small town that was experimenting with the Cubic System 
as an alternative to its manual system. It offered the opportunity to 
assess this system.' s use with a very small user. 

This small suburb of Boston has four precincts all located in one polling 
place. Each of the precincts vote in a different section of a gymnasium. 
When the polls close a Cubic machine is brought in. from a storage closet 
and the ballots for each precinct are processed and tallied individually, 
The four precinct totals are then manually tabulated. The complete vote 
is processed by within 45 minutes of poll closing, 

To provide control over ballots storage the Town Clerk locks the ballots 
in a jail cell, and secures them with a chain and padlock. The Clerk 
keeps the only key for the padlock, unlocking the ballots on election 
morning . 



Authority Title: 

Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


Lt. Governor 

Lt. Governor, Pouch AF, Juneau, Alaska 99801 

(907) 586-5248 

H.A. Boucher, Lt. Governor 

Law does not specify. Currently using 

Compliance with state law only. None 
Lt. Governor 



Authority Title: 
Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs 

Identification of Testing Agency: 

Identification of Machines Being 


Committee on examination of voting machines. 

Sec. of State, 203 Capitol Bldg., Phoenix 
Ariz. 83007 

C602) 271-4286 

Wesley Bolin, Sec. of State 

Lever, Punch Card, Electronic. Currently 
using CES. 

Compliance with state law only. None for 
lever machines. Electronic systems re- 
quire evaluation by a committee. No speci- 

Committee appointed by Sec. of State. Con- 
sists of professor from engineering college, 
member of the state bar and person familiar 
with rating process in the state. Committee 
recommends to Sec. of State who certifies 
the sytem. 



Authority Title 
Address : 

Phone : 

Hame of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 
Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency: 

Identification of Machines Being 


State Board of Election Commissioners 

Sec. of State, Rm. 256, State Capitol, 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 

(501) 374-1628 

Kelly Bryant, Sec. of State 


Compliance with state law only. 

State Board of Election Commissioners 


Authority Title: 


Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


State Commission on Voting Machine and Vote 

Tabulating Devices 

Sec. of State, 111 Capitol Mall, Sacramento, 

California 95814 

(916) 445-0820 

Edmund Brown, Jr., Sec. of State 
Lever, punch card, electronic, Currently 
using AVM, Gyrex, Cubic, Datavote, Datamedia, 
and CES 

Compliance with state law only. 
The commission is composed of: The Gover- 
nor, Sec. of State, Atty. General. They 
are assisted by Chainum of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Elections and Chair- 
of the Assembly Standing Committee on 

abide by the Commission 



Authority Title: 


Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 

Identification of Testing Agency; 

Identification of Machines 

Sec. of State 

30 Trinity St., Hartford, Connecticut 06115 

(203) 566-4346 

Gloria Schaffer, Sec. of State 
Law does not specify. Use AVM 
Compliance with state law. None 

Local election official and machine mainten- 
ance personnel are informally asked for 



Authority Title: 
Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 
Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


Sec. of State 

Sec. of State, State Capitol, Tallahassee, 

Florida 32304 

(904) 488-7690 

Mrs. Dorothy Gllsson, Sec. of State 

AVM, IES, R.F. Shoup, GES, Datavote 

Compliance with state law only. None. 
Sec. of State may employ not more than three 
individuals who are professional experts 
who will provide a written report. Within 
thirty days the Sec, of State must approve 
or disapprove the system and file a report 
on the system. This entire process must _ 
be completed within 180 days after the initial 
submission of the application for examination 
and approval. 

Fidlar and Chambers, Gyrex, Video Vote 


Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 


Board of Examiners 

Sec. of State, 214 State Capitol, Atlanta 
Georgia 30334 
(404) 656-2881 

Ben Fortson, Jr., Sec. of State 
Lever, Punch Card, Electronic. Currently 
using AVM, IES, Datavote, Datamedia, CES. 
Compliance with state law only. None 

A patent lawyer and two ^^l*^*^ 
are selected and employed by the Sec. of State. 
Upon receipt of their reports, the Sec. of 
State certifies or rejects the proposed machine 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 
Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 
Considered : 


Lt. Governor 

State Capitol, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 

(808) 548-2544 

George Ariyoshi, Lt . Governor 
Datavote is used statewide. 
Compliance with state law only. None 

Lt. Governor may employ technicians he 
finds necessary to assist in his evalu- 


Address : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved; 
Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


State Voting Machine Committee 

Peter T. Cenarrusa, Sec. of State 
Law permits use of CES and AVM 
Compliance with state law only. None 

Governor, Sec. of State, and the Attorney 
General constitute the State Voting Machine 
Committee. . 



Authority Title: 
Address : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 
Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 
Considered : 


State Board of Elections 

Sec. of State, State House, Springfield, 
Illinois 62756 

Michael Hewlett, Sec. of State 
Using AVM, CES, Datamedia, VIP 
Compliance with state lav? only. 

The State Elections Board may appoint two 
mechanical experts to examine the machine 
and then approve or disapprove the pro- 
posed machine. 



Authority Title: 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 


State Election Board 

Sec. of State, State Office Bldg., 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 

Larry A. Conrad, Sec. of State 

AVM is used although lever, punch card 
and electronic are allowed. 

Compliance with state law only. None 

The Board is composed of the Governor 
and two electors, one from each of the 
two major parties. The Board examines . 
and approves or disapproves the proposed 
machine . 


Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 
Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


State Voting Commission 

Sec. of State, State House, Des Moines 
Iowa 50319 

(515) 281-5864 

Melvin Synhorst, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever machines. AVM is used. 

Compliance with state law only. 

The Governor appoints three commissioners 
who examine machine and report to the Sec, 
of State who then certifies. 



Authority Title: 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


Sec. of State 

Sec. of State, Capitol Bldg., Topeka, 
Kansas 66612 

Elwill Shanahan, Sec. of State 

Law allows lever machines. Using AVM, 
Seiscor lever model. 

Compliance with state law only. None 

Sec. of State may employ competent per- 
sons to assist in the examination and 
then certify machine. 



Authority Title: 

Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


Sec. of State 

Sec. of State, State House, Augusta, 
Maine 04330 

(207) 289-3501 

Joseph T. Edgar, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 
tronic. Using IES, Seiscor, and CES. 

Compliance with state law only. 

The Sec. of State, the Attorney General 
and a member of the Governor's council 
make a decision on the proposed machine, 
and the Sec. of State then certifies. 



Authority Title: 


Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency: 

Identification of Machines Being 
Considered : 


State Board of Voting Machine Examiners 
(Ballot Law Commission) 

Sec. of State, State House, Boston, 
Massachusetts 02133 

(617) 727-2830 

John F. X. Davoren, Sec. of State 

Law does not specify. Currently using 
Cubic, AVM, IES, CES. 

Compliance with state law only. 

The Board examines and approves proposed 

machines . 



Authority Title: 
Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency; 

Identification of Machines Being 


Board of Election Canvassers 

Sec. of State, State Treasury Bide 
Lansing, Michigan 48918 ' 

(517) 373-2540 

Richard Austin, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 
tronic. Currently using AVM, IES, Data- 
media, Coyle, and CES. 

Compliance with state law only. 

Sec. of State certifies lever machines 
and the Board certifies electronic sys- 
tems . J 



Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency; 

Identification of Machines Being 


Voting Machine Commission 

Sec. of State, 180 State Office Bide. 
St. Paul, Minnesota 55150 

(612) 296-2805 

Arlen Erdahl, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 
tronic. Currently using AVM and CES. 

Compliance with state law only. 

Commission examines and the Sec. of State 
certifies the proposed machine. The 
Commission is composed of the Attorney 
General and two responsible persons who 
shall be master mechanics or graduates of 
a school of mechanical engineering. 



Authority Title: 
Address : 


Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency: 

Identification of Machines Being 

Sec. of State 

Sec. of State, Capitol Bldg., Jefferson 
City, Missouri 65102 

(314) 751-2379 

James C. Kirkpatrick, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 
tronic. Currently using AVM. 

Compliance with state law only. 

Sec. of State approves use of voting 
machines . 



Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency: 


Board of Election Devices 

Sec. of State, State Capitol, Helena, 
Montana 59601 

(405) 449-2034 

Frank Murray, Sec, of State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 

Compliance with state law only. 

Board consists of Sec. of State, State 
Auditor and the President of County Clerk 
and Recorder's Association. The Sec. of 
State may employ qualified mechanics who 
are electors of the state to assist in th 
examination. The Sec. of State certifies 
upon recommendations of the Board. 


Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 
Identification, of Testing Specs: 


Sec. of State 

' Ca " 
(702) 882-7438 

William D. Swackhamer, Sec. of State 
Law permits lever machines. 
Compliance with state law only. 

Identification of Testing Agency: Sec. of State must certify 

Identification of Machines Being 
Considered: None 


Authority Title: 

feme of Official and Title: 
lachines Presently Approved: 

[identification of Testing Specs: 
Mentification of Testing Agency; 

identification of Machines Being 

New Hampshire 

State Ballot Law Commission 

Sec. State, State House, Concord, 
New Hampshire 03301 

Robert L. Stark, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever machines. Currently 
using IBS. 

Compliance with state law only. 

Commission acts as Board of Voting Machine 
Examiners to approve machine for use. 



Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Warae of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency; 

New Jersey 
Sec. of State 

Sec. of State, State House, Trenton, 
New Jersey 08625 

(609) 292-3760 

Robert M. Falcey, Sec. q.f State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 
tronic. Currently using AVM and Data- 

Compliance with state law only. 

Sec. of State must appoint three exam- 
iners, one an expert in patent law and 
two -mechanical experts to conduct the 
examination. Upon receipt of their re- 
port, the Sec. of State may certify or 
reject the proposed machine. 


New Mexico 

State Voting Machine Committee 

Sec. of State, State Capitol, Santa Fe, 
New Mexico 87501 

(505) 827-2717 

Mrs. Betty Fiorina, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever machines. Currently 
using AVM 

Compliance with state law only. 

Committee consists of Sec. of State and 
four members appointed by the Governor. 
They must have the machine examined by 
two mechanical experts. The Committee 
certifies the proposed machine. 


Authority Title: 


Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of testing Specs- 
Identification of Testing Agency; 


New York 
Sec. of State 

Sec. of state, 162 Washington AVP 
Albany, New York 12225 ' 

(518) 474-6220 

John P.. Lomenzo, Sec. of State 

Law does not soer-ifi/ r 

AVM specify. Currently using 

Compliance with state law only 



Authority Title: 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing S p ecs . 
Identification of Testing Agency 

North Carolina 

State Board of Elections 

Box 1166, Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 

(919) 829-7173 

Alex Brock, Director of Elections 
Law does not specify. Currently using 

Compliance with state law only. 


Authority Title: 
Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 
Considered : 


Board of Voting Machine Examiners 

Sec. of State, State House, Coll 
Ohio 432J f; 

(614) 468-2530 

Ted W. Brown, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever machines. Curre 
using Cubic and AVM 

Compliance with state law only. 

Sec. of State appoints an election 
and two mechanical engineers as tht 
The Sec. of State must approve or c 
approve, based on their recommendat 



Authority Title: 
Address : 

Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 


State Election Board 

Rm. 519, State Capitol, Oklahoma Ci 
Oklahoma 73102 

(405) 521-2391 

Lee Slater, Sec. of State 

Law does not specify. Currently us- 


Compliance with state law only. 

The Board must examine and certify p 
posed machine. 



hority Title: 


2 of Official and Title: 
lines Presently Approved: 

tification of Testing Specs: 
tification of Testing Agency; 

:ification of Machines Being 



Sec. of State. 

Sec. of State, IK-pl;. (: State, Sflle 
Oregon 97301 ' ^'Uei 

(503) 378-3131 
Clay Myers, Sec. of State 

Law permits punch r.-ml or electronJc 
Currently using Snlscor punch card " ' 
Gyrex, Datamedia, CKS, Dat.-ivotu ' ' 
Compliance with fital:n 'law only. 

Sec. of State may employ not more than 

three individuals oxpcri- In O no n 

of the fields of data pro ( BB lft 

cal engineering ,,n<l puh.l :!,, n , ,Ur r 

The Sec. of State, .u-.i-tlfto, "tor 1 "' 

from these expc-rt.s. Ia P rl1 


city Title: 

f Official and Title: 
es Presently Approved: 

fication of Testing Specs: 
^cation of Testing Agency, 

ication of Machines Being 


Sec. of the Comnuniwca I Hi 

(717) 787-76:10 

C. Delores Tucker, (! ,. of tho Commonwealth 

Law permits lever machine,,. Currently 
"sing AVM. '-"'J-i.c.nL.i.y 

Compliance with state lav only. 

C <<a<:h appoints one 


^c^ 1.1 '... j.uu & 
ies tho propound machine. 



Authority Title: 

Address : 


Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency; 

South Carolina 

State Elections Commission 

Box 5987, Columbia, South Carolina 

(803) 758-2571 

James Ellisor, Executive Direc 
Law permits lever, punch card an 
tronic. Currently using 

The Sec. of State omp anof ^ 

Adjutant General, and ona tions O f 

Committee on Privileges ana constituCe 

the House ^^"^^iBatioti and 
the Board. Upon their exa ^^ 

Identification of Machines Being 

the House 
the Board. Upon 
approval, the Director 
Elections Commission c 
posed machine. 


thfl pro 


Authority Title: 
Address : 
Phone : 

Name of Official and Title: 
Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency: 


Sec. of State 

(512) 475-2015 

Mark White, Sec. of State^^^ 

Identification of Machines Being 


Compliance with sta.te law o 

ThP Sec. of State must appo 

ihe oeu. vj. O vnprt in v - 1 j-r 

examiners, ne / n . e ^" ts- "P 011 recel ? 
and two mechanical expert gtate cert . 
of their reports, the Sec 
if 188 the proposed machine. 



Authority Title: 


Name of Official and Title: 

Machines Presently Approved: 

Identification of Testing Specs: 
Identification of Testing Agency 

Identification of Machines Being 

West Virginia 

State Election Commissioner 

Rm. 157W, Capitol Bldg. Charleston, 
West Virginia 25301 

(304) 348-2112 

Edgar Heiskell, Sec. of State 

Law permits lever, punch card and elec- 
tronic. Currently using AVM. 

Compliance with state law only. 

The Commissioner must appoint two experts 
not of the same party to examine the machines 
Upon receipt of their report the Commissioner 
certifies the proposed machine.